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Due to the abundance of referral to the extensive work of Frank Ankersmit and my general 
reliance on his published books and selected papers as sources, I ask the reader to use the 
following list of abbreviations of some of the most featured works: 
NL – Ankersmit, F. R. 1983: Narrative Logic – a Semantic Analysis of the Historian’s Language. 
Martinus Nijhoff publishers, The Hague, Netherlands. 
HT – Ankersmit, F. R. 1994. History and Tropology: The Rise and Fall of Metaphor. University 
of California Press. London, England. 
HR – Ankersmit, F. R. 2001: Historical Representation. Stanford University Press, California, 
USA. 
PR – Ankersmit, F. R. 2002: Political Representation. Stanford University Press, California, USA. 
SHE – Ankersmit, F. R. 2005: Sublime Historical Experience. Stanford University Press, 
California, USA. 
MTR – Ankersmit F. R. 2012: Meaning, Truth and Reference in Historical Representation. 
Stanford University Press, California, USA. 
HSI – Ankersmit, F. R. 2013: History as the Science of the Individual. Journal of the Philosophy 
of History Vol. 7 (3), 396 – 425. 
WEM – Ankersmit, F. R. 2017: Where the extremes meet. A presently still an unpublished 
paper, given as the handout for Frank Ankersmit’s opening speech at the Seminar of 
philosophy of history in October 2017 in Oulu university. 
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Introduction 
 
Understanding Ankersmit: The Aims of my Thesis  
 
Well, my presentation was not a success, to put it mildly. The incomprehension was near to total. 
Nobody had the foggiest idea of what I was talking about. I might have come from the moon or the 
Andromeda nebula. As was to be expected, the main obstacle to a meaningful discussion was my claim 
that historical representations are not determined by anything outside themselves – a claim which is, 
of course, in agreement with Leibniz’s theory of the substance.1 
I find the anecdote above intriguing in two ways. Firstly, it immediately reveals the divergent 
character of Ankersmit’s philosophy of history. At first encounter, one cannot help but 
wonder what he might mean by claiming that (historical) representations are not defined by 
anything outside themselves? Secondly, another source of puzzlement will be most likely be 
Leibniz’s appearance. What does Leibniz’s substance theory have to do with historical 
representation, or philosophy of history in general? As Marek Tamm and Eugen Zeleňák have 
recently put it, Ankersmit is arguably the greatest living philosopher of historian of today. Yet, 
the reverence he enjoys is accompanied by controversy.2 The aim of this paper is to help 
resolve some of that controversy by exploring and explaining the Leibniz’s ideas as they 
appear in Ankersmit’s philosophy. Ankersmit sees in philosophy of history three distinctive 
categories, also identified roughly in the same way earlier by Tamm and Zeleňák.  
1. By Historical research Ankersmit refers to the work historians do in analysing evidence 
of the past. This happens in a variety of methods ranging from interviews to discourse 
analysis of texts. These methods of analysis provide us with reliable facts about past 
events and will necessarily form a significant part of the historian’s work. Here theory 
and more generally, epistemology, is useful. Any logical approach to language may be 
applied here, as long as it helps establish facts3. 
2. With Historical representation he refers to the process of history-writing. Such a 
process is not a simple putting together of these fact in an attempt to describe the 
past. Rather, it should be though of in the narrativist way as a synthetic process of 
putting together a representation. In this process, unlike in that of historical research, 
                                                     
1 Leibnizian Philosophy of History: A Conversation. Ankersmit & Tamm, p. 499. 
2 Tamm & Zeleňák, 326. 
3 Let us not problematise the term “historical fact” here, as Ankersmit has never done so. If we question simple 
statements such as “Caesar crossed the Rubicon”, historiography will become a no-go.   
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epistemology is useless, and aesthetic criteria are applied. Historical representation 
necessarily takes place in the framework of a representationalist logic, in which one 
treats a whole text as the basic semantic unit.4 
3. Finally, there is historical experience, which Tamm and Zeleňák identify as Ankersmit’s 
“ontology” of history. Best expressed in Sublime Historical Experience, historical 
experience is a proposal for how historian’s actually come into contact with a past that 
does not exist anymore. 
For those unfamiliar with Ankersmit’s work. A large section in this introduction will be 
dedicated for explaining the basics of many of Ankersmit’s central philosophical concepts. 
Additionally, in the chapters themselves, further elaboration will be provided where 
necessary, though therein my focus will be in fleshing out the what is Leibnizian about these 
very concepts. With Leibnizianism I refer in the context of this paper to Ankersmit as someone 
who analogically applies aspects of Leibniz’s philosophy. These aspects are parallel to the tri-
partite division that was just made about Ankersmit’s own work.  
As we will see, G. W. Leibniz was a precursor on many areas of scholarship. For the purposes 
of this paper, his metaphysics in its two primary forms, his ideas about mathematical function 
and calculus, and his projects for the development of a universal language are at centre stage. 
In approaching Leibniz’s theory of substance, I follow scholars such as Daniel Garber and 
Glenn Hartz, who have claimed that Leibniz meant to propose two theories of substance 
simultaneously in the Monadology and the theory of corporeal substances5. I will argue that 
both are, in a sense, included in Ankersmit’s philosophy. The theory of corporeal substances 
in historical research, which is recognised but virtually left untouched by Ankersmit. The 
Monadology can also be found both his theories of historical experience, where it is mostly 
implicit, and historical representation, where the analogy between historical representation 
and the monad is explicitly drawn. I will also propose that Leibniz’s ideas about mathematics 
– the notion of function and infinitesimal calculus – are present in Ankersmit. Function due to 
Ankersmit’s interpretation of the Monadology that the monad may be thought of as a such. 
                                                     
4 The distinction between historical research and history-writing is made in all of Ankersmit’s book that touch 
upon the notion of historical representation. See e.g. NL, 8; HR, 52 – 54; MTR, 60. 
5 Garber, Daniel 2009: Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad.  Oxford University Press. UK. Hartz, Glen 1998: Why 
corporeal substances keep popping up in Leibniz's later philosophy. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 
6 (2) 193 – 207. 
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And the calculus because it is useful in explaining how historical writing commences, through 
what Ankersmit called his “scope criterion” in Narrative Logic and because it is useful in 
explaining, among other means, what historical reality is for him in philosophy of history. 
Calculus is parallel to the aesthetic criteria that guide a historian in picking the right order and 
amount of statements in a narrative. Leibniz’s project on universal language is a more 
troublesome affair. It on the other hand is constructed on the same principles that help define 
the Monadology and is based on the notion of complete concepts that may be analysed into 
primitive ones. While Ankersmit’s historical representations are analogous to complete 
concepts, they are never broken apart in analysis. This is allowed in epistemology but not in 
representation. Therefore, the characteristica universalis may be seen as contributing to the 
theory of representation, while mostly falling into the domain of historical research. Both 
substance and function are given whole chapters in order to fully explain their application in 
Ankersmit’s philosophy, while Leibniz’s intensional logic will be explained at the end of 
chapter I.  
This thesis will then evolve around these complex subjects and their interrelatedness with the 
aim of answering the wholesome and most troublesome question: What exactly is Frank 
Ankersmit’s Leibnizian vision and what is the extent of this vision? This question is worth 
answering because of the general bewilderment associated with Ankersmit’s philosophy and 
referred to already by Ankersmit himself in the citation I began with. My point of departure 
is to take Ankersmit’s word on both his Leibnizianism and the confessed aims of his 
philosophy. His mission has always been to explain what history is and thereafter provide for 
philosophers of history an apriorist system within which rational debate may commence 
regardless of the paradigms of the debaters6. His philosophy draws from various sources, of 
which historicism and Leibniz are the most important ones7. I will only define historicism more 
articulately later on but hasten to note that Leibniz has been an influence on historicist 
thought much before Ankersmit entered the picture8. Therefore, I have incorporated into this 
paper many interpretations of historicist philosophers, of which Ernst Cassirer is foremost. 
                                                     
6 WEM, 4 – 5.  
7 On Ankersmit’s commitment to historicism: Ankersmit 2003: Invitation to Historians, 3; Ankersmit 2010: The 
Necessity of Historicism, 23. 
8 See for example den Hollander, Jaap 2010: Beyond Historicism: From Leibniz to Luhmann. Journal of the 
Philosophy of History 4 210 – 225. 
6 
 
.  
While I may have over-pronounced his importance to Ankersmit, I find his philosophy of 
symbolic forms and interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics invaluable for my own analysis of 
Ankersmit’s Leibnizianism. Cassirer’s Essay on Man and his 1910 book, Substance and 
Function, are commonly referred in this paper.  
Now, as I mentioned, Ankersmit wants to explain what history is and through this help 
genuine debate in philosophy of history take place. His problem with contemporary 
philosophy of history is that it, as he sees it, almost exclusively takes interest in 
epistemological questions concerning the problems of how we can describe the past and find 
out the truth about the past. A project that is insufficient in accounting for how the past 
becomes meaningful for us through the writing of history9. More recently he has 
reformulated the problem by stating that philosophers prevent themselves from making a 
clear distinction between historical research and historical writing10. This problem is seen by 
him to follow from the Quine-Duhem thesis of theory-ladenness, which results in an anti-
foundationalist philosophy of science, though not necessarily of history11. In a footnote in 
MTR, he writes: “I am convinced that the belief in the perfect continuity between historical 
research and historical writing is a myth inspired by the thesis of the theory-ladenness of 
empirical fact”12. If philosophy of history is to be taken seriously as an independent discipline, 
it must accept representation as its point of departure and deny such continuity. 
With this, Ankersmit is also defying the criticisms he has received, which position his ideas 
within postmodernism by seeing in him someone, who denies that history is about truth13. 
Whether there is weight in these accusations, depends on one’s definition of postmodernism, 
a theme we will visit in chapter III of this paper. Ankersmit’s account is that those making this 
accusation are then falling victims to the illusion of what he has called “narrative realism” or 
either themselves denying the connection history has with the past14. The question is seen in 
a new light via Leibniz. In SHE, Ankersmit re-stated his views on the status of philosophy of 
                                                     
9 NL, 13 – 14; HT, 3 – 4. 
10 MTR, 60 – 61. 
11 WEM, 4 – 5. Quine-Duhem thesis. 
12 MTR, 60f. 
13 There are numerous such critiques, many of which will be referred to in this paper. See e.g. Stanford 1998; 
Zagorin 1990; Zammito 1998, 2005.  
14 I will explain the distinction between Ankersmit’s notions of “narrative realism” and “narrative idealism” 
shortly. 
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history in yet another way. In reflection of his philosophy of historical experience, he sees 
contemporary historical theory as: 
---an almost endless series of transcendentalist monstrosities, each of them even more difficult to grasp 
and more ambitious than its competitors, and that these monstrosities did, in fact, little more than to 
perversely draw attention to themselves instead of opening our eyes to the sublime mysteries of the 
past15. 
The problem here is, for him, that it is precisely theory that insulates the historian from the 
past. 
A confusing thing about Ankersmit is that it is sometimes unclear whether he is referring to 
history or philosophy of history in his work. Generally, and somewhat surprisingly, he states 
that he had very little to say to historians. In NL, he argues that all his work, as a description 
of the historian’s work in regard to history-writing, can do for the historian is state the goal of 
historiography but never any instruction in how to achieve this16. In a 2005 interview he said 
that “I have no pretension to change the historical discipline. If I have any revolutionary 
pretensions (in spite of my rather conservative turn of mind), then these are for philosophy 
only”17. Where you’d expect a definition, the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy gives you 
several and afterwards states the following about philosophy of history: 
---it is impossible to give one definition of the field that suits all these approaches. In fact, it is misleading 
to imagine that we refer to a single philosophical tradition when we invoke the phrase, “philosophy of 
history,” because the strands of research characterized here rarely engage in dialogue with each 
other.18 
This is a state Ankersmit claims to be attempting to remedy. He argues that philosophy of 
history currently has no way of determining which theory is best. All historical theorist are 
doing in his mind, is present their views and argue against those of others with no “urgency” 
in attempting to genuinely reflect the work of others and renew one’s own.  He insists on 
genuine debate, referring to representations of scholars’ ideas. Not arguments occurring in 
conferences, where he thinks little progress is made.19  
With the logic of historical representation his aim is to provide an apriorist foundation for 
debate so that philosophers can break through their subdisciplinary boundaries and here is 
                                                     
15 SHE, 105. 
16 NL, 205. 
17 Moskalewizc, 256. 
18 Little, Philosophy of History. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. 
19 Invitation to Historians, 433. 
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where Leibniz’s metaphysics provides a model20. Many secondary aims are also explicitly 
stated in his work. Historical experience is an account of the subjective and the sublime and 
how the past becomes present for us through experience. Also, for example, on his list is 
defence of political representation against theory-laden forms of policy-making21. In 
retrospect to this Leibnizian analysis of Ankersmit’s work, we will be able to evaluate the 
success of some of these projects in the conclusions section. 
Ankersmit has little to say to historians themselves, because he states that history as a 
discipline has an uncanny resistance to historical theory22. Where he does approach historians 
is when it comes down to historical experience. He laments that modern historians shy away 
from their personal experience about history:  
I would not know of any contemporary historian who still has the pretension to provide us with such a 
map for our collective future; the attempt to do so would be considered a ridiculous overestimation of 
the historian’s cultural assignment and, even worse, as an abnegation of the historian’s duties towards 
the cause of objectivity and of scientific truth.23 
Only historical experience can provide the past with meaning. Historical Representation, 
Ankersmit’s 2001 book, begins essentially with the same message. He writes of a “golden age” 
of historical thought, when historians boldly projected meanings to the past, stimulating 
public about the human condition. While he speaks of history, he refers to “Braudels, 
Foucaults, Arieses, Fogels, Ginzburgs or Hayden Whites”.24 His wish is that history as a 
discipline adopt bold thesis as it’s primary guideline and in this I believe his agenda is similar 
to that put forth by in the quite recent The History Manifesto by Jo Guldi and David Armitage, 
who call out for la longue duree history25. So like Leibniz, Ankersmit has put to together a 
philosophy that is deceptively simple and yet incredibly ambitious. He commit’s to Leibniz’s 
work because he wants to do what Leibniz wanted to do. Provide a framework within which 
it is possible to It is unfortunate that I am unable to provide that this framework, though most 
readers of this work probably have some idea about it. The explanation, however, must wait 
until the conclusions.  
                                                     
20 WEM, 1. 
21 Ankersmit 2002: Political Representation. 
22 Moskalewicz, 256.  
23 Invitation to Historians, 417. 
24 HR, 2 – 4.  
25 Guldi, Jo & Armitage, David 2014: The History Manifesto. 
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Recently some interest has been directed towards Leibniz’s appearance in Ankersmit’s ideas 
by scholars in philosophy of history. Most notably, Daniel Fairbrother has written papers 
already addressing Ankersmit’s Leibnizianism, two of them directly reflecting his views and 
their Leibnizian inspirations26. He has defended Ankersmit’s representational logic against 
Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen’s attack on it by identifying its reliance on Leibniz’s metaphysics27. 
Relying of Daniel Garber’s interpretation of the development of Leibniz’s substance theory to 
make an interpretation that Ankermsit applies only a small part of Leibniz’s philosophy in the 
Monadology and limited use of Leibniz’s so-called predicate -in-notion -principle. He has also 
questioned the applicability of Ankersmit’s work for historians.28 This papers aim is to show 
that this accusation misses its target and that Leibniz indeed is present in Ankersmit’s writings 
in various ways. 
Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen recently also wrote a text on Ankersmit’s rationality, in which Leibniz 
is taken into account concerning the pragmatic aspects of Ankersmit’s theory, or how Leibniz 
becomes a part of Ankersmit’s rationalism, which usually is defined in the terms of 
aesthetics29. Kuukkanen makes what I believe to be a correct interpretation of Ankersmit’s 
notion of how represententational logic is applied by application of the Leibnizian notion of 
calculus. While significant part of this work, I do not believe I can add much there, other than 
establish better the connection calculus has with Leibniz’s metaphysics. The problem in 
general is that while Ankersmit has been praised, criticised and reviewed from the point of 
view of numerous scholarly paradigms from analytic philosophy of language to gender 
studies, I do not think anyone has considered him at face value as a thoroughly “Leibnizian” 
philosopher. In the conversation with Tamm, he states: “The funny thing is that though my 
theory of history is Leibnizian through and through, no one ever paid any attention to this 
aspect of it”30. As said, this characterises my approach and hopefully this paper will provide 
people with an extended and accessible understanding of Ankersmit’s philosophy. 
                                                     
26 Fairbrother 2017, 2018a, 2018b. 
27 Fairbrother 2017. 
28 Fairbrother 2018a, 17 – 18.  He writes: “If Ankersmit wishes to maintain a robust connection with Leibniz’ 
broader philosophy, rather than just borrowing the formal apparatus of the Complete Individual Concept---” 
29 Kuukkanen, 2018. 
30 Leibnizian Philosophy of History: A Conversation. Ankersmit & Tamm, p. 499. 
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I answer my research-question by analysing Ankersmit’s philosophy through the concepts I 
have provided in the title: 1) Intension. With this term I refer to the knowledge contained in 
a concept that is equal to the combination of all the more primitive concepts contained 
within31. For Leibniz, propositions are identities and they are true if the predicate is contained 
in the subject. As a nominalist, Leibniz did not accept universals, but reality was composed for 
him of individual things that are defined in thought only in complete concepts fully 
corresponding to them32. Raili Kauppi called Leibniz’s logic an intensional one because of 
these notions. Concepts are expressions of things in it and all one needs to do  … stands for 
Ankersmit’s commitment to the idea that whole texts in history must be treated as complete 
concepts in the Leibnizian sense. This means that whole texts are treated as individuals, that 
can only be referred to, by addressing every one of the statements contained in the text. 
2) Substance, the largest and arguably most counterintuitive aspect here, stands for 
Ankersmit’s theory of representation, which is inspired by Leibniz’s idealistic metaphysics. 
Ankersmit applies the perceptive nature of the Leibnizian monad to argue for historical texts 
as “points-of-view” to the past. These points of view are experienced. Just as some monads 
are conscious, so is the historian’s experience of what the past is like. The text is a substitute 
of this vision of the past. Ernst Cassirer noted, that the notion of mathematical function 
became an integral part of Leibniz’s theory of substance33. Ankersmit seems to follow this 
interpretation of the monadology in his theory of historical experience.  
3) Calculus represents the sublime process the historian goes through in his search for the 
best of possible historical account. Historians seek maximal explanatory power combined 
with a compact text which is supported by ample facts. This abstract idea carries over from 
the analogy he draws between Leibniz’s notion of God and the historian, both of whom seek 
the best in creation. The calculus also explains historical reality, which for Ankersmit is not 
the external reality of previous times per se, but rather the reality we create in our 
representations of the past, which are ideally preserved for all time. Historical reality is the 
                                                     
31 Ariew & Garber, 24. See also Adams, 78 – 79. In Adams’ book, the term “conceptual containment theory” is 
used to describe Leibniz’s account for what truth is. 
32 Mates, chapter x. 
33 See, for example, den Hollander, 212. Cassirer for one saw in Leibniz’s substance the equivalent of 
mathematical function. 
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context of historical debate, and it is in debate we decide what representation is best, and 
define the meaning of parts of the past.  
In chapter I I introduce Leibniz’s metaphysics and his ideas about language and argue that 
both are found in Ankersmit’s work. My interpretation of Leibniz will follow somewhat from 
my own reading of his texts but mostly from those put forth in recent Leibniz-scholarship. 
Another theme is the identification of Ankersmit as a historicist and the suggestion that since 
Leibniz was an inspiration to many historicist thinkers, Ankersmit follows an older creed that 
he has attempted to reform with his work. This reforming leads to Leibniz’s idealistic 
metaphysics in its representationalism becoming the new model for what history-writing is 
about. The end of chapter 1 will deal with the intensionality of historical 
language/representation in Ankersmit’s work and examine it from a Leibnizian perspective. 
When historical texts are thought of as complete concepts in the Leibnizian sense, why is it 
necessary to insist on the existence of a semantic gap between statements in the text and the 
whole text? An answer will be provided by illuminating how texts and statements follow 
different logics similarly to how Leibniz’s substance theory has two seemingly contradictory, 
but ultimately reconcilable incarnations. One featuring a subject and object, another 
disposing of them, at least arguably. 
The distinction between these theories is fully made only in chapter II, where the far-reaching 
Leibnizian vision of Frank Ankersmit is revealed to be not only about intensional meaning, but 
also about experience, as Ankersmit interprets this notion to appear in Leibniz’s idealistic 
substance-theory. Chapter II therefore contains my explanation for how Leibniz’s idea of 
substance is applied by Ankersmit to account for the conscious experiences of historians that 
write these texts and how these experiences are represented in historical texts as unities. 
Ankersmit draws an analogy between Leibniz’s monad and that which is represented in 
historical texts – both are points of view to reality. Epistemology is of no use here, Ankersmit 
says, because such a represented is not constructed logically, but is experienced. I.e. it is not 
part of the phenomenal and objective, but the noumenal and subjective. The latter part of 
the chapter moves on to how Leibniz can help Ankersmit in explaining the ramifications of his 
proposed representationalist logic.  
It’s appliance, or perhaps, lack of it, will be explained in chapter III, where explain the two 
applications of calculus in Ankersmit’s theory and also explain how the notions of aesthetics 
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and metaphor relate to this. Finally, I will take a look at some of Ankersmit’s critics and see 
how Leibniz helps him provide arguments against them. 
About Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz crafted his philosophy from many influences. Formally he was 
educated as a scholastic, but he refused academic positions to not get anchored down for he 
wished to be able expand his knowledge and influence the scholarly world, which was moving 
beyond the reach of scholasticism34. As a child, Leibniz was a nuisance to many of his teachers, 
for he had also begun his own education at his father’s library and, understanding Latin at a 
young age read classic works, and often challenged the people that were supposed to be his 
intellectual superiors35. His approach to scholastic teachings was unorthodox and he criticised 
contemporary interpretations of classic philosophy such as Aristotle’s works. Nevertheless, 
he retained many aspects of scholasticism in his philosophy and perhaps most importantly 
emphasized Aristotelian individuality in his approach to substance theory36. But scholasticism 
was not enough. In the 17th century, Paris and to an extent the royal academy in Britain were 
the leading scholarly centres of Europe wherein discoveries in mathematics and natural 
sciences were being made and philosophy – not quite distinguishable from science at this 
time – was accommodating quickly to this unprecedented progress. A new kind of 
mathematical vision of the universe was emerging and this was evident in the rising popularity 
of geometrical demonstration in philosophy37. Something Leibniz took very seriously. Leibniz 
had to adapt to the “moderns”, and he did so by compromising between scholasticism and 
the mechanistic philosophy put forth by Cartesians and the likes of Thomas Hobbes. 
                                                     
34 Antognazza, 66. When offered a professorship in Altdorf university, Leibniz declined due to “ardent desire to 
earn more glory in the sciences”. As Nicholas Jolley recounts in the introduction he wrote to the Cambridge 
companion to Leibniz, at this time the function of scholastically oriented universities was to uphold current 
doctrines rather than to advance new ones. Scholasticism in this paper  
35 Antognazza, 30 – 32.  
36 Generally, for scholastic philosophers as for Aristotle, an individual object (e.g. a person) is a primary 
substance because he/she cannot be predicated further onto anything else. Secondary substances or concepts 
can predicated to primary substances. For a neat general presentation on Aristotelian substance see Robinson 
2018, section 2.2. 
37 Spinoza’s Ethics is a good example of this sort of metaphysics centred on demonstration by setting rigid 
axioms and definitions and explaining everything from them. Cartesian did this too and Leibniz expressed that 
this was the proper way, though he felt that usually it only served to alienate readers. See Jolley, Metaphysics 
in The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy. 
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Though educated as a scholastic and being influenced by mechanistic philosophy, categorising 
Leibniz into philosophical traditions is difficult. The oeuvre of this prolific writer is both 
immensely wide and uncannily fragmentary and aside from his Théodicée, his logical proof for 
the existence and goodness of God, he never left behind a grand work that could be referred 
to as his official view38. Leibniz’s metaphysics is at the heart of this work and that of 
Ankersmit’s. Therefore, it is unfortunate that there exists no consensus on Leibniz’s final 
views about his ontological meditations. In his metaphysics Leibniz is often described an 
idealist. A notion based on the strikingly coherent solution, which Leibniz offered in his 
unpublished paper called the Monadology, to the problem of what there fundamentally is in 
reality39. Competing views present him as a theory pluralist, someone not willing to fully 
commit to any one theory concerning metaphysics40. Some have even claimed he was always 
committed to a theory of substance not defined in the idealistic terms of the Monadology41.  
The Monadology is of prime importance in this paper, due to it being a central inspiration for 
Frank Ankersmit’s philosophy of history. It was written by Leibniz at the request of a Parisian 
courtier and scholar Nicolas Rémond and Prince Eugene of Savoy, both wishing to understand 
Leibniz’s latest views on metaphysics better. Leibniz answered these requests with two texts 
written roughly simultaneously: The Principles of Nature and Grace and The Principles of 
Philosophy (the Monadology). The first one is a condensation of his philosophical views and 
it is generally agreed to be the more easily comprehensible of the two texts. In it, substance 
is presented as both simple and aggregated, whereas in the Monadology, the only true 
substances are simple ones42. Leibniz suppressed the Monadology, however, and sent the 
Principles of Nature and Grace to his intended audiences and this text was subsequently also 
published four years later unlike the Monadology which had to wait until 1840. Maria 
Antognazza suggests as the most probable explanations for this is that Leibniz felt the public 
                                                     
38 Mates, 6 – 7. Unpublished writings as the basis of inquiry require an extra layer of interpretational care. In 
Garber 2009, the author convincingly presents Leibniz as a philosophical explorer, who often experimented 
with ideas in his letters and essays, out of which only a fraction was ever published. John Whipple has 
researched the esotericism and exotericism of Leibniz’s writings, presenting him as someone, who never failed 
to contemplate matters of chosen terminology and style for his texts and their intended readers.  
39 Adams, 1994, Rutherford 1995, Wilson 1989. 
40 See Hartz, 1998. Garber, 2009. 
41 Daniel Garber describes Pauline Phemister’s 2005 book Leibniz and the Natural World as such an account. 
See Garber, 386 – 387. I was not able to get hold of the book myself. 
42 Ariew & Garber, 207. Theorem 3 in The Principles explicitly describes for example animals as aggregates of 
infinite monads, the unity of which belongs to a single monad that is the central one. This makes up a 
corporeal substance. 
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was not ready for his more advanced views or that he was genuinely still undecided about the 
question whether aggregates should count as substances.43 Having to be cautious of his way 
of addressing new audiences was a common obstacle for Leibniz. This point is well addressed 
by John Whipple in his article Leibniz’s Exoteric Philosophy, where a distinction is made 
between Leibniz’s philosophically uncompromising “exoteric” texts, and “esoteric” ones that 
were written for specific audiences with terminological consideration.44 That is, e.g. that 
scholastic terminology was used to address scholastics and cartesian terms in the case of 
cartesian readers. It is also important to remember that Leibniz continuously wrote not only 
to philosophers, but to laymen and nobles of differing backgrounds as well. 
I find it fitting to describe the theory of corporeal substances described in The Principles of 
Nature and Grace Leibniz’s best formulation of the phenomenal universe, while the 
Monadology represents an attempt to explain what it is nominally or representationally. 
According to §14 - 17 it is the case that the monad is perception. The Monadology forbids 
intermonadic causation, preserving the sanctity of perception and consciousness, which 
cannot be reduced to something that is aggregated. Leibniz could not accept the idea that 
monads affect one another, because this would compromise the monads role as a subject of 
change and meant that the subjective perceptions of individuals could cause the subjective 
perceptions other individuals. While the same terminology (substance) is applied in these 
texts, they would in fact be theories about different matters. 
Concerning Leibniz’s ideas about language and concepts: Despite the scholasticist-
Aristorelian foundation of his metaphysics, Leibniz could nevertheless be described as a 
Platonist when it comes to the question of inherent ideas and his debate with Locke, who 
entertained the idea – abhorrent to Leibniz – of “thinking matter”45. Leibniz was a committed 
nominalist just like the materialistically inclined Thomas Hobbes, whom Leibniz read as a 
young man. But unlike the English philosopher, he maintained, that ideas or concepts were 
not subjective46. Though nominalism implies that he denied universals exist, he nevertheless 
took it for granted that things could be identified as they really are through proper reasoning. 
                                                     
43 Antognazza, 500 – 502. Antognazza provides an account of what was requested of Leibniz and of how the 
two texts came exist in Leibniz’s attempt to answer these requests. 
44 See Leibniz’s Exoteric Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  
45 Look, section 6.3. Explicitly in Leibniz’s New Essays on Human Understanding p.48.  
46 Leibniz’s nominalism is discussed thoroughly in Mates, p. 171 – 183.  
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i.e. by defining things with their correspondent concepts. The twist is that for Leibniz, 
concepts are not to be thought of as universal things, but as dispositions to think about 
things47. This idea about concepts is at the core of his pursuit for the characteristica 
universalis. A project Leibniz never managed to even partially complete despite numerous 
attempts48. 
Three of Leibniz’s intellectual ambitions are worth focussing on for the purposes of my 
thesis49. They represent what I interpret as different commitments Ankersmit makes to 
Leibniz’s philosophy. Firstly, Leibniz’s metaphysics, in two of its incarnations. The 
scholastically driven theory of substantial forms that was the basis of Leibniz’s ideal about 
corporeal substance, and the idealistic monadology Leibniz is famous for. Secondly, aside 
from philosophy, Leibniz had also a keen interest in mathematics and he is remembered as 
one of the inventors of calculus, alongside Isaac Newton50. This discovery would affect 
Leibniz’s thinking dramatically and as Ernst Cassirer suggested, transformed his metaphysics 
into the system given in the Monadology. Thirdly, ever since his first published writings, 
Leibniz expressed interest in a project attempted already by his time by many logicians of 
fame, namely a universal logical language. This already mentioned characteristica universalis 
was in Leibniz’s vision at the same time a tool for communication, logical reasoning and 
discovery51. 
 
 
                                                     
47 Mates, 175.  
48 For narratives on the development of Leibniz universal language and logical calculus see Donald Rutherford, 
Philosophy and Language in Leibniz; Mates, chapter X; or Antognazza’s biography of Leibniz where the 
characteristica universalis is a central theme throughout. 
49 Leibniz’s other projects included calculating machines and other feats of engineering, diplomatic endeavours 
of a grand scale, history-writing and theological proofs only to name a few. 
50 It’s not suggested that they worked together. The opposite is true as this matter became one of controversy 
since the Royal Academy attempted to discredit Leibniz by accusing his of having stolen Newtons methods and 
conclusions. Antognazza, 166 – 167.  
51 Not to be confused with constructed languages like Esperanto, the proposed universal characteristic would 
presumably encyclopaedically break concepts down to their primitive constituents, to which symbols or 
numbers would be assigned. Everything that could be expressed or reasoned could be done rigorously with 
these symbols and their combinations. For description of Leibniz’s efforts on the project, see Rutherford 1994 
or Peckhaus. Some of the attempts Leibniz made on this front are documented in Ariew & Garber p. 5 – 19. 
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The Outline of Ankersmit’s Philosophy of History52 
 
During a span of nearly four decades Frank Ankersmit has written several influential books on 
philosophy. The extent of my project is such that it makes sense to try and flesh out some of 
the intellectual background he comes from and bring up the most central themes in his work 
concerning philosophy of history. Ever since his first publications, two prominent influences 
can be seen in historicism and the philosophy of G. W. Leibniz. Though other influences are 
present in his work on philosophy of historiography, such as W. H. Walsh’s theory on historical 
colligation and Arthur Danto’s views about historiography as metaphorical representation of 
past subjects; historicism and Leibniz provide the foundation and are also linked to one 
another in several circumstances preceding Frank Ankersmit. 
A Logic in Narrativism and Historicism 
 
The position of history as an independent academic discipline is heritage from historicism. All 
historians have heard of Leopold von Ranke, who is often looked upon as the founding father 
of modern academic history.  Ranke promoted a rigorous methodological approach to 
historical research so that only proper sources could be used in a historian’s work and these 
sources are treated with properly critical attention53. At the foundation of historicism is the 
idea that a thing is defined by its history. Ankersmit has often expressed his alignment to this 
basic tenet of historicism54. I will explore historicism and its connections with Leibniz further 
in chapter 1. However, when it comes to theses made in historical accounts, he has openly 
supported the narrativist view. 
In 1973 Hayden White’s book, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century 
Europe, was published, and in it a theory was presented that treated historical texts not as a 
scientific theorising about the past, but instead as “emplotted” literary artefacts merely based 
on historical research55. Stories, to put it in more mundane language. The essential thing is 
                                                     
52 It is recommended for advanced readers of Ankersmit to move on to chapter I, though it may be worthwhile 
to skim through in order to get an idea of how I have interpreted Ankersmit’s corpus.  
53 For an account on historicism see e.g. Iggers, Georg 2005: Historiography in the Twentieth Century. 
54 NL, 8; HSI, 421; MTR, ix. 
55 Doran, 106 – 107. Emplotment refers to the conscious or unconscious process of infusing an ethical or 
political agenda into the narrative of a historiography using one of a set of literary tropes. Therefore, in 
White’s approach there are always motives behind a historical narrative, be they conscious or not. 
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that such a story is not a “true story” in the conventional sense. It is a colligated whole made 
up of historical facts that expresses a political or some other motif using a chosen style to 
transmit the message in a fashion of the writers devising. White’s theory of literary tropes in 
the writing of history, and the arguments he made were effective in changing people’s views 
about the discipline of history as a scientific endeavour. A narrativist take on history is 
generally to see it more akin to literature than science. White’s theory was a challenge to the 
discipline of history56, in which empirical methodology was and is commonly applied in 
Rankean fashion in an attempt to discover the truth about the past. In what is now often 
called the “linguistic turn” in historical theory, narrativism called to question this kind of 
objectivity of historiography and the wisdom of adherence to optimistic approaches such as 
logical positivism in the discipline57. As Michael Stanford put it: “What we know and how we 
know it began to give way to questions of what we tell and how we tell it”58. Not a pleasing 
situation for those who viewed history as a scientific endeavour. 
While I do not wish to claim that White had no interest in history beyond treating it as pure 
literary exercise, this was common criticism against him. A decade or so after Metahistory, 
Frank Ankersmit attempted to up the ante by presenting a new theory59. A logic he felt could, 
firstly, show that historiographical texts are distinct from other products of science (be they 
natural- or social-), and secondly to expound exactly what makes them different. This meant 
the redefining of several epistemological key notions such as “truth” and “representation”. 
Though his first published book had a poor reception and did not catch the attention of wider 
audiences, it already contained the basics of Ankersmit’s theory of representation such as 
they are today60. One important aspect Ankersmit thought Hayden White had ignored – 
because he primarily wrote as a literary theorist – is the relationship that historical texts are 
                                                     
56 Or philosophy of history / philosophy of historiography. 
57 See chapter 2 in Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen’s book Postnarrativist Philosophy of Historiography. Since the early 
20th century, logical positivism was an influential philosophical movement, that heralded science as the only 
and ultimate tool for describing reality. Tenets such as verificationism and empiricism were expounded. Even 
in the discipline of academic history some philosophers thought that it was possible to formulate general laws 
similarly to other sciences by carefully observing past events and establishing rules and laws. C. G. Hempel 
proposed that similarly to other sciences, certain covering laws can be proposed meaningfully in history and 
even that predictions could thus be made about the future. Also see Berry, 165 – 166; Kosso, 23. 
58 Stanford, 229. 
59 The book was not well received, and Ankersmit’s theory became more widely known only through later 
work. For Ankersmit’s reflection on its release, see for example, Jonathan Menezes’ The limits of the ‘autumn 
of historiography’: On Frank Ankersmit’s postmodernist moment, p. 2 – 3. 
60 Menezes, 3.  
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expected to have with the past. Surely there must be one, since a historian claims to study 
the past. Ankersmit admits that White’s contributions are revolutionary considering the 
“linguistic turn” in history. Specifically, he implies that thanks to White we began to better 
comprehend that the historian’s language has great impact on how we understand the past. 
However, Ankersmit himself stands strictly inside the boundaries of philosophy history and 
he proceeds where he felt historicism failed. His theory denies that historiography describes 
the past, just as narrativism does, and yet he attempts to establish how the historian’s 
language relates to past reality.61 This task was first taken up extensively in Ankersmit’s 
doctoral dissertation of 1981, Narrative Logic – A Semantic Analysis of a Historian’s Language, 
though – as we shall see – it becomes clearer only in later publications62. Briefly the answer 
has two components. Firstly, he has never denied that facts are  a necessary requirement for 
historiography. Secondly, though this is a later idea not present in NL, the past, as something 
that is actual, is a creation of the historian’s mind. Or rather it becomes the historian’s mind. 
As stated, Ankersmit’s work spans four decades of philosophy of history and so it is no surprise 
that terminologically there are shifts and turns in his writings. Also, his reference to Leibniz 
has since Narrative Logic been fickle63. While occasional references are made64, Leibniz has 
only lately returned in force to Ankersmit texts65. However, it is important to note that his 
theory of historical representation, though refined, remains mostly undisturbed throughout 
this time. The most notable change being that the words representation and represented have 
taken precedence over the term narrative substance in his vocabulary66. A comparison of 
what Ankermsit says about the narrative logic in NL, chapters V and VI67  and his essay 
Representationalist Logic (2014) in Admir Sdodo’s Other Logics, p. 104 – 108, one will see that 
virtually the same arguments are made in both texts, though terminology has shifted. 
Jonathan Menezes refers to an interview given by Ankersmit to Ewa Domanska in 1998, 
suggesting that Ankersmit purposefully adopted new vocabulary from American philosophy 
                                                     
61 HR; 29 – 30, 63 – 65.  
62 The notion of historical experience  
63 In NL, Leibniz’s philosophy is given a thorough treatment in the beginning of chapter VI. Also, theorems of 
the Monadology are explicitly evoked in his introduction of narrative substances on p. 94. 
64 See e.g. Political Representation p. 227; HR, p. 212. Invitation to Historians, Rethinking History 7:3 (2003), p. 
413 – 437. 
65 History as the Science of the Individual; Where the extremes meet. 
66 A change that does not jeopardise the “leibnizianism” of Ankersmit’s work since representation and 
substance are essentially the same thing in the Monadology. 
67 See e. g. pages 95, 109 – 110. (Narrative logic and narrative universe) 
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of language and French post-structuralism so as to achieve a more ‘radical’ tone in his work68. 
Ankersmit’s reading of Richard Rorty made him realise how similar their ideas were 
concerning language, theory and reality, and this was partly the reason for adopting a new 
terminological approach69. In SHE, Ankersmit implies that it was Arthur Danto’s work on 
historical representation that set him up on the road towards a shift in his thought from 
narrative to representation70. What is noteworthy is that he believes Leibniz is the “greatest 
philosopher of representation in all of the history of philosopher”71. This is no coincidence. I 
will use the different terms in Ankersmit’s work interchangeably. With narrative substance 
being divided up to the terms representation and represented Ankersmit has made it easier 
to understand his philosophy as a two-way road between historical experience and historical 
representations. Representation makes it also easier to explain that not just texts are 
historical representations.  
Historical Research & Historical Text 
 
A core element in Ankersmit’s theory of historical representation is what Jouni-Matti 
Kuukkanen has aptly dubbed the narrativist insight. The concept expresses a common notion 
that to get to the thesis presented by a historian on a subject, one must read her book from 
cover to cover72. Narrativism, a modern paradigm to historiography to which the early 
Ankersmit aligned himself, proposes that in historiography the whole text is semantically 
greater than the sum of its parts. A historical writing is more than a simple set of statements.73  
This suggests that there is some logical function at work when propositions are brought 
together in a text. One perhaps explained by expanding the focus of traditional logical inquiry 
beyond the proposition. Ankersmit thinks that this is an oversimplification. 
His approach to the problem is different. As said, a distinction he is keen to make in virtually 
all his work on philosophy of history, is one between historical research and history-writing74. 
Ankersmit radicalises this distinction by establishing a logical and semantic gap between 
                                                     
68 Menezes, 3. 
69 Moskalewicz, 252. 
70 SHE, xvii. 
71 Tamm, 502. 
72 Kuukkanen, 1. 
73 Rigney, 190. 
74 See for example NL, 8; HR, 52 – 54; MTR, 60. 
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statement and text. The level of statements functions in a way a contemporary logician wants 
it to. A statement in a historical narrative is a true proposition that can refer to a subject in 
the past. Nothing prevents anyone from thinking that texts have meaning this way. However 
contemporary logic and epistemology cannot account for what happens when history books 
are written.75 What follows, is that a text – be it for example a history book – once it is written, 
cannot be altered in any way. It remains forever an expression of its writer’s vision. Not only 
as language, but as something more fundamental in representation. 
Historical Experience and Historical Representation 
 
Representation then, whatever its means, is human endeavour to give a substitute of an 
individual’s experience of the past. The notion of representation in Ankersmit comes from 
aesthetics and takes after Nelson Goodman and Arthur Danto76, though his aesthetic ideas 
also bear a striking resemblance to Ernst Cassirer’s writings about art77. The basic idea is that 
a philosopher of history is better served by the notion of representation as an act of 
substitution rather than resemblance. Just as an artist’s attempt to create a representation of 
a thing is not merely an attempt to capture the resemblance of said thing, but also to 
pronounce some essential aspect in it and convey some message.  So is the case in history-
writing: A historian’s thesis is not description of the past. Instead, it is a holistic attempt to 
create a representation of the historian’s point of view into the past. This point of view is what 
historical representations represent and what early on in Ankersmit’s work was called the 
narrative substance78. 
Ankersmit’s representation follows an aesthetic path in describing how historiography 
connects with its topics. A “historical realist” taking the epistemological route will always be 
                                                     
75 NL, 186 – 187.  
76 See e.g. HR p. 222 – 231 for Danto; and Ankersmit 1995, p. 219 – 232. The idea also is presented in MTR, 
chapter 4, and latest in WEM section 4. 
77 In the Essay on Man, Cassirer’s late English introduction book to his ideas, art is describes as one class of 
Cassirer’s “symbolic forms” in which an artist patterns reality (say a landscape or a model) not by imitating its 
perception of it in categories of sense-data, but by attempting to represent his or her qualitative experience or 
emotions of it in the piece of art being made. 
78 This change in terminology seems to appear in the mid-nineties and is related closely to pronounced 
aestheticism. In History and Tropology p. 113 – 114: “The narrative substance of a historical narrative is its set 
of statements that together embody the representation of the past that is proposed in the historical narrative 
in question”. And in Ankersmit 1995 p. 230: “The narrative substance in which this interaction takes place is a 
‘representation as –‘, a representation of the past under a particular aspect which is established by the 
narrative substance”. In Historical Representation, six years later narrative substances no longer appear. 
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bound for disappointment, because he has to take one of two routes:  Either go against the 
narrativist insight via reductivism and claim that history books are nothing but sets of true 
propositions – and even then you have problems, since the sequence of these propositions 
will have an effect on the meaning of the whole. Or admit that a historian will always create 
his “realistic” description according to the standards of his own cultural and intellectual 
background as per the thesis of “theory-ladenness”79. The term refers to a notion developed 
from Duhem’s and Quine’s thesis that scientific theories cannot be tested in isolation from 
theory itself as any test configuration will require theoretical frameworks, however primitive. 
The same applies to suggestion made about the “realism” of any historical narrative. A 
generalising frame of reference is impossible to achieve in history-writing.This view leads to 
“narrative idealism”. Or the idea that what history-writing gives us is proposals for seeing the 
past as something80. E.g. seeing the years from 400 to 800 AD as the “dark ages”. 
In NL narrative substances are referred to as “images” in the mind of the historian and it is 
claimed that they are constructed by the historian’s mind81. This claim, along with the 
association of narrative substances to colligatory concepts and Ankersmit’s insistence that in 
historical texts only the particular can be expressed, have attracted criticism and accusations 
of postmodernism82. However, Ankersmit has argued that there is more to such “images” 
than just the construction mental representations. The narrative substance is a 
representational construct composed of statements. It is the historians attempt to present a 
vision she has of some part of the past83. Ankersmit makes use of the notion of the sublime 
as it appears in European philosophy since Kant and Schopenhauer84. The former denied any 
continuance between these two, while the latter saw in art and especially music a way to 
access noumenal reality in sublime experience. Ankersmit suggests that the notion of sublime 
experience explain how a historian has access to things themselves or the noumenal, that is, 
the past. A historian can engage with the past and break through the objective/subjective 
barrier that in our phenomenal worldview is unassailable, in a nostalgic or traumatic 
experience that makes her realise the difference/distance between the present and the 
                                                     
79 Ankersmit 1989 21 – 27. NL, 75 – 82. 
80 NL, 83 – 84.  
81 NL, 81. “For the ‘historical landscape’ in not given to the historian; he has to construct it”. 
82 See e.g. Zagorin 1990; Zammito 1998, 2005. 
83 NL, 187. 
84 MTR, . 
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past.85 This is not an act per se. It simply takes place, once the historian is sufficiently 
knowledgeable about her subject. An experience takes place and provides a new way of 
representing the past86. You could say, that historical research facilitates experience and that 
historical experience gives the represented.  Finally, aesthetics is the way one turns this into 
a representation. This process is invisible to someone who sees in historiography nothing but 
epistemological meaning. This kind of meaning is crucial, for without it nothing could be 
written in a way that others could read it. But for Ankersmit the situation is the same as with 
an artist that has no technique. No-one would claim that the vision is secondary to technique. 
The opposite is true. 
Sublime experience is the precondition of history writing. Yet its status declined in historicism. 
Ankersmit writes that historical experience, or nostalgia as he called it in History and 
Tropology, “became suspect since its resistance to the reification of the past seemed to 
question and even to endanger historical truth”87. As historicists wanted to “erase 
themselves”, so to speak, from the past, nostalgic approach to history writing was rebuked. 
Ankersmit sees however the idea continue in historicism through Friedrich Meinecke and 
Johan Huizinga88. “Nostalgic experience” allows for the past and the present to become one. 
An example may help to further elaborate the point: Some of Ankersmit’s favourite examples 
of history books give a hint of what is meant by this. Huizinga’s The Autumn of the Middle 
Ages or Braudel’s The Mediterranean belong to this category. Both present in their thesis in 
powerful metaphors that supposedly emerged to these famous historians. These metaphors 
are not the product of historical research. Braudel never read from anywhere that there are 
many Mediterranean seas. He might rather be said to have experienced his vast subject as 
such and used the metaphor as his technique to communicate his vision.  
And indeed, on many remarks Ankersmit laments a meticulous and overly cautious approach 
of modern historians in their work, where engagement such as given above seems to be non-
existent89. In an interview Ankersmit has suggested that historians tend to ignore historical 
experience due to the unpopularity of the term in professional discourse90. To go along with 
                                                     
85  
86 SHE,  
87 HT, 202. 
88 HT, 207 
89 HR, 2 – 4 or Invitation to Historians in Rethinking history 7:3 415 – 417. 
90 Moskalevicz, 260. 
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accusations of postmodernism, the notion of historical experience has also been criticised 
heavily91. Whatever one may think of it, it does allow Ankersmit to claim that for 
historiography not just “anything goes”, since facts remain central and there is this suggested 
point of contact with the past. Or, as Ankersmit has claimed many times over, there is no past 
in existence but the one we experience in the present. And while this is so, he does not 
abandon rationality, but suggests it be allowed to function not only through epistemology, 
but also aesthetics and thus representation of “historical reality”. While each vision of the 
past is an individual one, history gets its meaning from the relations of such visions put forth 
in histories, usually in texts. And while one may claim that the thesis of a historical text is 
nothing more but a complex meaning in the epistemological sense, this fails to account for 
experience. We experience different things when reading the same text. 
In describing Ankersmit and the criticisms his writings on historical experience have received, 
I find a good analogy in contemporary philosophy of mind, where different schools of thought 
concerning what David Chalmers has dubbed the “hard problem of consciousness”92 exist. 
Physicalistically oriented philosophers explain the qualitative aspects of consciousness and 
experience away in reduction while dualists such as Chalmers himself demand that subjective 
consciousness and experience be taken seriously and that a fundamental place be reserved 
for it in science. In a way, Ankersmit is in the same position: 
Without experience, there is no consciousness. So, if we move from language to consciousness, the 
issue of experience becomes an ineluctable item on the philosopher’s agenda93. 
Historiography presents the subjective in order to get to the objective through debates 
concerning accounts of history that cross over the same topics. An analytic philosopher 
wishing to see in historiography nothing but justified true claims will never be able come to 
agreement with this. For Ankersmit, experience and meaning are fundamental and take 
                                                     
91 For what is probably the most notable example in this, see Peter Icke and Frank Ankersmit’s Lost Cause. In 
the book, Icke laments that Ankersmit has abandoned language for the sake of experience. However, 
experience is already strongly present in NL through Leibniz and in fact it is discussed in the last section of 
Chapter VI of the book quite lengthily. 
92 Introduced in The Conscious Mind, the “hard problem of consciousness” addresses the explanatory gap 
between the subjective and the objective. Subjectively there is a qualitative aspect or “Likeness” to sensations 
that cannot be explained away by reduction. 
93 SHE, 6. 
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precedence over truth and reference and representation allows a bypass of conventional 
language in historiography94. 
The logic of representation in Ankersmit maintains that texts are representations of individual 
entities95, which are called the representeds of historical representations or aspects96 of the 
past. The first two terms have an unshakeable Leibnizian feel to them and both have been 
given an analogy in Leibniz’s metaphysics97. It is claimed that “narrative substance” is not part 
of language, but a thing, which has statements as its properties. Statements therefore have a 
double-function in Ankersmit’s philosophical approach to historiography. Firstly, and more 
familiarly, they refer to things, subjects, events and entities in the past. But each one also 
functions as an irremovable part of the whole text, which only as a whole can be a 
representation of the historian’s vision or thesis of the past. Notice that some of the “entities” 
or “subjects” of the past may be narrative substances in themselves. A historical account is 
an attempt to communicate some meaningful insight about the past. A new viewpoint to a 
past event or character. The double function just described reflects the already mentioned 
division of the historians work to historical research and history-writing. 
Colligation in Historical Representation 
 
Aside from Leibniz and historicists, W. H. Walsh is mentioned as an inspiration to Ankersmit’s 
narrative logic. William Whewell had coined the term colligation in the philosophy of science 
of 19th century. He described it as the mental process of organising empirical data into a 
                                                     
94 In NL p. 251, Ankersmit makes an interesting reference to philosophy of consciousness: “The essential 
difference between robots or computers and human beings lies, in my opinion, in the capacity of human 
beings to constitute the Ns ‘Iint’”. With Iint he means roughly subjective identity: Conscious experience of self. 
95 The best explanation for the he perfect individuality of these textual entities is found in Representational 
Logic (chapter 6 in Admir Skodo’s Other Logics) and in HSI. In both Ankersmit distinguishes the notions of 
uniqueness from individuality. A unique thing is logically unique by contemporary standards if it features 
universal a set of properties that are not contained in anything else. So long as this condition is fulfilled, the 
thing is unique, but not an individual in the strong sense of the word. Ankersmit is adamant that an individual 
is not defined (individuated) until every single one of its properties is listed. The example of Barack Obama is 
given. If there is an x that has the properties president of the USA and is visiting China at t. Just by these 
properties x’s uniqueness can be established, but not its individuality as President Obama. 
96 A fruitful notion, the aspect provides the best metaphor for what I believe Ankersmit means. In MTR, it is 
described as the middle ground between things in themselves and the properties of things. An aspect of a 
thing may be viewed without this aspect being a property. The aspect of past comes about with the sublime. 
97 As we will see in chapter 1, the notion of an indivisible substance is of paramount importance in Leibniz’s 
metaphysics and in the idealistic version of his system, Leibniz seems to insist on the phenomenality (or 
representationality) of reality as we know it.  
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concept that can express a general law98. In the 1950’s Walsh introduced colligation to 
philosophy of history.  He went through different positions concerning the notion, but 
eventually his “colligatory concept” referred to an interpretation of history99. The idea being 
that historians tend to find connections between different events in history and as a result, 
begin to see them as a process and name the newly formed larger concepts fittingly and often 
metaphorically. The “renaissance” or “the French revolution” are fine examples100.  Originally, 
Walsh’s Colligation is “the procedure of explaining an event by tracing its intrinsic relations to 
other events and locating it in its historical context”101. However, Walsh was somewhat 
ambivalent about what exactly the nature of colligation was. He later confessed that 
colligating history in “dominant ideas” that guided the actions of historical characters was not 
a reliable way of presenting the past. He thus took on a more interpretative role for colligation 
that approached constructivism in its outlook. A colligatory concept is an attempt to account 
for the facts and illuminate to the reader a suggestion of what took place. Ankersmit follows 
this latter interpretation. 
A most striking move is made by Ankersmit in partly removing the colligatory concept from 
the mental by giving his narrative substance the characteristics of Leibnizian substance. 
Narrative substances or the already mentioned “images” represented by historical 
representations (texts) are things instead of linguistic entities or mental representations102. 
So, are they then not unlike senses in Fregean semantics, as abstract entities that are outside 
language but intrinsically related to it103? On the level of historical research, one could indeed 
say so. Then one would be ascribing to a Fregean predicate logic in ascribing meaning to a 
text. As was said in the beginning of this section Ankersmit insists that when we are dealing 
with historical texts, a representationalist logic is applied. And then texts, as representations, 
have no meaning104. They only do once they “enter the minds” on other historians. The mind 
of a grand historian is, from this point of view not a constructor of meaning. Rather it is a 
spewing profligacy of historical experience (i.e. visions, possibly sublime, about the past) 
                                                     
98 Snyder, section 2.  
99 On Walsh and the evolution of his colligatory concept, see Ritter, 50 – 54.  
100 McCullach, 153. 
101 Walsh, 59. Also Shaw, 11. 
102 NL, 93. 
103 See Margolis, section 1.3. Concepts as Fregean Senses. 
104 WEM, . Ankersmit calls texts, in this paper, meaningless signs. 
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which becomes the essence of his or her thesis. One of the points of view is chosen as the 
represented of the historical representation based of how it is seen to fit in with previous 
representations.  A historian must apply sources and facts truthfully, but there must be room 
for any view that can be supported by these facts. Historical representations pronounce 
aspects of the past that are represented by the historian with a text in the aesthetic fashion 
described above.  
Representational Logic Applied 
 
A difficult to discern facet in Ankersmit’s philosophy of historical representation is the one 
that discusses its application (or lack thereof). Other more analytically aligned philosophers 
of history such as Daniel Gorman and Paul Roth have expressed dissatisfaction with 
Ankersmit’s work due to its propensity to insulate historiographical texts from language. Both 
argue that removing texts from language is an unnecessary and potentially harmful act, that 
can only lead to incomprehension. Arguments go along the lines that while the theory may 
be internally coherent, it has no application whatsoever when concerning the historian since 
it only serves to divide historians by destroying their means of communication. There is no 
normative aspect or praxis to it.105 Ankersmit can mount a defence by making again clear the 
distinction between historical research and history-writing and arguing that in the former 
indeed all available outside paradigms and norms may be mounted to produce new visions. 
In an interview with M. Moskalewicz, he has stated: 
I have no pretension to change the historical discipline. If I have any revolutionary pretensions (in spite 
of my rather conservative turn of mind), then these are for philosophy only. Indeed, there I would like 
to rearrange things a little.106 
 
Considering his commitment to historicism I believe in general he does not think there is 
anything dramatically wrong in what historians do. They follow methodologies and produce 
new knowledge about the past accordingly, yet without any universal normative theory 
dictating their actions107. More generally, he is addressing philosophers of history with the 
intent of creating an “apriorist foundation” for discussion in the discipline108. What he has 
                                                     
105 Jonathan Gorman 1997: Philosophical Fascination with Whole Historical Texts. Paul Roth 2013: Whistling 
History. I thank Daniel Fairbrother for directing me to these reviews. 
106 Moskalewicz, 256. 
107 Most recently in his response to his critics he expresses explicitly that philosophers of history should refrain 
from advising historians. The Journal of the Philosophy of History. Volume 12, no. 3 P. 489 – 490 
108 WEM, introduction. 
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expressed concerning historians, though, is a regret that historians in modernity lack a certain 
“urgency” about their work, referring to what I believe is a lack of bold theses in big themes 
that could ignite fruitful debate. For this purpose he has  developed what in NL is called the 
“scope criterion” and is referred to in another part as “narrative pragmatics”. The tricky thing 
is that thought demarcation between the logic and pragmatic parts can be fathomed, the 
difficulty in doing so is recognised by Ankersmit himself in NL: 
…at least a number of the reasons for our historiographical preferences are closely tied up with the 
logical issues considered in Chapter VI and in the present chapter, narrative logic itself should not be 
confused with the problems its application gives rise to.109 
 
The chapters mentioned here are the ones that establish narrative substances as the logical 
unit of historiography and discuss its characteristics, similar to a Leibnizian substance. The 
pragmatic part is about how a historian should aim at a balance between the factual and what 
is suggested by her in situating her new historical representation to the existing matrix of 
representations. Somewhat unexpectedly, Leibniz makes an appearance here and his notions 
of the monad and mathematical function are put to use in helping define what “good 
historiography” would amount to.  
Definition of some Central Concepts 
 
Even with the threat of repetition, since in this thesis two layers of complex terminology have 
to be maintained (Ankersmit’s and that of Leibniz) I saw it best to include here some central 
terms in Ankersmit’s work that may help less advanced readers of this work to keep up: 
Experience – Ankersmit interprets Leibniz’s metaphysics as an idealistic theory of substance. 
This means that substance is perception that is sometimes accompanied by conscious 
experience. If the past is to become present, this is where it must take place. Historical 
experience is the term used by Ankersmit referring to an identification of the past in a 
historian’s consciousness. Such an experience cannot be objective due to its subjective and 
qualitative aspects. Sometimes the concept of the sublime is used to describe the tendency 
of historical experience to blur the distinction between the past and the present even. 
Objectivity – Objectivity only comes about after several representations of the same part of 
the past have been given. Only multiple points of view can enter conversation and begin the 
                                                     
109 NL, 133. 
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process of approaching objectivity. Representations will metaphorically form a cluster of 
given meanings that will gradually help a community of historians map the past. Debates 
about the meaning of the past is constant and can be explained. A working historian would 
have no idea where to begin her research, were there no previous representations of the past 
to begin with.  
The Past – We experience historical reality and even though memory, language and theory 
are a necessary precondition of historical experience, experience is nevertheless the most 
fundamental aspect of our being. It is being. Past reality, as it was, is unreachable in terms of 
epistemology. One can only theorise what may have happened. Nominally, the past is beyond 
the subjective and the objective and can only be reached through the what is described with 
the notion of sublime.  
The past that is represented in historiography is the experience the historian had. Ankersmit 
supposes that while truthful propositions about past things can be made; all claims about 
notions in the past, be they about Napoleon’s personality or democracy in ancient Athens, 
are bound to require representation in the vein of metaphor. In fact, attempts at describing 
democracy in the present face the same problems because without history, the notion could 
not be anchored semantically. Aesthetics is the best philosophical route for communicating 
our historical experience. 
Representation – a substitute, most often textual, for the aspect of the past the historian 
wants to pronounce. In the discipline of history, reports of a historian’s work are almost 
exclusively whole texts. Hence, the focus of Ankersmit’s philosophy on the text and 
alternative ways of approaching it logically. Texts may be said to refer, but not to the past. 
Only to the represented, which is an experienced “vision” of the past. A historian “knows” 
when the thesis is right the same way an artist “knows” when her art is executed properly, 
though its impossible to describe this process, except perhaps to other artist who have similar 
experiences. Similarly, historical representations can only be fruitfully discussed between 
historians.  
Represented – The “image” a historian has about the past. It may be thought of as a 
constructed semantic entity, but Ankersmit provides with the notion of Historical experience 
the possibility that the represented is an aspect of past itself. Not the past. Not some property 
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of the past. But a result of the historians internal noumenal experience of past reality. An 
ontological explanation for aspects is given in a profile. If one looks at a house or a person 
from one side and then from another, one will have seen two aspects of the same thing110. 
Such is the quality of human perception. To perceive a thing simultaneously from all point of 
view is quite impossible and the same applies to the past. 
These three central concepts make up what Ankersmit calls a three place-model of historical 
representation. Representation takes place between two variables. The representation and 
the represented. However, when it comes down to historical writing, nobody would deny that 
have the case of a person attempting to establish something about the past. 
Truth – Just as the statements in a narrative have two functions, so are there two levels of 
truth in historiography. The commonsensical notion of correspondent truth of propositions, 
and the aesthetic truth in the level of whole texts. On this level, a historian discovers truths 
about the past by approaching a subject from a particular angle. Correspondence between 
propositions and affairs are irrelevant since no access can be made thereby to past reality and 
therefore meaning is what guides representational truth.  
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I – Philosophy of History and Leibniz’s Substance-theory 
 
In this chapter I will explore Leibniz’s philosophy by first delving into his “mature” metaphysics 
as well as exploring his ideas about logic and the characteristica universalis. We will see how 
Leibniz has acted as an inspiration to historicist thinkers and from there continue to explain 
how Ankersmit has proceeded to develop historicism and applied the interpretations the 
historicists made about Leibniz’s substance theory. Ankersmit has explored the ideas of 
earlier historicists and Leibniz-scholars and applied these in creating a philosophy of history 
that does not aim at providing historians with theoretical tools, but only to provide a basis for 
our understanding of what history is. I will propose that in Ankersmit’s work different aspects 
of Leibniz’s metaphysics are utilised and that the Monadology is present not only in historical 
representation but also in his notion of historical experience. Here I will provide the basics 
and further elaboration of the evolution and consequences of Ankersmit’s Leibnizianism in 
both these dimensions (of representation and experience) are explored in the following 
chapters. I will end this chapter with a brief investigation into Leibniz’s intensional logic and 
its relation to Ankersmit’s work and how it too, can be seen as contributing to the Leibnizian 
system Ankersmit has in place. 
I wish to begin with explaining the basics of the Monadology itself, and will do so with a 
citation: 
Indeed, considering the matter exactly, it should be said that there is nothing in things except simple 
substances and in them perception and appetite; moreover, matter and motion are not so much 
substances or things as phenomena of perceivers, whose reality is situated in the harmony of perceivers 
with themselves (at different times) and with other perceivers111. 
This insert, taken from correspondence between the Dutch mathematician and physicist 
Burcher de Volder and G. W. Leibniz during the years 1698 – 1706, is one of the first 
expressions of an emerging metaphysical system that would stimulate the curiosity of 
generations of philosophers. A person with some knowledge about western history of 
metaphysics may interpret that here we have an idealist brand of ontology – and a pluralist 
one – in which perception seems to be the defining aspect of substances. This notion of 
substance as perception or alternatively as representation, is a central theme in this paper.  
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This is because the philosophy historiography defended by Frank Ankersmit is built around 
this such an account of representation. His historical representation or rather, what is 
represented by such a representation being an analogy for Leibnizian substance. 
In 1714, two years before his passing, Leibniz wrote The Principles of Philosophy, known to 
later generations simply as the Monadology112. Written at the request of Prince Eugene of 
Savoy and Nicolas Rémond, a Parisian scholar and courtier, it could be thought of as an 
introduction to some of Leibniz’s most central ideas, though Ariew and Garber describe it 
instead as a condensation of Leibniz’s ideas as presented in his Théodicée113. In the 
Monadology, the substance-theory described in the letters to de Volder is more thoroughly 
presented. The beginning of the text is constructed around the concept of “monad”, 
characterised as a perceiving substance, or substance as perception. What is characteristic of 
the monad is its indivisibility. A monad has no physical dimensions and no parts, so it cannot 
be divided. Monads are indestructible soul-like entities with ever-changing states of 
perception and consciousness114. They pass from state to state driven by an intrinsic and 
internal force which Leibniz calls appetition. Every monad is an individual and therefore one 
of a kind, a matter related to it being a point of view to all other monads.115 Each one reflects 
the entire universe, and some do so consciously, being capable of memory and distinct 
perception. These monads are called souls.116 Souls occupy the highest echelon of the system, 
and you could categorise them further into animal souls and human souls117. What separates 
the human mind from all other monads is knowledge of necessary truths, or abstract thought 
                                                     
112 See Bennett, Jonathan 2017. Translation with notes: The Principles of Philosophy known as Monadology by 
G. W. Leibniz, 1712. Theorems at the beginning lay out the foundations of his idealistic metaphysics while the 
further you read the more applied uses are approached. Leibniz eventually discusses in the text what we could 
call philosophy of mind (§ 17 – 28), corporate substances (§61 – 82), theology (§83 – 88) and in a sense ethics 
(§89 – 90), among other things. As said, the Monadology was a commissioned introduction to Leibniz’s ideas at 
that time. 
113 Ariew & Garber, 213. On when and why the Monadology was written: Antognazza, 500 – 502.  
114 Leibniz himself uses a French word of his own invention: Aperception. Both Ariew & Garber and Bennett 
also use the English word “consciousness” here and Bennett also offers “awareness”. See §14 in the 
translations. 
115 See, § 1 – 6 in the Monadology. About change and properties in monads §11 - 13. About the uniqueness of 
monads § 8 – 9. My reference here is The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology in Ariew & Garber 213 – 
214. 
116 Ibid. § 19, 20. 
117 Ibid. § 14. Leibniz’s disagreed with Descartes in that he suggested that animals have an inner life complete 
with feelings similar to human beings. 
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and philosophy118. I.e. unlike “mere monads”, human beings can also perceive that they 
perceive. 
Perhaps the most counterintuitive thing about monads is the idea that there is no causality 
between them119. Monads have perceptions but nominally these are not of anything outside 
themselves. When it is said that a monad reflects all other monads, what is meant is that their 
internal perceptions are guaranteed by God in a pre-established harmony. In God’s chosen 
design, all monads are given a subjective set of consecutive perceptions that is laid into 
perfect synchronicity with those of all other monads. This is what Leibniz proposes as the 
guarantee that we can trust our common intuitions about phenomena. Perplexingly, monads 
never perceive an external reality per se, or things in themselves to put it in Kantian terms. 
Rather, they are unities of perception and this is all there is to what is noumenal. The problem 
with this is what Bertrand Russell, Frank Ankersmit (and many others, I am sure) have called 
the “Leibnizian dilemma”. If everything is subjective in this way, what need is there for a pre-
established harmony? Why insist on temporal synchronicity, if all substances are causally 
insulated from every other? It is easy to see that the system is outdated. Our interest in this 
problem is limited to Ankersmit’s solution to it, which I will discuss in the next chapter.  
As mentioned earlier, the question of Leibniz’s idealism is a debated issue. While some 
scholars argue that Leibniz’s late metaphysics is exclusively idealist and that the corporeal is 
illusory, others pronounce him as someone who presented multiple theories about reality 
without utter commitment to any. In contemporary debate about Leibniz, scholars like Daniel 
Garber and Glenn Hartz, propose that Leibniz was a “theory pluralist”120. Hartz argues that 
the interpretation that Leibniz is a pure idealist must be rejected on account of the many 
writings in his later years that supported a theory of corporeal substances. He concludes that 
Leibniz was someone who experimented with “wild abandon” and never succeeded choosing 
between his substance theories121. Garber’s idea is similar in that he proposes that until the 
very end, Leibniz was looking for a better and more complete theory on substance122. Some 
commentators, such as Jeffrey McDonough have even offered to resolve divisions of 
                                                     
118 Bennett, Jonathan 2017. Translation with notes: The Principles of Philosophy known as Monadology by G. 
W. Leibniz, 1712. § 28 – 30.  
119 Ariew & Garber, 213 – 214: § 7. 
120 See the part about Leibniz in the introduction. 
121 See Hartz: Why Corporeal Substances Keep Popping up in Leibniz’s Later Philosophy. 
122 Garber, 386 – 388.  
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interpretation by presenting Leibniz as a conciliator for his contemporaries in the matter of 
substance123. McDonaugh argues that with his two accounts of substance Leibniz attempted 
to conciliate Aristotelian and Platonic theories concerning substance. Such an approach 
would fit Leibniz’s profile well as he inhabited various intellectual traditions and appealed to 
and adopted ideas from members of all of them. 
I mention such interpretations, because Ankersmit commits closely to the monadology as 
Leibniz’s substance theory, making this very clear in his conversation with Tamm124. As 
Fairbrother has argued, this is problematic for Ankersmit’s “Leibnizianism” if it is indeed the 
case that “(The Garber-)Leibniz vacillates between formal and material (or corporeal) theories 
in the course of his philosophical career, and it is within the range of this vacillation we find 
various interpretations of Leibniz’ concept of monads”125. However, the problem is alleviated, 
if we expressly commit to the notion of “substance” as it is given in the Monadology and 
subsequently commit to the Monadology as Leibniz’s metaphysics. His “first philosophy”, as 
he states in the Clarke-correspondence126. This would make sense for Ankersmit because he 
wants to articulate a “first philosophy” for history and thus provide an “Archimedean point in 
philosophy of history, so that one can draw up from that point, again, by means of apriorist 
argument, a conception of historical knowledge and of the semantics of the writing of 
history”127. So, he is not interested in providing norms for, but the “conception” of history 
and in this his system is indeed an analogy to the metaphysics of the Monadology and its 
substance. Analogously, then, any applicable theory of history would follow not from Leibniz’s 
metaphysical notion of substance, but from his theory of corporeal substance.  
Arguments have been made against the Monadology being Leibniz’s official metaphysics.  
Addressing these is a task well beyond me, and in the context of this work I am mostly content 
in having established a coherent view of what Ankersmit thinks. However, the letters to 
Samuel Clarke do speak for the Monadology, as in them Leibniz clearly expresses that the 
notions of space and temporality are phenomenal occurrences that have no independent 
                                                     
123 McDonaugh, Leibniz’s Conciliatory Account of Substance. 
124 Tamm, 498. Ankersmit says: “.---his monadology, or theory of the substance has been absolutely basic to 
me right from my first fledgling and still desultory attempts to get hold of the secrets of the writing of history 
down to the present”. 
125 Fairbrother 2018a, 11. The first brackets are my addition. 
126 Ariew & Garber, 333. My underlining. 
127 WEM, 4. 
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existence. Also, Leibniz expresses here his conviction that the soul is a simple substance and 
that a pre-established harmony is what ensures that the occurrences of the external world 
correspond to our perceptions of it, i.e. that the noumenal is in harmony with the 
phenomenal.128 While differing opinions about Leibniz’s substance theory have been put 
forth, for example by Daniel Garber, who suggest that the Monadology was not Leibniz’s final 
view. Here he is convincing in arguing that Leibniz’s idealistic metaphysics only came about 
rather late in his life. He is less convincing in arguing that Leibniz continually looked for 
alternative theories in metaphysics. For example, he presents the De Bosses -correspondence 
and stipulations for the new notion of substantial bonds as evidence of a new attempt at 
reformulating his metaphysics129. But he fails to report Leibniz’s explicit statement historically 
occurring right after his own period of investigating the correspondence ends, that he prefers 
the more parsimonious theory of monads130. While he is certainly right that Leibniz offered 
different theories for different fields of study, I do not think the Monadology’s role as Leibniz’s 
metaphysics can be challenged. In his letters to Clarke Leibniz argues for the monadology 
implicitly, since he denies all possibility of absolute space and time. His relational versions of 
these notions follow from monadic metaphysics131. Naturally, Leibniz had also his corporeal 
substances, but these go beyond metaphysics and the theory of corporeal substance can be 
seen as supervening on the monadic one. 
The Monadology in Historicism and in Ankersmit 
 
Originally historicism is the movement that made history into an academic discipline in its 
own right. Efforts by men such as Leopold von Ranke saw history become professionalised by 
demanding a rigorous methodological approach to sources through which historical research 
was to be conducted.132 Now, a critical distinction already made during the introduction, must 
be repeated here: One between historical research and history-writing133. While historicism 
presented a unified front in demanding a scientific approach to sources, it was not altogether 
                                                     
128 Aho & Roinila, 366 – 367. Points 29 – 37 in Leibniz’s third letter to Clarke. 
129 Garber 2009.The development, in the letters between de Bosses and Leibniz, of the notion of substantial 
bonds, is described in Chapter 9. This might relate to the fact that the 1989 book Daniel Garber published with 
Roger Ariew containing Leibniz’s writings cuts the correspondence right at this point. 
130 The letter and Leibniz’s statement to De Bosses is referred to in John Whipple’s article, section 6. See 
reference 192 above. 
131 McDonough 2014, Section 5.2. 
132 For a history of historicism, see Iggers, 26 – 28. 
133 See p. 19. 
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clear from the get-go, how historians should report their findings. Ranke and his 
contemporaries had to think of a way to present the results of historical research 
meaningfully. They had to synthesise historical knowledge around a theme and write about 
something.  
What specifically to focus on in a historical text is a question all working historians must face. 
Facts about the past can be established in historical research, but it is another matter 
altogether to write a book on history. The narrativist insight is at the heart of this matter134. 
A historian needs to find some central theme to his work. Something to argue for. Facts must 
be stated in some order and something meaningful must be insinuated through them, lest 
the result resemble merely a list of facts. Additionally, such a list of facts – unless it is 
completely arbitrary – can already be interpreted to be semantically more than a sum of the 
meanings of its parts. 
Ranke saw a problem in presenting history as a grand whole as those following Hegel’s view 
of history wished to do. At the heart of the early historicist argument was that sources had to 
come before narrative continuity.135 Facts would be produced from sources through a critical 
investigation and only then could the historian begin to write around a theme. Herman Paul 
describes the early historicist problem of Historical Justification, i.e. how to decide what is 
important about the past, thus: 
---in spite of their anti-Hegelian stances, the early historicists combined their increasingly sophisticated 
methods of historical inquiry (partly borrowed from classical philology and biblical scholarship) with an 
idealist belief in the ‘meaningfulness’ of the historical process. They could insist on the individuality of 
nations and epochs, or on the need to falsify historical legends and myths, because they believed in a 
metaphysical reality or providential power that endowed all nations, persons, and events with ultimate 
meaning.136 
So, while speculative historical holism was put to the background to allow historical research 
to be impactful, there remained a commitment to metaphysical entities that historical 
research was set out to support. It is worth noting, that this has been elaborated by Ankersmit 
many times in his work: “It is to historism and historists like Ranke that we owe this 
achievement of fragmenting the whole of history into independence [independent] entities 
                                                     
134 See p. 19. 
135 Day, 7. For instance, Hegel saw the origin of modern concepts such as “freedom” or “nation” in the ancient 
world. He had a teleological vision in which these concepts were perfected during the course of history. Ranke 
detested this approach and preferred the concrete before the abstract and evidence before theory.  
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or particulars”137. The early historicists saw individual and distinctive entelechies in the past 
itself that were described in their writing and provided evidence for with sources. Think of 
such an entelechy, for example, as a central character or a political institution in a 
historiography (a King, or a nation). Most of political history follows this route and Ranke 
himself, for one, wrote that states may figuratively be said to have individual personalities in 
historical writing138. Ankersmit disagrees with such a view and in arguing against this he has 
developed the ideas of previous historicists. 
Jaap den Hollander calls Leibniz the “the philosophical grandfather of historicist thought”139. 
He justified the use of this friendly term by specifically bringing up two historicist thinkers that 
were influenced by Leibniz in their own ways: Friedrich Meinecke and indirectly Ernst Cassirer. 
Meinecke promoted Leibniz’s concept of simple substance in his philosophy of history140. He 
saw in Leibniz and specifically his account for individuality a forerunner for historicism and 
explained how, via Herder and Goethe among others, 19th century historicism came to life as 
a celebration of historical individuality that took both personal and collective forms in great 
persons and nations141. While Meinecke certainly did not propound Leibniz’s metaphysics, he 
did see in the Monadology a model for historiography. That is, that historical reality should 
be understood to be about self-sustaining, ever-changing, individual entities the story of 
which could be written down to capture the essence of meaningful history. Here we should 
recall that monads are individuals that pass through their states, utterly unaffected by other 
such individuals: 
We could give the name ‘entelechy’ to all simple substances or created monads, because they have 
within them a certain perfection....; there is a kind of self-sufficiency which makes them sources of their 
own internal actions—makes them immaterial automata, as it were.142 
 In history then, one can thus think of individual entities that unravel in a grand harmony of 
things – the life-stories which can be reported in historiography. Some readers likely will think 
                                                     
137 Ankersmit 1994, 186. My suggestion in cursive. Historism and historicism both refer to 19th century 
historical theory and the movement led by von Ranke, not Karl Popper’s views on speculative philosophy of 
history. 
138 Den Hollander, 215. 
139 Ibid, 211. His article is not precisely about Leibniz, but he does provide insightful background to to the 
influence Leibniz had on historicism.  
140 Ibid. 215 
141 Meinecke: Historism – Rise of a New Historical Outlook. The 1936 book presents Leibniz as a forerunner to 
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142 See Bennett, Jonathan 2017. Translation with notes: The Principles of Philosophy known as Monadology by 
G. W. Leibniz, 1712. §18. 
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of Hegel and his concept of Geist in this connection. However, a defining distinction can most 
easily be made by focusing on the concept of the individual as reported above. The Hegelian 
historicist will see modes of the same world-spirit, while the “Leibnizian historicist” sees 
myriad independent entities143. And again, when one thinks about a history book and the 
narrativist insight, the analogy seems an intuitive one. Works of history tend to focus on 
change happening in between points of time in some entelechy-like subject such as 
“Germany” and historical figures, like “Napoleon”, might also be thought of in this way. 
Another philosopher forming an important link in the chain leading from Leibniz to Ankersmit 
is Ernst Cassirer. As den Hollander suggests, Cassirer was influenced by Leibniz’s ideas about 
mathematical function and calculus, both of which he saw as an integral part of Leibniz’s 
metaphysics144. Cassirer interpreted Leibniz as having treated his notion of the monadic 
substance as a mathematical function, in which different inputs and outputs produce 
alternative points of view to reality: 
Each monad is, with all its contents, a completely enclosed world, which copies or mirrors no other 
being but merely includes and governs by its own law the whole of its presentations; but these different 
individual worlds express, nevertheless, a common universe and a common truth. This community, 
however, does not come about by these different pictures of the world being related to each other as 
copies of a common “original” but by the fact that they correspond functionally to each other in their 
inner relations and in the general form of their structure.145 
 
There is no common world but the one we imagine. Cassirer interprets the Monadology by 
seeing each monad as a functional representation of the universe. He makes an analogy out 
of this to argue for what Michael Friedman calls the genetic conception of scientific 
knowledge. Cassirer, in his philosophy of science, thought that science was about structure 
and the ordering of reality in a purely mathematical way, and not about generalisation on the 
basis of induction, as some contemporaries claimed. Scientific theorising or the ways of 
ordering knowledge thereby analogous to the monads, which mirror the universe in each of 
                                                     
143 In Historiography and Postmodernism (p. 149), Ankersmit himself analogised speculative philosophy of 
history with a trunk of a tree while historicists, as described above was analogised to the branches. The point 
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144 Den Hollander, 212.  
145 Cassirer 1926, 391 – 392. 
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their consecutive phases. Empirical reality only comes about in science through function-like 
theory which gives outputs based on inputs. Science has a history in different variants in this 
formalisation and what makes Cassirer distinct from analytic philosophers, according to 
Friedman, is that the formal scientific interpretations of reality are abstractions from a more 
fundamental process in his philosophy of genetic conception of scientific knowledge.146 
Science is a series of abstract formal structures that could be said to improve upon previous 
ones. Philosophy is not, for Cassirer, subservient to science in general as was suggested by 
the logical positivists. It’s about providing a logical structure for what science itself is. This sets 
him up as a historicist. Theories are essentially defined by those they were developed as 
improvements upon. 
A neo-Kantian originally, in later works, Cassirer became directly interested in other ways that 
human beings make sense of reality in art, myth and history. The philosophy of symbolic 
forms, as Cassirer called it, orients towards the history of human culture and explores how 
cultures and human beings in them apply symbols and impose expression to reality initially in 
order to cope in it and later to explain it147. What never changes is the monadological (in 
Leibniz’s sense) outlook of Cassirer’s work. Gregory B. Moynahan writes of Cassirer’s reading 
of Leibniz’s monadology: 
---it is the promise that there is always an infinity of qualitatively different transformations through 
which the world could be understood in the future and is understood by other monads in the present. 
For this reason our perception of present experience (and certainly of our selves and objects) is always 
provisional since it could always be proven to be rearticulated in a different form.148 
And he continues: 
The concept of the monad – although itself ultimately metaphysically problematic for Cassirer – 
performs the invaluable historical service of allowing all assumptions about the difference of animate 
and inanimate life, “internal” and “external” experience and numerous other assumptions of western 
philosophy to be bracketed. Leibniz’s philosophy avoids psychological and empirical assumptions, and 
avoids indeed any preconceived notion of reality itself.149 
In this interpretation there is no cartesian theatre in which reality is represented, but monads 
essentially are reality that is not divided up to categories like objective or subjective and this 
is the bottom level in this ontology. We, who make science and history, are the 
experience/reality. All the categories we use in constructing phenomenal reality derive from 
                                                     
146 Friedman, section 3. 
147 Friedman, section 4 first paragraph. 
148 Moynahan, 102. My cursive. 
149 Moynahan, 93. 
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this experience. As we will see in the next chapter, this is something Ankersmit builds on when 
he develops his ideas on sublime historical experience. The Monadology is for Ankersmit a 
theory of the noumenal. The following citation is from a text that anticipated his book, 
Sublime Historical Experience: 
Leibniz’s monadology is mainly an attempt to explain how our conception of the phenomenal world 
and how our notions of the things it contains arise out of the manifold of the monad’s perceptions (or 
experiences)150. 
 
But Ankersmit makes also another interpretation by stating in a later text:  
This is Leibniz’s principle of pre-established harmony. Thanks to it there is ‘a reality’ of which all monads 
have the same perceptions. Leibniz call this reality the ‘phaenomena bene fundata’. It is a merely 
‘phaenomenal’ reality, not to be confused with the actual metaphysical reality of the totality of all the 
monads.151   
 
Are these citations not in contradiction? In the latter citation, it seems to be precisely the 
other way around. Here what is perceived and experienced is the phenomenal, and what is 
noumenal is the monadic system in itself. To explain what is taking place, one needs to think 
about Ankersmit’s point of observation when making these claims. For the monad itself 
experience is noumenal, since the monad is experience152. This is how Ankersmit sees the 
matter in his philosophy of historical experience and here the historian’s point of view indeed 
is the monad. For the purely theoretical outside observer (paradoxically, as we saw, there is 
nothing outside the monads) only the synchronised network of monads makes up reality. And 
this is the case in his philosophy of historical representation, or representational logic, where 
there is no meaning. Only the representations as meaningless signs. 
Ankersmit reveals his influences by occasionally writing about the interpretations that 
European scholars not belonging to the tradition of analytic philosophy have made about the 
monadology and Leibniz’s philosophy. In a footnote in SHE Ankersmit refers to the 
interpretation D. Mahnke made of Leibniz’s work in Leibnizens Synthese von 
Universalmathematik und Individualmetaphysik and expresses that this interpretation 
proposes how “Leibniz’s notion of the substance may enable us to show how the world view 
of the sciences (Frege) and that of the humanities (Saussure) are related”.153 In another text 
                                                     
150 Ankersmit 2003, 432.  
151 WEM, 7. 
152 Moynahan, 103. This is Cassirer’s interpretation to which Ankersmit states agreement in WEM, mentioning 
the formers Leibniz-interpretation in Function and Concept. 
153 SHE, 407 – 408 f25. In Ankersmit 2003, p. 432 he writes the same. 
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Ankersmit argues that  “Universalmathematik” should be related to the universalism of the 
sciences and their reliance on mathematics, whereas the term “Individualmetaphysik” is 
suggestive of a world of individual entities as studied in the humanities, and especially in 
history154. What this means is that Ankersmit sees in Mahnke’s interpretation of Leibniz a 
foundation for his own Leibnizian system, where the universal and the individual are 
reconciled in an attempt to provide a full account of what history is and how is, as a discipline, 
functions. Another influence, I believe, can indeed be found in Ernst Cassirer, whose ideas 
about the Monadology are very similar. I admit that due to his better availability, I perhaps 
stress the role of Cassirer unnecessary and misleadingly in this work. Eventually the point is, 
however, that his interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy seems to agree with Ankersmit’s. 
Two thoughts need to be established about Ankersmit and his relationship to historicism. 
Firstly, it is critical to note that Ankersmit endorses the historicist tradition, and while he 
criticises past historicists on their “essentialism”155, he nevertheless feels that this tradition is 
the only one that has any chance of capturing the essence of history as a discipline. Early on, 
Ankersmit stated that “no one can write history as it is done by 90% of all living historians 
without being a historist” and consequently he has not changed his view156. On another 
occasion, he has stated:” ---no historical theory has guaranteed historical writing greater and 
better-deserved triumphs than historism”157. Secondly and for the purposes of this paper, 
more importantly, Ankersmit should thus be thought of as a revisionist of historicism. Nothing 
makes this clearer than a statement in the abstract of a 2013 paper: “This essay is an effort 
to rehabilitate the historicist argument”158. 
In this mentioned paper, called ‘History as the Science of the Individual’, Ankersmit comments 
on the historicist approach to history which attempts individualisation under vast holistic 
concepts, such as a state, in the past – as admirable, but erroneous159: 
First, the old historicist thesis that history is the science of the individual has always had a prima facie 
plausibility. But the historicists were confused about how they understood the individual: they did 
                                                     
154 Ankersmit 2014, 103. He reports that the mentioned Mahnke’s book about Leibniz is fairly common reading 
for philosophy undergraduates in the German speaking world.  
155 NL, 115. 
156 NL, 8. 
157 HT, 238. 
158 HSI. Abstract. 
159 HSI 2013, 423 – 425. 
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neither distinguish between an extensionalist and an intensionalist use of the term, nor between 
individuality and uniqueness, nor between what I called weak and strong individuals. 160 
 
The citation well describes his divergence from 19th century historicism. While historicists 
generally saw what historians were writing about in the past itself, Ankersmit argues that this 
entelechy exists only in the mind of the historian. As said, they tended treat historical figures 
such as “Napoleon” unproblematically as the extensions of historical texts. The problem here 
is, that extension is dependent on truth-value, which is unavailable to the historian apart from 
fragmentary evidence in sources upon which statements are built161. This is the confusion 
mentioned in Ankersmit’s phrasing. These so-called “Strong individuals”, are representations 
and must be respected as such. They are only individuated by all the statements they contain, 
given in the order meant by the writer. Representationally speaking, historians, with their 
whole texts, refer to nothing but their representations of historical subjects. Not the subjects 
themselves. The relation to what is represented is an aesthetic one. Not epistemological. 
In NL, Ankersmit spends some effort in making a distinction between “narrative subjects” and 
“narrative substances” which parallels an extensional and intensional use of language or 
reference and meaning of narratives: 
---from the narrative realist point of view it seems reasonable to say that the (narrative) subject of the 
narratio is formed by those proper names (e.g. “Napoleon”, “Bonaparte”) or those identifying 
descriptions that refer to this historical Napoleon. However, from the point of view of the narration or 
of narrative idealism, the individual statements of the narratio should be thought of as each 
contributing something to the “image” or “picture” of Napoleon’s life and times that his biographer 
wants to present to his public.162 
 
When a historian writes about “Napoleon”, according to Ankersmit, he is not writing about 
the same individual as all other historians working on the “Napoleon” of the past. The point 
is that since we are irretrievably out of direct touch with the past as it is (was), we cannot 
reach “Napoleon” but can only construct him in our minds using whatever cognitive tools at 
our disposal163. Alternatively, and more precisely one could say that in Ankersmit’s view a 
                                                     
160 HSI, 421. The same idea is put forth thirty years earlier in Narrative Logic, in which individuality as handled 
by early historicists is criticised: “…they [the historicists] were not prepared to abandon the notion of the 
‘essence of socio-historical things’, because they needed it as their ‘subject of change’”. See p. 114 – 115. 
161 See the distinction between “narrative realism” and “narrative idealism” in the introduction. 
162 NL, 90. 
163 On one hand, references to constructivism are made: See Narrative Logic p. 81. On the other in Historical 
Representation chapter 2 it is suggested that precisely the subjectivity and ethical views of the historians 
enable her to flesh out something meaningful from the mass of raw data she is processing. Without this 
subjectivity, no meaning would result. 
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certain aspect of Napoleon, as perceived by the historian, is re-presented in a historical text. 
This is a view the later Ankersmit of representation would pronounce.164 The bottom line is, 
that while Ankersmit believes that a connection with the past can be made – he denies this 
happens via constructed meaning165. Epistemological construction of meaning will only give 
you the narrative substance just like the sense of perception will only give you the outlook of 
a painting. To get to the meaning of the painting, aesthetics is required. 
But we must recall, that singular statements of a historical text may still be thought of as 
referring to some individual Napoleon Bonaparte that existed in the past. It is the whole text 
that cannot be said to refer or describe the past.  It can merely present the Napoleon of the 
past in a certain light. Or more precisely, to again use Ankersmit’s own terminology, present 
an aspect of the historical Napoleon. Many historians have the same facts to choose from in 
their representations of a certain part of the past. Still, they all come up with a different thesis 
about it. Ankersmit’s “Copernican revolution” of historicism is then, roughly, the transfer of 
the ambivalent entelechies imagined by the early historicists from the past itself into the 
historians view of the past, where they become strong individuals in the Leibnizian sense166. 
What this sense is exactly, will be partly explained in the next section. Cassirer and his 
interpretation on Leibniz’s metaphysics and the notion of historical experience will be 
explored in the next chapter.  
Intension: Historical Representations as Complete Concepts 
 
On the basis of what has been said earlier, we already have some grasp of Leibniz’s his 
metaphysics. But considering this paper it is important to get to the scholastic foundations on 
which Leibniz originally laid out his metaphysics. The following citation is from NL, chapter VI, 
where Ankersmit addresses the Leibnizian aspects of his theory: 
                                                     
164 See aspects, in MTR p. 68 – 71. 
165 While not at the centre stage in this paper, Ankersmit’s Sublime Historical Experience is a case for sublime 
experience as a tool for understanding the past. The point being that the past itself has meaning but grasp of 
such meaning precedes epistemological truth and reference, which confuse us as attempts to convert meaning 
to modern standards of knowledge are made by the experiencer. 
166 MTR, 156. Here he refers with “Copernican revolution” to the jump from epistemological meaning to 
representational meaning. 
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---an insight into the nature of the statements on Nss can be gained more easily when it is recognized 
that Leibniz’s theory of the proposition is admirably suited to describing them. Leibniz’s central thesis 
is the so-called “predicate in notion principle---167 
The “theory of the proposition” refers to what is commonly known as Leibniz’s predicate-in-
subject -principle. Something Ankersmit adopts to his own philosophy. It is also referred to as 
the conceptual containment theory of truth by Leibniz-scholarship, a fitting name since it well 
defines what truth was for Leibniz: Correctly recognising that some notions are contained in 
others, making it possible to state true proposition, in which identity is confirmed by seeing 
how a notion is included in another. The following citation defines the principle: 
In every proposition, the predicate is said to be in the subject, that is, the notion of the predicate is 
contained in the notion of the subject. For, in a universal affirmative proposition, when I say “every 
man is an animal” I mean “the concept of animal is contained in the concept of man” (for the concept 
of man is to be a rational animal)168.  
In the Discourse on Metaphysics from 1686 Leibniz brings the principle to bear in metaphysics, 
describing how real things should be conceptualised. In §8 he states: 
---we can say that the nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so 
complete that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject 
to which this notion is attributed.169 
The principle is used here to define an individual substance. At this point, Leibniz had not yet 
come up with the fully idealistic world-view of the Monadology170. Instead, he arguably had 
substantial forms in mind. Something in the lines of Aristotelian substance171. Whatever the 
case, already present here is the notion that substances are fully defined by nothing but their 
internal properties and that in theory all that an individual things have ever been or will be is 
deducible from the complete concepts of them. 
Truth is further divided, in Leibniz, to two familiar categories: The analytical and contingent. 
The former is put forward in another principle, the principle of contradiction, and is 
                                                     
167 NL, 130. Nss is short for narrative substances. 
168 Ariew & Garber, 11. Leibniz’s sketch called A Calculus of Consequences from 1679. There are several other 
formulations of this in Leibniz’s writings. Mates reports its appearance in Leibniz’s Théodicée and many other 
texts. The importance of this doctrine to Leibniz cannot be denied as he applied it constantly in his 
philosophical writing as a basis of truth-functionality of propositions. Thus, it may also be called the conceptual 
containment theory of truth. In the monadology it appears implicitly as part of his theory of substance. For 
better explanations of the principle, see Adams, 57 – 62 or Garber, 184 – 185. 
169 Ariew & Garber, 41. 
170 See Daniel Garber: Leibniz – Body, Substance, Monad. Chapters 3 & 4. Alternatively, Hartz p. 1 – 2.  
171 Robinson, section 2.2. Aristotelian primary substance is an individual thing that cannot be said to be an 
attribute of any further things. Aleksi Oja, for example. Things may be predicated of Aleksi but he cannot be 
predicated to other things. 
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characterised as identity. Simply put, propositions cannot be both false and true at the same 
time172. The principle is also seemingly trivially applied to substances. A thing cannot both be 
and not be, and it cannot both have and not have a property. A thing cannot be both actual 
and not actual, but it can be not actual and yet possible. Possibility is signalled in contingent 
truth is which defined by Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. This principle states that 
whatever is true must have a reason for being true. Or whatever exists, exists for a reason 
(which only God fully knows). For example, it is not necessary that I write this paper. It is 
merely possible, or contingently true that I do so. In Leibniz’s view on freedom173, I am free 
to do as I please, but nevertheless I write this paper because I choose to do so in the best one 
of possible worlds, any of which God could have created.  
In a text called Primary Truths Leibniz combines these “two great principles” with the principle 
of predicate-in-subject174. Take any notion, be it the Pythagorean theorem or a cat that is on 
the table, and in the end a rigorous demonstration will show it to be analysable down to 
“primary truths” or what are also called “primitive concepts”. The predicate “is round” is a 
part of the notion of the circle and is thus contained in the subject. This is how we know that 
the proposition “the circle is round” is true. Similarly, the predicate “is married” belongs to 
the notion of husband and is therefore contained in the subject. With contingent 
propositions, somewhat surprisingly, the same applies. 
When I think about the cat on the table, I attempt to summon the notion of that cat to mind 
and look for correspondence, not between facts and reality, but between the contents of my 
humanely confused concept of it and the complete notion of the cat itself. If I say, “the cat is 
on the table”, the proposition is true if at that time it is in the notion of the cat to be on the 
table. A chain of deduction for analysis of contingent truths is infinite, and only traversable 
by God, whom alone may deduce everything175. A factor that makes later observers often 
accuse Leibniz of determinism (quite justly) is related to the notion that in the end, all 
knowledge is theoretically analytical in this view. The concept of contingency suits human 
needs and we require a posteriori knowledge to cope in the world, but it does not apply to 
                                                     
172 Mates, 153. For Leibniz’s definitions, see Ariew & Garber p. 19, 217, 321. 
173 Adams, 3; Look 2013. There is an uncanny resemblance to 20th century modal logic dealing with possible 
worlds semantics. 
174 Ariew & Garber, 30 – 31. 
175 Original text, On Contingency, translated with notes in Ariew & Garber, 28. See also Adams p. 25 – 30. 
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Leibniz’s all-perceiving God. So, metaphysically speaking, “being on the table at that time” is 
a property of the cat in our example.  The predicate-in-subject -principle and that of sufficient 
reason justify, in later Leibniz, the claim that monadic substances are causally insulated.176 All 
individual substances are defined only by their complete notions, and nothing outside 
themselves. 
For Leibniz then, truth is not correspondence between propositions and states of affairs in 
the way it is often taken for granted by us. Instead, concepts are signs we assign to things. 
They express things and rigorous analysis of concepts is necessary to understand reality177. 
What is required of language is simply not to obscure this mirroring process. The problem 
was that Leibniz knew of no language that could be used to perfectly express concepts and 
therefore concepts would often get lost when words are assigned to them178. He devoted 
years of his life to the creation of a language that would avoid this problem, but though in 
retrospect his work was revolutionary, he eventually reduced the scope of the project and 
even then, never managed to get the results he wanted.179 What has just been recollected, is 
the basis for what Raili Kauppi called Leibniz’s intensional logic180. When we’d speak the truth 
in Leibniz’s envisioned lingua philosophica, we’d simply be figuring out the way things are 
through calculation. Philosophical debates would be about improper understanding of 
debaters over the concepts used by other parties. But, how is this realised in Ankersmit? 
When Ankersmit first presented his Narrative Logic, his intent was to explain how an 
intensional logic following Leibniz’s philosophy was needed to properly explain what it is that 
historians are writing about. Later he described a central thesis in his first book as follows:  
The relationship obtaining between a monad or substance and its perceptions or experience is exactly 
the same as that between a historical representation and the statements from which it is constructed. 
This is why Leibniz’s intensional logic is the kind of logic we need for understanding historical writing.181 
                                                     
176 Jolley 2005, 48 – 49; Mates, 85 – 86; Look, section 3.2. 
177 Adams, 67 – 71. Also see Philosophy and Language in Leibniz. In the article Donald Rutherford explores 
Leibniz’s developing views about the relationship between reality and the mind and language. 
178 Think of the term “” and all the meanings we assign to it. 
179 See Philosophy and Language in Leibniz by Donald Rutherford; chapter 1 in Catherine Wilsons Leibniz’s 
Metaphysics; or the biography of Leibniz by Maria Antognazza (where Leibniz’s attempts at the creation of a 
logical calculus and universal language is a central theme continually returned to).  
180 Kauppi, 196. Also, xiii – xiv: Kauppi, in her dissertation investigated Leibniz’s work in developing Aristotelian 
syllogisms and argued that Leibniz’s main interest was in intensional logic (containment of concepts in 
concepts) and that he had had good reasons to believe that such a logic could be completed. It was this project 
that was, in a sense, continued by Frege in the 19th century in creating his Begriffsschrift. On this influence, see 
chapter 2 in Michael Beaney’s Frege: Making sense. 
181 Ankermsit 2003, 432. He never speaks of representation in NL, but the idea is there. 
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As was already expressed in the previous section, historical representations or texts about 
history are strong individuals and therefore complete concepts in the Leibnizian intensional 
sense. On another occasion, Ankersmit calls the historian’s text a blind symbol or a sign, that 
is empty in meaning, until a meaning is given to it in a blind calculation of epistemological 
semantics182. This means that epistemologically the meaning can be said to be constructed 
from statements (i.e. the text is fully read by another historian). Its intension and not 
extension that’s relevant when we read historical texts, since – as described in the previous 
section – description of the past per se is impossible. 
Zeleňák has described this distinction made by Ankersmit between the intension of narrative 
substances (complete concepts) and extension of statements in narratives by suggesting that 
there is an “empirical” and “conceptual” component to Ankersmit’s logic of narratives. He 
calls the distinction made by Ankermsit the “fundamental difference thesis” and suggests 
eventually that while such a thesis is fruitful because it helps us guard against naively 
empirical accounts of the past, it also creates a problem: 
---it is doubtful that the underdetermination present at the level of representation should suddenly 
disappear when we descend to the bottom level of its constituents. (Conversely, the opponents might 
question where the underdetermination comes from if we build the representation from the 
statements strictly determined by the facts they describe.)183 
 
Referring to several critiques of Ankersmit’s work, Zeleňák suggests that the problem is 
resolvable if the historical representation were thought of as “a whole produced by the 
interplay of factual and conceptual elements”184. It is suggested that Ankersmit is drawing an 
unnecessary semantic gap between the statement and the text. Essentially this idea is carried 
over from modern intensional logic. Gottlob Frege’s most famous text, On Sense and 
Reference, distinguishes between the reference of a proper name and its sense. The former 
being the object in treality denoted by it and the latter what thought the proper name 
expresses. For example, “the Morning Star” and “the Evening Star” both denote the planet 
Venus, but still mean different things and telling an ignorant person that the Morning Star is 
the Evening Star will be a revelation, that could not occur if one tells him that Venus is 
                                                     
182 WEM, 13. 
183 Zeleňák, 2009, 367. 
184 Ibid.  
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Venus.185 The same proper name can then have many senses and the same is true of 
sentences. For example, Michael Beaney’s reading of Frege’s logic suggests that a large unit 
of language such as a historical text would in Fregean intensional logic have a sense that is a 
function of all the senses of the statements contained by the text arranged in a particular 
way.186 In a later text Zeleňák describes Ankersmit’s notion of historical representation as 
similar to this mentioned Fregean concept of sense 187. He backs down however, surmising 
that Ankersmit claims his theory is an argument for the connection between historical reality 
and the writing of history instead of being merely a formal account for historical language.  
Considering that this paper is about Ankermsit’s Leibnizianism it might be surprising then that 
here it is actually Frege (or Zeleňák) who is Leibnizian as far as the characteristica universalis, 
or Leibniz’s ideas about intensional logic are concerned. But here one must remember the 
distinction made by Ankersmit between historical research and historical texts as 
representations188.  Ankersmit has never denied the applicability of such a logic or any variant 
of it in the work of historians as far as what he means by “historical research” is concerned. 
And, in this sense, he is never actually in conflict with contemporary logic. In fact, he never 
denies anyone from thinking about text just as Frege or Zeleňák do. His interest is turned 
towards how historical language is oriented towards the past. 
In NL, an analogy is drawn between the universe of Leibniz’s monads and that of narrative 
substances. This analogy is the useful fiction of the “narrativist universe”. He encourages the 
reader to imagine a fictional universe where instead of spatial dimensions in y-, x- and z-axles 
you’d have infinite dimensions in possible true statements. Figuratively, one can imagine all 
possible narrative substances to be part of this universe. A narrative substance is then a 
sequenced “activation” of some of these infinite possible statements. And there can be no 
                                                     
185 Frege, 1892.  
186 Beaney, 155 – 165. Of secondary interest here is the fact that Frege cited Leibniz’s characteristica 
universalis as a major inspiration for his own logical work in the preface of Begriffsschrift (p. 6 – 7). Both Frege 
and Leibniz had the aim of providing science a tool in a logical language that would enable the users of this 
language to not only as a means of communication, but also as a method of discovery and proof. In the 
introduction I brought up the issue of Leibniz’s nominalism and it is noteworthy that just as Leibniz thought of 
concepts as dispositions of the mind to think about things, so are Fregean senses modes of presentation for 
things. Both Frege and Leibniz approached language, in their respective universal languages as conceptual 
constructs that could always be logically broken down to their constituents. Leibniz referred to these as 
primitive concepts to which all complete concepts should be reducible (See Leibniz’s essay Meditations on 
Knowledge, Truth and Ideas in Ariew & Garber p. 24). 
187 Zeleňák 2010. 
188 See p. 19.  
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disparity between intension and extension here since there just is nothing to extend to. A text 
is referred to when all the statements are activated and there is no meaning in a constructed 
sense. Texts of course commonsensically have meaning for us, but they do not in the narrative 
universe, where they are just sequenced arrays of statements.189 As it is with Leibniz’s 
monads, you can’t go outside. There is no meaning outside. Yet both the Monadology and 
narrative logic are theories about the noumenal and therefore do this “going outside”. This 
results in all narratives or historical representations essentially being “meaningless signs”. 
While all this is coherent and nothing prevents us from seeing in this a description of what 
texts are and why they are individuals, the question arises about how helpful this really is? 
The answer is that it’s not supposed to be helpful, since it’s just an elaboration for what 
historical texts are. He later brings up metaphor in chapter VII and argues for an irrefutable 
role of the metaphorical capacity of (natural) historical language for laying out the historian’s 
theses He also brings up aesthetics in chapter VIII to explain that we rely on it when deciding 
what kind of a text we present to our audiences190. This, along with his alignment with 
postmodernism in relation to text (though not the statement) invited trouble for him, which 
probably inspired him to reformulate his theory further towards its current form as 
representational. Opponents like Paul Roth, on the other hand, have argued that Ankersmit’s 
insistence on the special status of historical language creates unnecessary complications (in 
requiring a separate logic of texts and creating the semantic gap) and rewards one with 
nothing that has application191.  
And to make an account of this, he need not Leibniz’s logic as put forth in his logical calculus, 
but his metaphysics as I have been interpreting it at the first part of this chapter. And here 
the notions of conscious experience and subjectivity, in the Leibnizian sense of the 
Monadology, are central. While intensionality of language can be useful in explaining how 
whole texts are constituted semantically, this is not Ankersmit’s project. His semantics of 
historiography aim at a more fundamental problem as an account for how the past that 
manifests to the historian and subsequently is represented by the historian in a process that 
                                                     
189 NL, 138. 
190 NL, 228. Here he pronounces Huizinga’s account of the historian’s “aesthetic grasp of the past”. Later in SHE 
a chapter is devoted to Huizinga and he elaborates historical experience and Huizinga’s ideas better. 
191 Roth, Paul 2013. Whistling history. 
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can only be described with an aesthetic approach due to the metaphorical nature of the 
historian’s language. But these are issues for the next chapter. 
Now, considering what has been said about complete concepts and colligation in 
historiography192, one could argue that Ankersmit must be wrong here. Following Frege’s 
“Leibnizian vision” one could claim that meaning of historical texts is logically nothing more 
but the function of the arranged meanings of the statements193. It should theoretically then 
be possible to reduce the meanings of texts to a formal setting that could be laid out in a 
logical language. The metaphorical nature of historical language would disappear, and the 
intended meanings of historians would be accessible to readers. This idea is of course utopian, 
since no human mind could be expected to consciously process a history-book from cover to 
cover using such language to arrive at the exact intended meaning or Sinn, to use the Fregean 
term. However, one could still argue, as Paul Roth (2013) And John Zammito (2005) have, that 
Ankersmit is creating an unnecessary complication to language by demanding that 
historiography be allocated to the realm of representational logic. It might be said that there 
is no gap between textual meaning and the meaning of statements, but rather that there is 
an incredibly long distance from a bunch of the latter to the former. 
However, there is a misinterpretation underlying all this. To see what this misinterpretation 
is, the distinction made by Ankersmit between historical research and history-writing must be 
maintained. Ankersmit can actually claim to be Leibnizian in both these domains. He has on 
many occasions said that theorising and different logic have nothing to do with how 
representation is realised194. Therefore, the logic of history-writing must be dealt with 
separately, namely because it is about the thesis of the historian’s work, or the aspect of the 
past represented by the text. As such, it belongs to the realm of the sublime experience and 
is subjective. 
At the same time, it is the only way to connect with past reality. The idea of history-writing as 
representation is needed by Ankersmit because historians are thought by him to substitute 
their thesis of the past with a text195. Historians bring forth their vision with texts that – like 
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pieces of art – attempt to bring forth a certain aspect of the past that is deemed important. 
In such a representation, parts simply have no meaning. Only when the viewer sees the whole 
is the intended effect achieved. 
Ankersmit is not particularly interested in the way language operates in historical research 
and that is why this matter usually avoided once the distinction between statements and 
whole texts as representations has been made. He encourages anyone approaching the logic 
of history-writing on the level of statement to apply any logical approach one likes.196 This is 
why he argues for the double-function of statements in historical texts197. We must keep 
repeating that his intent is to argue that the historical text as a whole is what is central when 
describing how history as an academic discipline operates. His theory presents a logic that 
treats whole texts as representations of the historian’s vision of the past. The analogy drawn 
to the monad helps both to explain that Leibniz’s intentional logic forbids the breaking down 
of texts and see that whole texts as representations substitute the historian’s personal vision 
of the past. It is a linguistic manifestation of what the historian experienced. This notion of 
experience will be explored next. 
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II - Substance:  Experience, function and representation 
 
Ankersmit’s claims of Leibnizianism most significantly refer to his appliance of Leibniz’s 
metaphysics and his substance theory as it appears in the Monadology. The Monadology, in 
our interpretation so far, is the answer to the problem of what is noumenal. And this answer 
is the monads. The monads are perception and their synchronised infinite totality is all there 
is to noumenal reality. But we must recall that individually, for the monads themselves, what 
is noumenal is experience. We will here see what this amounts to in the context of Ankersmit’s 
transposing the idea to philosophy of history.  
In chapter V of NL, it is stated: “As will become clear in the course of this study, Leibniz’s use 
of the concept of substance or monad is most easily adaptable to the narrativist philosophy 
advocated here”. The exact theorems from the Monadology applied in narrative logic are 1 – 
9, 11, 12, 18, 38, 47, 51, 57, 58 and 61198. Of these, theorems up to 12 describe the indivisibility 
and individuality of substance and its nature as what Ankersmit later calls a strong individual. 
As explained in the previous chapter, the monadology through these theorems helps define 
narrative substances as intensional entities that are defined by nothing outside themselves. 
§ 18 describes the monad as an entelechy, that is, an individual entity that is the source of its 
own actions. Theorems 38, 47, 51, 58 and 61 are, I believe, more related to the historian’s 
relationship with the past and to the application of narrative logic and therefore we will return 
to them in the next chapter where I see these theorems as a master key to Ankersmit’s 
application of Leibniz’s metaphysics in explaining how objectivity works in the discipline of 
history and what historians do in their work when looked at from Ankersmit’s proposed 
paradigm. I have included in this work a body of these chosen theorems, to help the reader 
stay on board. (See attachment I)   
In this chapter, of more interest will be theorems 14 – 17, which are not featured in NL, but 
become of interest later as Ankersmit connects Leibnizian substance with perception and 
experience. Ankersmit seems to have expanded his Leibnizian vision. This, he claims, followed 
from his terminological transition from “narrative substance” to “representation”199. He 
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began to pronounce the representationalist aspect of Leibniz’s metaphysics. Ankersmit’s 
historical representation is divided into what is represented in this interpretation he follows 
Cassirer, since the latter was apparently among the first to give an application to the 
Monadology in both philosophy of science and the humanities200. I admit the distinction 
between the notions of what the historian does and how objectivity is realised in 
historiography is not clear cut. Once you explain one you explain the other, because both are 
based on the same Leibnizian idea, namely that we are dealing with (conscious) perception 
about the past. 
The first part in this chapter will focus on historical experience and explore the development 
and meaning of this concept. My argument is that when it comes to historical experience, 
Ankersmit is applying the Monadology as an explanation to what is noumenal for the monad, 
which is analogous to the historian, who creates points of view to the past by experiencing 
them. These experiences have qualities that are irreducible to epistemology. Historical 
experience and the sublime make up historical ontology. Historical experience is closely 
related to representation, because what we try to represent in history-writing is how (or as 
what) the past emerges in our consciousness. The continuance from experience to 
representation is difficult to discern. This is because, as with Cassirer’s symbolic forms, a 
crucial point is that existing representations define what form consciousness takes and on the 
other hand, conscious experience defines what our representations are of. Therefore, there 
will be overlap in between the two sections of this chapter.  
The second part, as one would expect, will the elaborate the notion of historical 
representation and explain what is Leibnizian about it. It is introduced by Ankersmit as an 
analogy between the monad and Ankersmit’s narrative substance or what he later called the 
presented of a historical representation. With this analogy, it is argued by Ankersmit that 
these representations bring forth the historian’s conscious perception of the past by providing 
a point of view into the past. In NL, he writes:  
We should understand historism not as a philosophy on things in the past, but on their (narrative) 
description; and as we know the past from only descriptions of it, it is not surprising that it was easy for the 
historists to confuse the two201. 
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And yet things are what Ankersmit’s narrative logic comes down to. Things postulated in 
Ankersmit’s representational system by a Leibnizian analogy between the monad and 
narrative substance, which are said to exist somewhere between language and historical 
reality as we commonly understand it202 This may sound strange because of Ankersmit’s way 
of understanding thinghood in the Leibnizian way. And as he himself writes: “One should 
never forget that these “images” or “pictures” – narrative substances, as we shall call them – 
are things, not concepts”. And one might replace thing here, with monad to see where we are 
going. I will argue that while essentially the same, Ankersmit’s interpretation of this thinghood 
develops through the years, as he begins to see experience as more important in historical 
representation. 
Historical Experience 
 
Historical language can mean two things for Ankersmit. Firstly, it is the language of historical 
research. In historical research the historian describes the past objectively. The past is the 
reality and one needs to remind oneself here that one’s subjectivity in biases and emotions 
can affect the description. One must extinguish the phenomenal to get to the noumenal, just 
as historicists like Ranke wished to erase themselves from their work. On the other hand, and 
more importantly, historical language is not language in the conventional sense, but 
representation. In Ankersmit’s system, the whole text is a representation that stands in for 
historical reality that does not exist in the past in a similar fashion to how it did in historical 
research. Here what is noumenal is the represented and all attempts to analyse this (reduce 
it to something else) will be phenomenal. In MTR, the represented is an aspect of the past, 
which is not the past, but simply a point of view into a specific historical subject or perhaps 
an attempt to combine multiple subjects into a coherent whole203. In SHE, it is written about 
in terms of historical experience. I suggest that it is helpful for our understanding of Ankersmit 
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comes to more abstract things like the industrialisation, we see that its actually very difficult to connect this 
aspect of the past with anything particular. However, Ankersmit insists that this is no problem for 
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realism and therefore there is nothing to represent in the past – as understood in historical research – to begin 
with. What is represented is in the historian him- or herself and therein is noumenal historical reality.  
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to see these dimensions of the noumenal and phenomenal follow from an analogous 
relationship between the theories of historical experience and the monadology.   
Though few seem to have noticed it, the notion of conscious experience has been present in 
Ankersmit’s work all along, though it only becomes well-defined 1994 with the last part of 
History and Tropology, where Ankersmit writes about the “phenomenology of historical 
experience”. He gave a more thorough account in Sublime Historical Experience in 2005.  NL 
is a book on the logic of historical texts, and it deals with the notion of experience only so far 
as to posit it as a fundamental logical entity that is essential to history-writing. It deliberately 
deals only with texts as the form of historical representation204. Narrative substance is said to 
refer “exclusively to narrative interpretations of the past”205. It seems that he still identified 
strongly at this point with narrativism and tended to focus on language, despite considering 
experience in a limited way. In later work, Ankersmit clearly states that historical 
representation is not limited to linguistic expression alone. As the following citation implies, 
he thinks representation is achieved in other mediums besides language as we commonly 
know it: 
Admittedly, HR’s consist of linguistic entities, but the import of that fact dwindles to irrelevance against 
the far more crucial fact that HR’s are strong individuals and belong, as such, to a regime different from 
that ruling the linguistic entities being their properties.206 
What is represented by historical representation is not linguistic. It is merely that historical 
representations as we commonly think of them – texts – are. Therefore, I will reformulate 
what I just stated like this: Experience is a fundamental logical entity that is essential to the 
representation of history. Representation includes narrative but not the other way around. 
This distinction is important, and I shall return to it later in the chapter when addressing 
aesthetics. Now that this is out of the way, let us proceed to how Ankersmit has approached 
the notion of experience. In NL, Ankersmit writes about the concept of self-identity, proposing 
it as the logical condition for historical experience. The identity of an individual person is 
described as something defined either externally or internally. The externalist definition of 
my identity – Ankersmit calls this the personal identity – could be something like “Aleksi Oja 
is x, y and z” where x, y and z denote properties that help us identify Aleksi Oja among other 
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quantifiable objects. The difficulty here is that one is defining identity circularly by addressing 
it as an identity. And since history is about change in things, how does one define a subject of 
change in this way? Ankersmit begins his elaboration of internal self-identity (Iint) by saying 
that “there is a peculiar ‘unity of perception and/or feeling’ that pervades all our successive 
experiences and states of consciousness”207. Experience and consciousness are obviously of 
importance here. The last section of chapter VI in NL deals with this “Iint” followingly:  
 
The concept of selfidentity denotes the uniqueness and the unity that characterizes and pervades all 
my experiences; it is the logical entity that, somehow, ensures that all my experiences and states of 
consciousness are really mine and not either partly or totally somebody else’s. Thanks to this logical 
entity, i.e. the concept ’Iint’, all the experiences I come to see as my experiences are effectively 
attributed to me, whatever these experiences may have been or will be. In other words, “’Iint’ is the 
logical entity required for the possibility of describing the (historical) change I undergo during (phases 
of) my life.208 
 
We all internally and logically think of ourselves as subjects of experience, and this does not 
prevent us from thinking of ourselves also abstractly as objects with properties. There are two 
separate logical realms here, so to speak. The self has extension and intension. The sentence 
“Iext am a” refers to the individual called Aleksi Oja and a denotes a property of that individual. 
But “Iint am a” refers to a narrative substance that I use to represent myself. Ankersmit 
continues: 
The unity of this Ns “Iint” explains the intuition of continuity we associate with the stream of our 
experiences, states of consciousness and so on. Individual statements on my experiences can be derived 
analytically from the complete notion of “Iint”, whatever these experiences have been or will be. 
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the Ns “Iint” refers to a history I have constructed on 
myself.209 
 
Iint is the subject of change that constitutes the historian’s consciousness. It must be thought 
of as a narrative substance itself. Committing to historicism, Ankersmit retains this central 
tenet – that a thing is defined by its history – at the root of narrative logic. We must think of 
narrative substances as entities that are formally modelled after Iint. We can construct the 
histories of other things after a realisation about the historicity of our self-identity. This does 
not, however, suggest that personal experiences should be projected onto past subjects in an 
attempt to arrive at some conclusions (as they are in hermeneuticism) but only that self-
identity as defined here – a narrative of our consecutive experiences – is the model for 
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history-writing or historical representation. We think of some narrative of the past as tragic 
and this mood may shadow the narrative in a similar way that a person may reflect his own 
life as tragic. Consciousness has form that is defined by all the previous forms it had. A 
personal history in the form of a narrative is used in defining the self, and this acts as a model 
for other narrativization as well, complete with experience: 
That we are aware of having a history ourselves (selfidentity) is the logical prerequisite for all writing 
of history, that is, for our ability to discern “identities” (or Nss) and, possibly, at some later stage, 
“individualities” (i.e. intensional types of Nss) in external historical reality.210 
 
Iint is what provides us with the formal framework for how to understand history. In later 
writing he states, that:  HR’s are not models of past reality, but past reality is a model of 
HR’s”211. This means that good representations will make those who behold them experience 
reality in a different way and here we are already touching upon the supposed “application 
part” of Ankersmit’s logic212. The model given in a representation is, however a mere proposal 
and it is the closest we ever get to the past, since Ankersmit thinks that it is absurd to assume 
the past exists somehow to be discovered213. While epistemologically speaking we are of 
course making the attempt at forming a model of the past, the separation between the past 
and the present prevents us from saying that such models approach truth. This is the gap 
between science and history and from here we can see how the latter may even subsume the 
former, while the reverse will not do. In “narrative idealism” the strong individuals mentioned 
in the previous chapter function as a way of understanding past reality. 
Like Cassirer’s symbolic forms, which are in his theory our ways of making sense of reality, 
these strong individuals are ways of making sense of the past. And just as symbolic forms 
constitute reality, historical representation gives us historical reality in the a new represented 
when we reflect on all the representations that we have available to us. There is a two-way 
motion to be discerned here. such strong individuals are irreducible to anything else, but they 
may be represented in symbols. Strictly speaking neither symbolic forms or representeds can 
be observed, because they rather are the observing. Holding a history-book in one’s hand and 
looking at the writing on the pages, this initially sounds absurd. But having freshly read the 
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(hopefully well-written) book and dwelling on a possible sense of discovery, one may come 
to a different conclusion. 
Here is where Leibniz enters the picture once more. Before SHE was published, Ankersmit 
wrote of how Leibniz had affected what he was about to elaborate in that book: 
But a quite different story may also be told about Leibniz. For one might also argue that a monad’s or 
a substance’s perceptions are, in fact, its experiences.214 
 
---in fact,there is nothing outside experience in Leibniz’s monadology. Leibniz gives us experience 
without a subject of experience – and this is what we need from the perspective of the sublime, since 
the weight of a subject of experience preceding experience will inevitably destroy the sublime by 
forcing it willy-nilly in the history of the subject and by ‘domesticating’ it as a mere part of this history215. 
 
The first citation confirms what I suspected was his interpretation of Leibniz and he is clearly 
referring to the previously ignored § 14 in the Monadology: “The passing state that 
incorporates and represents a multitude within a unity—i.e. within the simple substance— is 
nothing but what we call perception”216. I agree with Ankersmit’s interpretation, though he 
does take some liberties here, since not all monads but clearly only some are thought by 
Leibniz to have conscious experience217. However, as said, he does not cite the use of this 
theorem in NL. And he never explicitly singles them out thereafter. The second citation 
follows Cassirer’s interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics (and that, I suspect, of Mahnke, 
though I have never read him). Experience is not subjective or objective, as these categories 
belong to the realm of symbolic forms, which come after experience.  Cassirer states in the 
first volume of his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, that he "seeks the categories of the 
consciousness of objects in the theoretical, intellectual sphere, and starts from the 
assumption that such categories must be at work wherever a cosmos, a characteristic and 
typical world view, takes form out of the chaos of impressions"218. What there fundamentally 
and nominally is, is pure experience. We should note that a problem follows from this: If 
experience is all there nominally is and categories such as temporality (preceding experience) 
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is rejected, the pre-established harmony that Leibniz is arguing for, shatters219. This 
“Leibnizian dilemma”, as Ankersmit calls it, is better dealt with later as we move from 
experience to the notion of representation. 
In the meantime, we will address another objection that could be made by reminding 
Ankersmit about Leibniz’s commitment to metaphysical plurality. His main problem with 
Spinoza was that the latter proposed in his Ethics that phenomenal things are nothing more 
than the modes of God as the one substance. It would seem that with the sublime we might 
end up with Spinoza instead of Leibniz. Ankersmit has confessed that in his ideas about the 
notion of the sublime he is in debt to Hegel, who, in Ankersmit’s own words saw in Spinoza 
saw a champion against Kantian transcendentalism220. From this point of view, defending the 
idea Ankersmit is Leibnizian “through and through” becomes more difficult. While Leibniz 
certainly takes experience seriously, it is not obvious that he goes beyond the subject to the 
concept of sublime. There is at least one way to argue this however, and I will deal with it in 
the last section of this chapter. An answer to this, I believe, would be to remind the presenter 
of the objection about the distinction made between representation and experience. The 
plurality of the monads is crucial if we are to make narrative logic work. But with experience, 
we are dealing only with a single point of view and a single aspect of the universe, and 
therefore the question of plurality becomes irrelevant. 
NL brushes on experience, but it does not dwell on it and therefore I find it plausible to claim 
that the historical experience he later came to pronounce was not yet developed. I believe 
Ankersmit only later began to reflect on this level of historical ontology more. This is because 
if Iint  is a narrative substance, it cannot be the represented, but is the form of representation. 
Though Leibniz is featured thoroughly in the book (recall the list of theorems on page 43) 
Ankersmit never refers to the theorems in the monadology that would have allowed him to 
argue for the claims made in the two citations above. These would have been § 14 – 17, 19 – 
20, where Leibniz brings up the notions that monads are perception guided by the force of 
appetition and that a soul or a mind is a simple substance. Jonathan Menezes has suggested 
that what prompted Ankersmit to pronounce the notion of experience was a brief “moment 
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of postmodernism” during the 80’s that made him aware of a hole in his philosophy that may 
be interpreted as making it lose touch with the past completely221. Menezes makes an acute 
and important observation in that during the 1980’s is was not altogether clear yet what 
“postmodernism” meant or how it could be defined222. In HT, Ankersmit already makes a 
distinction between postmodernism and historicism in how the latter in the work of Meinecke 
and Huizinga applies the notions of “nostalgia” and experience. On postmodernism he notes: 
One of the criticisms we may justifiably make of postmodernism is that it focuses so much on textual 
presentation and feels so little inclined to consider closely modernist accounts of the experiential 
basis for what is expressed and presented by the (historical) text223.  
 
And with “experiential basis” he means not only empirical experience but also “nostalgic 
experience”. Such an experience always contains an emotional content that transfers to the 
greatest of historical writings224. Ankersmit writes that “by consistently upholding the 
unattainability of the past, [nostalgic experience] respects the distance or difference that is 
necessary for the possibility of historical experience”225. Bryan Cartledge has written a book 
about the history of Hungary titled “The Will to Survive”, from the name alone it is clear that 
a sense of nostalgia inspired to writer and it could be said that the hsiorian had a commitment 
to the past event in this region and it’s people accompanied by a historical experience as 
described by Ankersmit226. 
Here we are approaching the themes of Sublime Historical Experience, in which the namesake 
of the book is how Ankersmit explains how we are in touch with the past. He takes after 
Edmund Burke’s and Kant’s notions of the sublime, which blur seemingly contradictory 
emotions (such as pleasure and pain) together, and notes that both these philosophers had 
to turn against their own epistemological views to account for this aesthetic category that is 
based on experience227. With his interpretation of Leibniz, he takes this further and merges 
the subject and the object in his category of sublime historical experience, which makes 
epistemology secondary to experience. What is interesting is that neither in SHE or in 
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discussing his inspiration to this notion, after SHE was published, he no longer mentions 
Leibniz as a direct inspiration, though he does bring up Aristotle’s de Anima, in which a theory 
of the soul that inspired Leibniz is present228. It seems inconceivable that he would drop the 
idea of Leibniz’s going beyond the subject and object in experience, considering his previous 
ideas in 2003 and the fact that he claims Leibniz to be his most important inspiration. Perhaps 
the reason is that the subject and object are never explicitly disposed of in Leibniz’s work. This 
only occurs in the Monadology if one interprets the monad as a function the way Cassirer 
does. What is interesting though is that Leibniz’s mathematical notions of function and 
calculus are connected to the notion of the sublime in SHE229. This is something we will return 
to when addressing these notions in the next chapter. 
While historical experience is preconditioned by all our previous epistemologically conceived 
categories such as the subject and the object or nation-states or species – these are what 
facilitate the experience and make change possible. Without professionalised historical 
research and formerly established accepted ways of reporting one’s findings there would be 
no possibility of historical experience230. But historical experience is nevertheless something 
that has the power to transform these very categories that guide historical research and the 
writing of history: 
The sublime or traumatic experience has a directness absent from “normal” experience since we must 
undergo it without the protective mediation of the cognitive and psychological apparatus that normally 
processes our experience. But on the other hand it is abnormally indirect since we cannot face this 
directness and, precisely because of this, dissociate ourselves from it and thus remain,in a way, external 
to it.231 
Trauma goes with the sublime and it shatters previous ways of seeing the past as 
something232. It makes the past by making it distinct from the present way of thinking. I 
personally find it difficult to make a distinction between mere subjective experience and the 
sublime variant. In an interview, Ankersmit says that he basic form of historical experience is 
the sublime one. It collectively changes us by making us aware of the gap between the past 
and present. Think of the French revolution, the black death, world war II and the holocaust. 
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These kinds of events cause a traumatic and sublime experience that will not fail to make us 
aware of how we used to think and forcibly move us into a new way of experiencing reality, 
with no way back but in memory, and effigy233. I suppose Ankersmit would say that grand 
historical narratives concern such events and are only attempted by the most ambitious of 
writers that attempt give an account of the past to reveal something insightful and important 
about ourselves as human beings. But of course, much of history is written about era’s long 
gone, that were devoid of such cataclysmic events. Change may be subtle and historical 
experience may be hard to come by. But sensitive individuals may still be overcome by the 
sublime in even fairly mundane circumstances, such as glancing at an old engraving, that 
makes one realise the vast distance between the past and the present. Ankersmit sees in 
Huizinga someone who wrote history based on this sort of experience234. 
Yet all historical texts have are representations and are based in the historian’s experience of 
the past. Of course, smaller works in history – say – undergraduate papers would not be about 
such matters but rather report some humble findings about a small archive or perhaps letters 
written by some somehow significant person who has passed away. Can we really say that 
such texts are new representations of the past, formed through sublime experience? 
Ankersmit could have two answers here: Firstly, he would note that most history today, 
especially undergraduate works, have a heavy emphasis on historical research at the cost of 
historical writing. They tend to give lots of facts based on sources and claim little, and this is 
to be expected from inexperienced writers practicing historical research. Additionally, he 
could say that these papers nevertheless do pick and order facts with the purpose of giving a 
thesis, which may indeed present the reader (and the writer) with a thesis that is based on a 
genuine historical experience, and which might change the readers ways of seeing the past. 
Another important aspect about historical experience that Ankersmit pronounces is the 
qualitative emotional content of experience. Sublime and trauma go hand in hand. He refers 
to Otto Bollnow’s notion of “Stimmung”, or “moods and feelings” as Ankermsit translated it, 
describing it as the “color of all our experience” as opposed to the empirical form of it235. The 
same could be restated to anglo-saxon audiences more accessibly, I believe, through the 
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concept of qualia, or the qualitative aspects of experience irreducible with the terminology 
and methods of natural sciences236. Qualia describe how there is something it is like to 
experience, say colour, fear, or sound. We distinguish between different qualia and can 
connect them with the senses but there is no way to explain why a sound should have the 
raw feel of sound and seeing colour should qualitatively feel like seeing colour. 
Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument “Mary’s room” features a scientist, Mary, who 
has devoted her life to the scientific study of colour237. The thing is, she has never experienced 
colour personally, having spent her entire life in a black and white room. Once she is let out 
and presented a red rose, it’s persuasive to think that she learns something new about colour 
by getting a first taste of the quality of colour. This is not what Ankersmit is claiming per se, 
because qualia such as the unquantifiable experience of colour is related to objects. And 
mood as Ankersmit refers to it is something more persistent and basic. Trying qualitative raw 
feels like “melancholy” or “irony” would probably get one closer to it.  
While the point Ankersmit makes in SHE is primarily meant for philosophers of history, he is 
also encouraging historians to embrace “moods and feelings” instead of removing them from 
their writing238. In PR, he states that “representations are, essentially, metaphorical proposals 
for how to see or to perceive a certain part of reality”239. Thus. they should increase our 
options in making the choice in “seeing as”. (Though in case of sublime experience there is no 
choice, but our way of seeing the past is forcibly transformed.) Similarly, in HR, it is stated 
that a crucial function of history-writing is that it provides us ways of deciding between good 
and bad political or moral values240. While one can argue that this needs not involve emotion, 
but mere reason suffices, we might answer that in Ankersmit’s notion of the historical 
experience the emotional cannot be separated from whole of experience that acts as the basis 
for reason. For Ankersmit subjectivity and the historian’s moral opinions are what make 
history meaningful and the same is true in political representation. Without the subjective 
element, historiography would never be able to fulfil its important function of making 
                                                     
236 See e.g. The Conscious Mind p. 4 – 6. by David J. Chalmers. Chalmers’ focus is on the mind-body problem 
and he uses the term qualitative feel.  
237 Jackson, Frank 1982: Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly. 32 (127): 127–136. 
238 Moskalewicz, 256. 
239 PR, 228 – 229. 
240 HR, 99 – 100. 
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history.241 And as an important addition, subjectivity is not merely morality. Ankersmit’s view 
is that aesthetics is of equal, if not greater importance: “Indeed, aesthetic preferences, 
stylistic habits, lack of imagination or congeniality with a certain subject matter or just sheer 
incompetence may also make an author’s historiography ‘subjective’”.242 Here another 
connection can be established between Cassirer and Ankersmit, as the former saw the 
emotional and aesthetic content of history-writing as important. In the chapter about history, 
in Essay on Man he compares it to poetry, while keeping the notions separate:  
Poetry is not a mere imitation of nature; history is not a narration of dead facts and events. History as 
well as poetry is an organon of our self-knowledge, an indispensable instrument for building up our 
human universe.243 
Cassirer and Ankersmit both see a strong affinity between art and history and describe both 
as important ways of gaining knowledge about ourselves. I am hesitant to declare what 
exactly separates these two thinkers (and this is a matter of my own lack of knowledge) but 
it is clear that Ankersmit focuses on philosophy of history specifically and argues for its 
importance in his theory of representation. As far as I understand Cassirer, he did not think 
that there was a world beyond symbolic forms we have access to. And here he is similar to 
Ankersmit as far as historical experience and historical representation go. As far as 
representations or symbolic forms go, there is no reality beyond them. However, Ankersmit 
also moves on the level of historical research and therefore one can not say of his philosophy 
as a whole that he denies there is a reality beyond representations. Another difference is that 
Cassirer does not (I think) differentiate as clearly between the two movements that take place 
between historical representation and historical experience. Both help constitute the other 
in Ankersmit, whereas in Cassirer, it seems, is committed to a narrower interpretation and 
application of the Leibnizian monad. One symbolic form proceeds to another and as far as I 
know he does not define objectivity and subjectivity as Ankersmit does. A matter for the next 
chapter both through the concept of function and the objectivity-subjectivity dichotomy. 
These things are related. 
I think Ankersmit’s ambitions demand him to see a two-way road between the experience 
and representation. One the one hand, sublime experience changes us. On the other historical 
                                                     
241 Chapter 2, In Praise of Subjectivity makes this point.  
242 NL, 214 – 215. 
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representation enables us to change reality by creating representations about our 
experiences. Cassirer does not speak of representations but is more interested generally in 
theory, language, and myth. Ankersmit writes in SHE: “---we have, with the sublime a 
philosophical category legitimating the question of how to conceive of this apparently 
impossible creative interaction of narrative and experience”. He pronounces sublime 
experience and its re-presentation instead of symbolic form. He seems to put more weight on 
creativity and metaphor as our means of affecting the world politically in giving in 
representations powerful metaphors that change the way others experience reality. In 
Political Representation the ultimate point is, that the theory of historical representation can 
explain what representational democracy is about and draw power and attention away from 
the policy-making of “experts” and theory-based politics in favour of experience-based 
politics.244 Here draws comparison to Miki Kiyoshi’s “logic of the imagination”, which in turn 
was inspired by Cassirer. In Miki’s philosophy what is experienced is preconditioned by 
memory and what we experience is pure, spontaneous creation and what is represented is 
metaphorical creation by the historian. Miki’s aim was to create a philosophy that explained 
how reality is created in forms or symbols that others may reflect on to create further 
realities245. 
So, experience is the at the root of historiography and this notion can be traced all the way to 
Leibniz through Cassirer and historicism. But what is representation then? The previous 
paragraphs already point us to a direction that should be obvious. Namely aesthetics and 
specifically metaphor, since we are commonly talking about language when discussing 
historiography. The model of representation is again to be found in the concept of the monad, 
but there is a slight problem here. One already referred to earlier when I mentioned the 
“Leibnizian dilemma”. While Leibniz’s metaphysics is the key, as we saw already in chapter I, 
                                                     
244 See chapter 8 in Political Representation. In p. 195 – 198 Ankersmit argues that representations provided by 
individuals (possibly acting as representatives of a group of people) are a critical part of policy making. 
Representations, when reflected with other representations provide a framework in which choices are made. 
The state apparatus has knowledge provided by experts, but needs representations provided by political actors 
to organise this knowledge into representations, which are evaluated by aesthetic standards. This is something 
we will return to shortly, though not in the framework of politics. 
245 See John W. M. Krummel, 2016: Introduction to Miki Kiyoshi and his Logic of the Imagination. Social 
Imaginaries 2.1. p. 13 – 24.  
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there are adjustments to be made to the Monadology if we are to understand the analogy 
Ankersmit has made between the monad and his concept historical representation. 
Historical Representation 
 
As a theist, it was always in Leibniz’s interests to promote metaphysics that would make room 
for the wisdom of God. Ariew and Garber even suggest that the Monadology is no more but 
a further elaboration of Leibniz’s Théodicée246. As we have seen, even though substances in 
Leibniz’s monadic universe are not causally interacting with one another, he maintained that 
God nevertheless had ensured harmonious synchronicity of all human experience. I. e. that 
conscious souls share perceptions, despite not truly interacting with each other in any way. 
Descartes had shared such theistic aspirations but had never been successful in providing an 
account for how his two substances, the mental and the extended, affected each other.247 
Leibniz provided an answer in complete denial of intersubstancial causation. There were no 
categories of mental and the extended, but instead all monads would perceive a shared 
universe perfectly harmoniously, because God had chosen to create such a world on account 
of his moral perfection. Theorem 51 of the Monadology, one the Ankersmit mentions as 
applicable in narrative logic, describes how the principle of pre-established harmony ensures 
that perceptional states of any monad reflect and can be used to explain the perceptional 
states of other monads. Theorem 57 introduces an analogy between the universe and a town 
which is looked upon from different perspectives. The town is the same for everyone, though 
perceptions of it differ. On the other hand, and more precisely, the town exists due to our 
common perceptions of it. The town is not a genuine substance, but an aggregate. A well-
founded phenomenon. 
In some ways similar case of a need to account for God (and perhaps more familiar one) can 
be found in Kant, who distinguished between the noumenal world of which we can have no 
knowledge and the phenomenal world, of which we can have knowledge by imposing on 
reality categories such as temporality, dimension and causality. Now, Kant himself thought 
that science was about the phenomenal and that we must avoid attempting to gain 
knowledge of things as they are, but he was unable to ignore the noumenal completely 
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because he situated some central notions – such as God, immortality and freedom – in it. 
These were not issues for pure reason but faith. The difference between Kant and Leibniz is 
that the latter clung to God not only through belief but also reason. The Monadology itself 
begins as an attempt at coherent explanation of the noumenal but gradually adds the 
phenomenal and eventually God’s goodness. All based on what he figured were the most 
rational of principles, though it may be argued that faith is ever present in the Monadology in 
the sense that it was faith precisely that brought about the “Leibnizian dilemma”. To explain 
the universe in terms acceptable to his theistic aspirations, Leibniz had to assume that God 
would not deceive his subjects but ensured that all experience is temporally synchronised 
between souls. Or you can think the other way around, that God’s wisdom ensures perfect 
harmony for his subjects. However, since the monads are not causally related to one another, 
the reader may ask: “What difference does this make for any of the subjects that live out this 
reality?” Ankersmit is pointing out an absurdity that Bertrand Russell noticed: The system 
disposes of time and space as phenomenal, but nevertheless supposes pre-established 
harmony in temporality.248 
To take a step forward – that is, to switch the domain of historicism as a philosophy from 
objective past/reality to a logic/semantics of history – details such as the one about pre-
established harmony had to be attended to by Ankersmit. In effect, Ankersmit radicalised the 
Monadology and narrativized the life-histories of Leibniz’s monads249. This is a large theme in 
chapter VI of NL:  
We can safely disregard Leibniz’s theological speculations and still maintain that his theory of the 
proposition is a fundamental theorem on statements that have Nss [narrative substances] as their 
subjects.250 
One way of making this move more justified is to see in Leibniz himself someone who wished 
to make the same move but was unable to, due to the theistic motivations that underlaid all 
                                                     
248 The “Leibnizian dilemma” is this: To explain the universe in terms acceptable to his theistic aspirations, 
Leibniz needs to assume, similarly to Descartes, that God would not deceive his subjects but ensures that all 
experience is temporally synchronised between souls. However, since the monads are not causally related to 
one another, the reader may ask: “What difference does this make for any of the subjects?” Ankersmit accuses 
Leibniz of an absurdity that Bertrand Russell had earlier pointed out: The system disposes of temporality as 
phenomenal, but nevertheless pre-supposes pre-established harmony. See page 135 – 136 in Narrative Logic. 
249 NL, 136.  
250 Ankersmit 1983, 142. With “theory of the proposition” Ankersmit refers to the predicate-in-subject -
principle. 
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his work. Ankersmit states himself that: “Because Leibniz was not radical enough in his 
ontology he created for himself the dilemma sketched above”251. Arguably, this is one 
possible explanation for Leibniz’s suppression of the Monadology. His discovery of the 
calculus undoubtedly had an impact on the way he looked at metaphysics. He could develop 
his theory of substance with it. Cassirer saw in Leibniz someone who treated substance 
eventually as one would a function. 252 From substance then, or in it, phenomenal experience 
would spring forth in a way that could be compared to how in some quantum theories 
observation makes the universe fall out of superposition into something measurable. This is 
of course simply a metaphor, similar to the supposed difference between the noumenal and 
the phenomenal in substance. Such a suggestion goes beyond the previously mentioned view 
put forth by Daniel Garber and Glenn Hartz, that Leibniz was a “theory pluralist”, whom took 
both realist/materialist and idealist accounts equally seriously to solve philosophical 
problems253. Perhaps he did, but can there really be more than one “first philosophy”, as 
Leibniz calls his idealistic system in the Clarke-correspondence?254 Biographical musings aside, 
the point here is to suggest that the situation gives support to an argument that Ankersmit’s 
(and Cassirer’s) system is already implicit in Leibniz. This is because of the mathematical 
notion of function and Leibniz’s advanced understanding of it through his infinitesimal 
calculus. 
Mathematically speaking, functions are how we indeed make sense of reality. The position of 
an object in flight, can be, for example, described as a function of time. And in modern 
semantics, the concept of function can be applied to explain how meanings of texts derive 
from the combined meanings of statements255. The former may be thought of as a function 
of the latter. You have inputs and produce an output. You can understand something about 
the output that you could not directly understand about the inputs separately. With function, 
the thing is that inputs and outputs are always signs, the internal meaning of which is 
unimportant for the function itself to work. Outputs simply are more complex signs and this 
suggests that “understanding” is a matter of perceiving structures of meaningless signs. This 
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most of Leibniz’s late metaphysics in itself.  
255 As was suggested earlier in chapter I. 
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is how predicate logic can work. You have meaningless x’s and y’s that can be quantified and 
assigned predicates and with long and elaborate demonstrations one can convey much with 
these x’s and y’s. But things are, again, different for Ankersmit. While such logical work is 
important for historical research and science in particular, in representational logic it is the 
whole text that is the sign. The sign is not analysed but meaning is derictly assigned to it, while 
it remains unchanged.256  Whole texts are signs and therefore make up the official form of 
argument inside the discipline of history. 
There is no need for God in Ankersmit’s representationalist philosophy to necessitate that all 
points of view are in harmony. The metaphysical difficulty is removed, since all we expect 
harmony of in a historical debate, is the facts. And most often the truth on the level of 
statements in historical narratives is taken for granted. In his answer to Allan Megill’s 
question, stated in a conference, about the monads as harmonised points of view into the 
universe Ankersmit states: “---if you would say: ‘all history books we presently have are all 
monads, so to speak’, and let us also assume that we are dealing with decent historians who 
did their work properly and that all the statements they mention in the book are in agreement 
with each other. Well, then the whole problem that Leibniz has to deal with, disappears. This 
‘harmonie pré-établie’ as Leibniz called it is, so to speak, thrown in your lap”257. In WEM, he 
continues: “It then is as if past reality has been so kind and obliging to do for the historian all 
the computations that Leibniz had assigned to God”258. We should recall that in Leibniz’s 
theory of truth complete concepts cannot contradict themselves. Things either have a 
property or they don’t and statements on things are true or they are not. It’s not possible to 
create a narrative substance that is self-contradictory, though it is of course possible in 
retrospect for others to see them as such. So long as we trust that historians do not distort 
facts and remain coherent in their writing by not contradicting themselves, we may trust that 
all their points of view are in perfect harmony.259 One may counter that this only applies to 
the historian’s personal view of the past and cannot help us in getting at the truth about 
history. But this was never Ankersmit’s point. He is only explaining why there must be 
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257 Ankersmit 2013. He answered questions after his opening speech to the Inaugural conference of the 
International Network for Theory of History in the University of Ghent, Belgium. See the sources section for a 
link.   
258 WEM, 8. 
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historical debate based on other criteria than truth. Historians may make opposite claims 
about events in the past and sometimes it is easy to point out a misuse of sources. But 
different conflicting theses may arise from the same sources and often do between historians, 
especially on large topics such as World War I for example. We simply see different “truths” 
in them, so to speak, and pick different facts to present. In the latter case there is debate.  
While in every-day life facts are what unite all our views and theses are supported by facts, 
narrative idealism makes life difficult for the historian similarly to how the thesis of theory-
ladenness must alter our views about science. In both cases it is philosophically wise to admit 
these difficulties, however. The difference of course is the while science is about the general, 
history is about the particular. In Ankersmit’s words, “there is a looseness in historical 
discussion that has no parallel in the exact sciences”260. Truth (in the correspondent sense) of 
the past is often contested, and the bigger part of the past one writes about the more difficult 
the matter gets. And here is where historians get creative and aesthetics is more and more 
pronounced as the way to “historical truth”. This type of truth is also the aim of rational 
debate in philosophy of history261. While in science there are rational and empirical methods 
for testing theory, in history we are limited to rationality. 
Ankersmit does not care if the interpretations made on history differ between historians and 
in fact they must differ since otherwise there would be no debates in history or philosophy of 
history. There are no two monads or aspects of the past that are the same. Here we have 
Ankersmit’s adherence to Leibniz’s law of identity of indiscernibles (though this realisation is 
rahter trivial)262. If two texts are the same, then are they the same narrative substance? The 
answer is not altogether clear initially, because unlike the later three-place model of 
representation, where Ankermsit has first the past, then the represented, and finally the 
representation, narrative logic features only narrative substances. And narrative substances 
are said to be “identical to their linguistic manifestations”263. However, Fairbrother, in 
interpreting Ankersmit, has pointed out a potential “disanalogy” between the Monadology 
and narrative logic in a similar thought experiment, in which two historians coming from 
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different cultural backgrounds happen to produce the same text264. In fact, in the context of 
narrative logic, this act is not different from a historian simply reading another’s text or even 
his own text265. In all cases the same representation is faced. Looking at this from the logical 
level of statements, both historians could be said to construct a meaning based on going 
through the text. Obviously, the meaning and the text cannot epistemologically correspond 
here, because of differing intensions of terms, and Ankersmit is fine with this. However, if one 
looks at the matter from the Leibnizian perspective of representational logic, we have a case 
a single monad. But The question remains: Since we agree that the two historian’s meant 
different things, how is it possible that we have here only one intensional object? 
Based on what we know based on the previous section, it should be clear that there are two 
levels in Ankersmit’s monadological analogy. On one level (historical experience) historian is 
inside the monad, so to speak. On the other level we step outside the monad and all there is 
are meaningless representations266. The monadology encompasses both these levels. 
Ankersmit’s position can be explained through his interpretation of Leibniz’s notion of 
substance once more, in which the monad (which is described as “being” in WEM) is both 
representing and being represented267. As I have suggested, we can understand this as 
historical experience that is given by the historian in representation. Analogically then what 
the historian experiences is the monad, but it is also contains a reflection on all other monads 
in the universe, because representation is only possible in reflection to previous 
representations. This is in the precondition of historical experience. Historical experience also 
cannot be expressed objectively. It must be re-presented and when this is done it is no longer 
subjective experience. But – and this is crucial – it is still derived from the experience in a 
sublime act that is analogous to how in differential calculus a mathematician derives the local 
minima and maxima of a given function268. So, there is still another analogy at work, here. 
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One relating to the Cassirerian interpretation of the monad as function269. This is something I 
will return to again in Chapter III270. I think Fairbrother sees only the text or the representation 
as analogous to Leibniz’s monad, while it is both he representation and the represented 
towards which Ankersmit’s monadic analogy is directed. The representation and the 
represented are two sides of the same coin, and it is this coin that corresponds to the monad 
in the analogy. 
An easier, “un-Leibnizian” way to describe the same is to turn to aesthetics. In the 
introduction we saw how Ankersmit has applied the substitution account for aesthetic 
representation from Nelson Goodman and Arthur Danto’s concept of historical 
representation271. When you think of a history book as one would, say, a painting, you can 
see that no two individuals will have the same aesthetic experience when looking at it. The 
representation has meaning for individual viewers that varies according to the dispositions of 
the viewers to experience it, and these dispositions will vary from moment to moment even 
in an individual, though it makes little practical sense to argue that they are not the same they 
were a minute ago. We can dwell on experience but must realise that our ability to experience 
changes both collectively and individually. In HR, Ankersmit writes about “the privatization of 
the past” and about statues, as an example, which as historical representations often meld 
with urban surroundings, no longer acting as symbols people attach collective meanings to – 
something they originally were. The same is true of holidays, which may be declared to 
commemorate some event that causes a collective sublime realisation such as a revolution.  
Yet the holiday eventually loses its significance and becomes rather an opportunity for leisure 
with no reflection for the original social circumstances for which the holiday was declared.272 
Eventually then, the statue and the holiday are mere signs, in a sense, just like a historical text 
is, devoid of inherent meaning. The collective significance they once had was due to shared 
historical experience. The representation only has a shared meaning for those that are 
invested in getting to know what the representation was about by getting to the facts.  
It seems implausible to think that two artists should create the same painting. However, if 
this took place, we would not automatically think that they must have been trying to 
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represent the same thing. Such an idea is plausible only if we think that artistic representation 
is the same as copying. This is a point Ankersmit makes as he says that two painters do not 
paint the same landscape, but their interpretations (representeds) of the landscape273. 
Ironically however, it is, in a sense copying, but not of the phenomenal reality that we apply 
transcendental categories to. The “copying” is partly made of what the artist experiences at 
the sight of the landscape. Artist of different genres’ always attempt to find a balance 
between substitutional and descriptional modes of representation.  
For now, the point should be made that representations do not correspond to representeds 
in the common epistemological sense because one is subjective (or sublime) and the other 
aims at the universal. The relationship between them can either be described as an aesthetic 
one or characterised as one between a function and its derivative. Ankersmit writes of the 
monad: “---there always is a relation between each phase of its ‘life’ and the representation 
it will then have of the universe – in this way the latter is a function of the former”274. Though 
it must be said that the concept of narrative substance is confusing since often in NL it is 
seemingly used to refer simply to a complete concept in the Leibnizian sense, ignoring the 
matters about historical experience and perception that have been pronounced here and 
later in the book and other work of Ankersmit.275 Narrative substances seem devoid of these. 
What this means is that Ankersmit had not developed his “historical ontology” yet, or that he 
was at this time merely interested in spelling out his narrative logic. He is clearly committed 
to the idea that narrative substances incorporate the aesthetic and political attitudes of their 
writers, but he does not associate these with “historical reality” until later. 
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275 For example, on p. 111: “Nss belong to that curious kind of thing which ‘as a thing’ is identical with its 
linguistic manifestations. The process of its constitution as an individual things is identical with the 
individuation of its “complete notion”, to use a Leibnizian term”. 
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III – Calculus: Objectivity and the Application of 
Representational Logic 
 
In this chapter I will explain the appliance of the notion of mathematical calculus in 
Ankersmit’s philosophy and from there move on to how this notion helps him explain what 
objectivity means in his philosophy and how the notion is tied to the application of Leibniz in 
it. We should understand by now that Ankersmit’s sees the monad in representations. They 
are equivalent to functions in that they allow us to see the past in a certain proposed way. As 
was mentioned in Chapter II, we may also think of the historical experience as we would a 
monad.  Our experience of the past is then analogous to a state of a monad, and the way the 
world manifests to a subject. 
The notion of calculus helps Ankersmit solve two problem related to the application of his 
philosophy. Firstly, calculus is applied analogically to history-writing. Nothing prevents 
defining history-writing in terms of epistemological semantics. Indeed, epistemology 
contributes to historical experience by giving experience form. But describing this process is 
not Ankersmit’s project. He wants to show how we can account for the turning of the 
subjective and sublime in experience into concrete representation by the historian. How 
historical representation is derived from historical experience. Leibniz believed that 
mathematics was crucial for philosophy and in an answer to an unanimous critic claimed: “He 
claims that mathematicians who dabble in philosophy scarcely ever succeed; on the contrary, 
it seems that they should succeed the best, since they are accustomed to thinking with 
exactitude”276. Just as Leibniz became fascinated with the notions of function in his 
metaphysics and that of calculus in his proof that God chooses the best, Ankersmit has applied 
the notion of calculus to explain how the historians seeks to create the best possible 
representation. Additionally, the notion of calculus helps Ankersmit elaborate what he refers 
to with the notion of historical reality, which as we know is not the past but our collectively 
shared phenomenal understanding of the past. We recall his denial of narrative realism277.  
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The calculus is a useful notion in explaining what Ankersmit calls “scope criterion”. This notion 
explains what the objective of history-writing is for a historian. In the previous paragraph 
already, we see that a Leibnizian analogy is again already in place here as the historian is made 
analogous to Leibniz’s God. The calculus was a for Leibniz a tool used in proving the perfection 
of God. In WEM, Ankersmit provides citations in proof of this278. 
The aim of this chapter is, therefore, mostly to explicate the application of representational 
logic. However, with application it is not meant that Ankersmit’s philosophy should somehow 
be useful for the historian himself. Its function is instead to provide a framework that allows 
for genuine historical debate. Ankersmit never intended for his narrative logic to have more 
application than Leibniz did with his Monadology. Both are theories of the noumenal and as 
“first philosophies” provide the most basic level of discourse in philosophy. Ankersmit’s 
theory is therefore primarily intended as a platform for philosophy of history. 
I will start here with explaining how I think some of the theorems of the Monadology (38, 47, 
51, 57, 58 and 61) invoked by Ankersmit relate to his work. I will then provide an 
interpretation of the parts of his philosophy that relate to the notion of calculus. This involves 
necessarily bringing up aesthetics and metaphor, which instead of metaphor, help him 
establish what objectivity means in his philosophy of history. The chapter’s latter part focuses 
on some of the criticism Ankersmit has received; focusing on those that accuse him of 
postmodernism and the inapplicability of his theory.  
The Historian as God: Subjectivity and Objectivity 
 
Leibniz’s God chooses the best of possible worlds to create279. Theorems 38 and 47 of the 
Monadology explain how God is the only necessary substance, from whom all other derive 
and are maintained: 
All created or derivative monads are produced by him. They are generated by the continual flashes of 
silent lightning (so to speak) that God gives off from moment to moment—flashes that are limited in 
what they can give only by the essential limits on what the created things can take in.280 
                                                     
278 WEM, 19 – 20. He specifically refers to the Discourse on Metaphysics and Leibniz’s Théodicée. 
279 See p. in chapter I. 
280 See Bennett, Jonathan 2017. Translation with notes: The Principles of Philosophy known as Monadology by 
G. W. Leibniz, 1712. § 47. 
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Simple enough. Theorem 57 introduces a metaphor about the universe as a town which is 
looked upon from different perspectives. The town is the same for everyone, though 
perceptions of it differ. On the other hand, and more precisely, the town exists due to the 
shared monadic perceptions of it. The town exists, even though it is not a genuine substance, 
but merely an aggregate. A well-founded phenomenon. In § 58 then, Leibniz explains how 
God, in his infinite wisdom and goodness chooses the most perfect world possible to create. 
In this he seeks “the greatest possible variety, but with all the order there could be; i.e. it is 
the way to get as much perfection as there could be”281. § 61 is a long account of how simple 
substances come to terms with aggregated ones. The interested reader may look it up in 
attachment I. The point is that all simple substances perceive a phenomenal shared universe, 
and this is in harmony with how aggregated substances all affect one another in a full 
universe. A moving body only seems to have an infinitesimally small effect to other bodies in 
distance and similarly souls at a time can focus on a part of the universe with distinction, while 
most of the universe remains obscure. 
Now one may why these are integrated into Ankersmit’s theory? Well, firstly, in several places 
Ankersmit draws an analogy between the historian and Leibniz’s God: 
Indeed, when the historian is writing history he may be regarded as a kind of god, although, of course, 
the Leibnizian God deals with actual states of affairs while the historian only works with descriptions of 
them282. 
This analogy is meant to help explain how the historian is someone who attempts to create 
the best of possible worlds, that is, a historical reality that best fits both the facts established 
through historical research, and his historical experience. It, via theorems 38 and 47, also 
reminds readers that in Ankermsit’s system everything is meaningless without the historian. 
In many of Ankersmit’s texts, the point is made that representations need to be understood 
as wholes.  This is because in historical debate, we must respect the whole message, as 
intented by whoever wrote the bookonly have meaning once they enter the sphere of 
historical experience283. The meaning nce the book is read. Before this, the book is a dead 
thing lying on the table. In WEM, Ankersmit writes that historical representations as “signs 
                                                     
281 See Bennett, Jonathan 2017. Translation with notes: The Principles of Philosophy known as Monadology by 
G. W. Leibniz, 1712. § 48. 
282 NL, 212. See also WEM, 18 & HR 212 – 214.  
283 See e.g. MTR chapter 7, WEM, 14. 
76 
 
.  
are symbols that represent themselves; they are, therefore, essentially meaningless---”284 
And he goes on: “But meaning can be projected on, or associated with texts, thanks to there 
being other texts that are regarded as their representational rivals when dealing with roughly 
the same historical phenomenon”285. Here Ankersmit clearly again follows Cassirer, who 
claims that 
Human knowledge is by its very nature symbolic knowledge. It is this feature which characterises both 
its strength and its limitations. And for symbolic thought it is indispensable to make up a sharp 
distinction between real and possible, between actual and ideal things. A symbol has no actual 
existence as a part of the physical world; it has a “meaning”286. 
“Meaning” here refers to the meaning the symbol has to the individual. Ankersmit And 
Cassirer diverge in that the term “symbol” for Cassirer refers to internal meaning (symbolic 
form), while Ankersmit reserves it for the external signs, similarly to the way Leibniz does in 
an essay Ankersmit refers to. In both cases, however, meaning is not universal or inherent. 
The point is that while texts, as they are, have no “actuality”, they do have “possibility”. They 
meaningfully open up for readers equipped with a specific set of symbolic forms. The Bible 
will mean different things to a religious person and a scientist – which, by the way, may be 
two aspects of a single person. The very meaning of “epistemological meaning” is that it is 
phenomenal in character and always is dependent on symbolic forms. Ankersmit’s 
“representational meaning” is fundamental and undefined, because representation (the 
category under which texts belong in in Ankersmit’s logic of history) is more basic than the 
statement287. The text is a sign or a symbol. 
Ankersmit introduces the notion of the sign and writes of Leibniz’s thoughts about it, 
mentioning what he calls “Leibniz’s semantics”288. He refers to a text Leibniz wrote in c. 1686 
called Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas. Ariew and Garber claim that Leibniz 
presents himself in it as a mediator for the famous Arnauld-Malebranche debate about the 
latter’s occasionalism289. Leibniz writes here that while the human mind can think of primitive 
                                                     
284 Ankersmit 2018, Reply to my critics, 478. 
285 Ibid. 478 – 479.  
286 Cassirer 1945, 80. While their philosophies are similar in their approach to reality, Cassirer here uses the 
term “symbol” is the meaning. Ankersmit sometimes calls the representation a symbol, meaningless one at 
that.  
287 MTR, 153 – 154. 
288 WEM, 11.  
289 Ariew & Garber, 23. Occasionalism denies causal interaction between body and soul, just as Leibniz does. It 
explains mind-matter dualism by resorting to Gods active interference in all instances of interaction between 
the souls and body. Leibniz instead insisted that in thanks to God’s foresight he could choose the world where 
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concepts distinctly, complex ones fall beyond the mind’s immediate cognitive reach. 
Ankersmit takes the example of a complex concept in the thousand-sided, polygon. 
Something it is impossible to distinctively imagine, unless broken down to the more primitive 
concepts that make up the notion of this complex polygon. Therefore, we rely on “blind 
symbols” that cannot be adequately thought of but can nevertheless be broken down to 
primitive concepts that can be distinctively grasped. From this it is clear that the essay 
explains Leibniz’s intensional logic, as I described it in chapter I, and therefore does not discuss 
representation. It is an argument for better scholarly use of language and his ideas about the 
characteristica universalis. Leibniz does indeed write about blind symbols, but goes on to 
claim that there is no theoretical obstruction for reducing any complex concept to its primitive 
parts so long as there is sufficient computational prowess. Nowhere is it claimed that signs 
should only stand for themselves. Leibniz ends the essay with an example, in which it is 
claimed that perception is reducible to “minute shapes and motions alone”, clearly alluding 
that this published paper is not in support of the idealistic late metaphysics of Leibniz, but 
rather the theory of describable corporeal universe. On the other hand, it must be said here 
that Leibniz himself expresses his suspicions about human capability for adequate and distinct 
knowledge, though he suspects that numbers might come close to this290. I find it curious that 
Ankermsit chose to refer to this essay in arguing for the notion that symbols are meaningless 
signs. He would have been better served by continuing to interpret a historian’s paradigm as 
a monadic point of view, as Cassirer has done. 
But let us get back to the notion of meaning, which is argued to be relational here. In the 
Monadology monads are derivatives of God and Cassirer saw this as a crucial point in his 
understanding of Leibniz’s philosophy291. Monads are analogous to theories or symbolic 
forms. Starkly put, they are how phenomenal reality is derived from noumenal reality. Now, 
the synchronised perceptions of monads are for Leibniz what make the phenomenal 
universe292. Logically, for Cassirer and Ankersmit the same applies. But in practice here 
                                                     
our free choices and emotions correspond to bodily functions. He thought it erroneous to suppose God in his 
perfection would create a universe where he had to actively take part. The perfect clockmaker would never 
need to wind his clock.  
290 Ariew & Garber, 24. To further confuse things, Leibniz always expressed his conviction that the 
characteristica universalis could be completed. He was ambivalent on this, as sometimes he withdrew from the 
project while proclaiming its possibility at other times. See Donald Rutherford:  
291 See Chapter I.  
292 Recall again the metaphor of the town in §57 of the Monadology. 
78 
 
.  
nothing is pre-determined, and historians must struggle to create their universes by 
expanding the amount of relevant representations in the sphere of their knowledge, which 
alone is governed by a “pre-established harmony”. Practically speaking then, when finishing 
her book, the historian is in a position analogous to God. The historian has a certain amount 
of facts at her disposal and what she’s doing in the writing process is what God does in 
Leibniz’s system:  Creating “the greatest possible variety, but with all the order there could 
be”293. In representational logic meaning is immediately given in how it is reflected in regard 
to other representation. In representational practice of historical writing requires of the 
historian skill and a certain aesthetic intuition.  
In NL, Ankersmit writes about the “scope criterion”. The standard by which all historian’s 
intuitively write as they seek to account for the facts established in historical research as well 
as possible while making a thesis with the widest “scope” possible, that is, a thesis that 
explains much of the past. It’s obvious that a historical writing with only facts in it and no 
motif is not much of a historical writing. But the same is true of a text that claims much but 
goes against or ignores facts.294 In WEM, Ankersmit repeats the scope criterion in clearly 
Leibnizian terms. He speaks of the appliance of Leibniz’s notion of the calculus to the notion 
of writing of history. directly referring to how Leibniz applied the notion of Calculus in his 
metaphysics. God, in creation, is like a mathematician at work, applying the calculus to a 
function. Both have a perfect method for finding the local minima and maxima of functions, 
guaranteeing optimal results295. 
Essentially the same can be explained in yet another way, which may also help us along in 
understanding how the notion of infinitesimal calculus might help us understand how 
Ankersmit’s apriorist system of debate within the community of historians should work. In 
chapter I we already mentioned the useful fiction of the narrativist universe, where 
statements individuate narrative substances. Each one is necessarily a different whole, which 
can be defined only by going through all the statements contained in the narrative 
substance.296 Narrative substances are intentional entities. Later in the book, and also in a 
                                                     
293 See Bennett, Jonathan 2017. Translation with notes: The Principles of Philosophy known as Monadology by 
G. W. Leibniz, 1712. § 58. 
294 NL, 221 – 224. See also Kuukkanen 2018, 357 – 358. 
295 WEM, 18 – 19.  
296 See chapter I p. 47 – 48. 
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later text he discusses what follows from this situation. Ankersmit’s 2014 essay about the 
subject deals with the representationalist universe and explains what meaning is in this 
context. The configurations of statements that form narrative substances or representations 
in the representational universe can metaphorically be said to form clusters: 
HR’s tend to be comments on each other and … that they will tend to cluster together in groups of HR’s, 
whereas the “space” in the representationalist universe between such clusters is relatively empty. A HR 
without any clear relationship to other HR’s will tend to lose its meaning and to disintegrate into its 
constituent statements—and no HR will be willing to run that risk since it means its death.297 
 
Essentially the same is given in NL already in chapter VIII: 
The relative fruitfulness of the Nss proposed by the narrative idealist historian cannot be vindicated or 
denied merely by recourse to statements (whether or not belonging to these Nss). This can only be 
done by recourse to other Nss. We can only determine the (relative) merits of a narratio by comparing 
it with other narratios.298 
 
A representation is an indivisible individual and unanalysable in itself. It only gains meaning 
through being reflected on other representations. This is a surprisingly illuminating way to 
describe the community of historians, who supposedly subscribe to the logic of 
representation. Each historian has knowledge of representations. Specialists of a certain topic 
will know many representations that are in close proximity to one another. For example, 
historians specialising in the middle ages have knowledge of the same works on medieval 
history written by previous generations. No one would question that having such knowledge 
is a prerequisite for being an expert on medieval history. The man from the street will not be 
able understand past reality in a way that historians in their community do. He will not be 
able to locate the appropriate “cluster” or of representations or “area” in the infinite 
representational universe.299 Since narrative realism is false, the representational universe is 
the only historical reality we have. “To put it with a dash of paradox: historical reality only 
comes into being when the past no longer exists” Ankersmit writes, referring to Arthur Danto’s 
ideas about the nature of historical representation300. On the level of texts and 
representations one cannot truthfully refer to the past, but only one’s ideas about it. 
Historical reality comes to existence in representations through fixed accounts of history and 
                                                     
297 Ankersmit 2014 119. 
298NL, 223. 
299 Ankersmit 2014, 118 – 120. 
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debate between historians concerning these accounts is what helps us create further 
historical representations.  
The situation is the same as with the town in § 57 of the Monadology. Nominally there’s 
nothing outside the monads, but reality can still be said to be constituted in the collective 
personal perceptions of it phenomenally. Political Representation contains a straightforward 
description of how Ankersmit interprets the theorem. He points out how Meinecke and 
Cassirer were those who “pointed out how much the historist’s notion of historical 
individuality owes to Leibniz’s monadology”.301 Everybody has an aspect of the thing, and 
luckily, we can share these aspects representationally so that we can communally know things 
better. While it makes sense to say that writing of history is a creative process and the text 
evolves and changes along the way, the final product can only be a singular point of view into 
the past. Such points of view are what gives meaning to history and allows debate on historical 
matters to occur. Since the past does not exist, this is the only way we can make sense of 
“historical reality”302. 
If we call back to mind the thought experience given by Fairbrother in the previous chapter, 
in which two historians coming from differing backgrounds accidentally write the same text, 
it can here be argued that while the text is the same, the two historians will position it 
differently into the representationalist universe due to their differing knowledge of other 
proximate representations. They may write the same text, but their representeds are 
different. In terms of calculus, both historians attempt to find the maximum and minimum of 
their function (the represented in historical experience), they approach “historical truth” 
while never reaching it. And historical truth is defined by the maxima and minima of all 
previous representations known to these individuals.303 The historian is limited in two ways. 
First, in his command of representations. If you know little about the history of the middle 
ages, you shouldn’t make great claims about it until you “stock up on representations”. 
Secondly, putting forth your own argument in a representation requires skill. You may have 
                                                     
301 PR, 227 – 230. The citation is on p. 227. 
302 For Ankersmit’s arguments against narrative realism, see the beginning of chapter V in NL or section 4 in 
WEM. 
303 WEM, 19. 
81 
 
.  
the historical experience but reaching the maximum and minimum in the chosen topic is 
impossible, though we may approach it infinitely. 
What this all comes down to is that historical representation and historical meaning are 
relationalist so long as we move within the boundaries of representationalist logic. Here 
Ankersmit follows what he calls Cassirer’s relationalist logic: “---we saw that Cassirer’s 
relationalist logic compels us to see reality as a model of an abstract mathematical calculus 
instead of the reverse”304. The historians historical experience is forever immortalised in a 
text through the sublime process of representation, which is explained in terms of the analogy 
with calculus. In SHE Ankersmit describes the work of historians as analogous to that of 
mathematicians. A mathematician can derive (with calculus) from a function its local 
minimum and maximum. This had of course been possible before the discovery of calculus, 
as he could find out these values through trial and error, but with calculus the unexplained 
sense of sublimity was removed from this process, which suddenly has become 
commensurable. Ankersmit’s point is that historiography is actually similar, with the 
exception that there will likely never be a calculus for the discipline of history.305 Given 
sufficient time, we write out our theses until we feel we get them quite right and then publish, 
but there is no consensus-theory for explaining how our subjective thoughts and emotions 
turn into representations306. It’s impossible for the impressionist painter to explain why the 
powerful colours applied in the painting represent his or her intention. Here the sublimity 
remains. And the same applies to our evaluations of the representations of others. We will 
always set representations in relations to one another and sublimely calculate which is the 
best. 
Ankersmit’s historical representations are not only analogous to monads as indivisible entities 
and as perception but also monads as functions. He’s saying that historian’s make sense of 
reality with models (representations), which are analogous to mathematically defined 
theories307. While there certainly is no calculus for the humanities, the notion of sublime is a 
theory on how historical experience is applied in creation of historical reality. Perhaps it is not 
satisfactory theory, since we can seemingly never account for what this sublimity amounts to, 
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306 If we could, we would have a solution to the hard problem of consciousness. 
307 WEM, 21. Representations do not represent the past but only aspects of the past. 
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other than explain it in difficult to fathom analogies. We are left to wonder, just how we can 
then decide what representation is the best. We may feel that some representation is best 
that in a debate you can’t make arguments based on that. Ankersmit has a couple of answers 
here. Firstly, he will remind us that the facts we use in historiography are always 
epistemologically grounded and should be agreed upon universally. An epistemologically 
objective historiography gets the facts right. But beyond this, the most representationally 
objective historiography on a given topic should logically be the one made by a historian who 
is most familiar with the “area of the representationalist universe” that deals with this topic. 
Here, I don’t think Ankersmit has a way out from this relativism. But he doesn’t care, since 
representationalist objectivity arises from the relative merits of representations, each of 
which was put forth as the best possible representation by its writer – who, we assume, did 
the best he could. Objectivity in historiography is realised only when skilled writers put forth 
their factual, yet strongly subjective accounts. Ankersmit abhors traditional views on 
objectivity, since they prevent the preceding from occurring: 
As we have noted, traditionally the historian is required to refrain from the introduction of moral and 
political values in his writings since this would compromise his objectivity. But as we shall now have to 
recognize, this familiar injunction to the historian is naive because it fails to do justice to the fact that 
at the level of moral and political values the boundaries between the subject (the historian) and the 
object (the past) tend to dissolve.308 
 
In the introduction already I pronounced with citations Ankersmit’s attitude towards 
contemporary debate in philosophy of history. His view is that genuine debate is the result of 
historical representations being set into relations with one another in each participant’s mind. 
Historians (or rather philosophers of history) are obliged to read one another’s work 
constantly and produce their own representations rationally in response to. All he really calls 
for is an aesthetic approach to writing, in which the subjective is not held back. The collective 
subjectivity of all participants is the best guarantee of a most objective end result of the 
debate. Commitment to the traditional account of objectivity will never allow for the debate 
to begin. 
Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen has earlier noted that Ankersmit’s notion of objectivity in history 
defies “ontological objectivity”, that is, objectivity as correspondence between past reality 
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and the narrative309. For Ankersmit such objectivity is impossible, since we cannot accurately 
describe the past. In terms of the analogy with calculus, truth is never reached though it may 
be approached. All representations the way Ankersmit describes them are then from a 
commonsensical point of view subjective. And indeed, historical experience is always 
subjective since it encompasses emotion, moral position and aesthetic preferences. Historical 
experience forms in reflection to preceding representations and is thereby in coherence with 
them. So, if what we generally feel is “subjective” is shut out from history-writing, we will 
never reach what history-writing is about: The relationally defined meaning of the past we 
debate about continuously.  
Kuukkanen does well in bringing up the references made by Ankersmit to Karl Popper’s theory 
of falsification as he discusses the former’s rationalism310. This is a comparison Ankersmit 
himself has made in HR311. As we already discussed in chapter I, Popper can also be said to 
have applied “scope” in arguing for what makes scientific theories good. The best theories 
risk much by explaining as many phenomena as possible, thereby putting themselves at risk 
of being proven wrong. The same is true of the best historical narratives. They aim to provide 
a unified description of large parts of the past – think here of narrative substances like, “the 
renaissance” or “the cold war” – past. Successful historiographies change the way we think 
about the past. They remain at the centre of the cluster in the representationalist universe. 
Ankersmit sees in Popper’s philosophy of science the same aestheticism that defines his 
account of history writing312. Both are attempts at ordering reality in an aesthetically pleasing 
way. We want elegant scientific theories with scope and the same applies to historical 
representation.  
So to elaborate how debate in the discipline of history takes place, Ankersmit turns to 
aesthetics. And aesthetics is the answer to the historian successfully gets closer and closer to 
the local maximum and minimum of her chosen function, or historical topic (historical 
experience). In NL, aesthetics is not covered since he had yet to turn his narrativist theory into 
one about representation in Arthur Danto’s sense of the word313. Instead, he discusses 
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311 HR, 139. 
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313 Danto’s influence is explicit in chapter 4 of HT, 1994, and the essay Statements, Texts and Pictures of 1995. 
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metaphor. It is what gives historiography its “scope” and thereby its ability grant the past 
meaning. Ankersmit refuses to admit that metaphor could be reduced to logical language, as 
philosophers like Max Black have claimed314. Historical metaphor can transcend the 
borderline between reality and language precisely because it invokes emotion and the 
sublime and enables that stirring realisation one sometimes gets while reading that the past 
is truly strange in comparison to one’s present. Metaphor is what connects language with 
aspects of the past315. It also forces the reader into making a subjective investment into the 
representation at hand316. It allows the historian to use natural language as a painter would 
use a brush. He can create a representation that suggests much more than meets the eye 
initially. And representations are not language. Of course, there is a drawback. For example, 
the decades following World War II are called the “cold war”. This powerful metaphor is 
tremendously illuminating for most readers but would be utterly meaningless to an 
uneducated person with little knowledge of historical events. Therefore, its power is limited 
in the sense that we have to assume our readership has background knowledge in our topic 
to understand what we are presenting the past as. Here we see again that previous 
representations are the prerequisite for effective use of (and understanding of) metaphors.  
Representations can be argued for rationally, but this requires a balance between aesthetics. 
(In parallel, rational argument for facts given in singular statements is better served by 
epistemology). And aesthetics is what mostly replaces the notion of metaphor in later 
Ankersmit, who widens his theory to include all sorts of historical representation317. 
Epistemology can provide historians with certainty over the facts of history and that each of 
the empirically descriptive statements in historical texts are true. But only aesthetic intuition, 
and specifically, understanding of metaphor in the case of texts, can help in rational 
evaluation of the whole. My best answer for explaining what gives us this aesthetic intuition 
is that as was elaborated on p. 80, it follows from knowledge of various other representations 
preceding the one under the process of history writing one can maximise scope when the vast 
knowledge of the historian makes it possible to extend metaphor into different areas of the 
“representational universe”. But as said. Use of powerful metaphor puts readers under stress 
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315 Ankersmit 2013, 177 – 178.  
316 MTR, 74. 
317 See p. in Chapter II. Metaphor is still discussed, but is it contained in aesthetics.  
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as they struggle then to navigate the representational universe, less equipped than the writer, 
with preceding representations. 
Objectivity Contested: Ankersmit’s postmodernism 
 
Some critics do not accept Ankersmit’s Leibniz-inspired definition for meaning or objectivity 
but insist on what was earlier referred to as “ontological objectivity” of historical realism. That 
is, staying true to the facts and not adding anything of your own to the historical narrative. 
This is how historicism too is sometimes idealised318. This brings us to the topic of Ankersmit’s 
postmodernism. Since Ankersmit has moved on from historical entelechy situated in past 
reality to theorising that historiography is about narrative (represented) substances and not 
“real” ones in the past. What is written by the historian becomes a representation of some 
subjectively experienced aspect of the past. However, are not the critics then right in calling 
Ankersmit a postmodernist? John Zammito’s reviews of Ankermsit’s work pronounces his 
postmodernism, referring to how Ankersmit discards any possibility of there being a link 
between evidence and past reality. There is, after all the unbreachable gap between the logics 
of statement (truth) and that of representation. He complains that this leads to historiography 
losing all objectivity. This criticism deepens as Zammito characterises Ankersmit as an 
ambivalent character who, after abandoning positivism in history then re-introduces it319.  
From our perspective it is rather easy to see why this criticism comes about. Zammito does 
not properly notice or accept Ankersmit’s division of history into the realm of historical 
research and historical writing320. A division which reflects the two accounts of objectivity and 
that have been elaborated here. Ankersmit does not claim that evidence doesn’t give us facts 
about the past. Merely that language cannot adequately describe past as it was. In a later 
review, the heart of the problem is seen in the metaphorical and aesthetic character of 
historical texts, which Zammito himself interprets as containing description and meaning in 
the conventional sense. He writes: “Unless we can juxtapose the metaphor to its target, and 
not simply to other metaphors, it is unclear how insight into that of which it is a metaphor can 
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319 Zammito 1998. 
320 See p. 19 in the introduction.  
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occur, or how it might now be appraised”.321 It’s clear that their argument here about differing 
definitions for the notion of metaphor. Zammito thinks its language, while Ankersmit 
positions it into representation. My point for the time being is that the problems accounted 
for here simply do not appear to Ankersmit in his Leibnizian vision because of this clear 
division of labour between epistemology (language) and representation. 
Michael Stanford, in An Introduction to the Philosophy of History, describes Ankersmit’s 
“postmodernism”322 in six points out of which two are relevant here323: 1) “That in 
historiography the representation is the reality. Texts are self-referential; they do not refer to 
anything else”. 2) “That to such texts only aesthetic criteria are relevant, not epistemological 
norms or standards”. Point 1) pronounces Ankersmit’s postmodernism in the sense that text 
have no inherent meaning and that historians therefore can assign to them whatever meaning 
they wish. Point 2) seems to present the case that Paul Roth has made in a review of 
Ankersmit’s MTR: While the logical part of Ankersmit’s work is commended as being coherent 
he is criticised for not giving historians any common ground to work on324. It is inapplicable 
as a theory of history, since its disconnected from the ways we form knowledge of the past in 
theory and language325. This is because aesthetics does not contribute to our common idea 
of objectivity but is subjective. Beauty being a matter of taste. Roth expresses an attitude 
similar to that which Bertrand Russell initially had of Leibniz’s metaphysics326. Namely that 
while coherent, nothing useful is gained from this logic of representation: “Historical texts 
belong in all key philosophical respects to the same shared world that other empirical, 
nonfiction disciplines explore”327. The claim is that Ankersmit misinterprets analytic 
philosophy of language and that his separation of historical meaning from the meaning in 
regular language is an unnecessary and harmful move to make. 
                                                     
321 Zammito 2005, 160. 
322 Jonathan Menezes suggests that Ankersmit carries an unfortunate stigma in this since he genuinely aligned 
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about as the semantics of historiography. Logically speaking the text has no meaning, is simply symbolises a 
represented. In practice, multiple symbols give meaning in a relativist fashion. 
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326 See f. 89. 
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While I feel the points given in Stanford’s book well describe the general attitude philosophers 
aligned within the analytic philosophy of 20th century would have towards Ankersmit, they do 
not find their target if Ankersmit’s points are taken seriously. It’s of course possible to see in 
Ankersmit some degree of postmodernism and question the applicability of his theory, but 
one should always keep on mind that what he is proposing is a descriptive theory of theory. 
He’s describing historical debate as it occurs in the form of representations, hoping perhaps 
to encourage philosophers of history to better focus on what is essential in their work. 
Consider case 1). It is true terminologically, since for Ankersmit the text is a meaningless 
sign328. However, failing to see the underlying Leibnizianism of Ankersmit’s work will cause 
this generalisation to lead to misunderstandings. While representations are connected to how 
Ankersmit identifies historical reality, it is in the representations themselves only so far as 
these representations are related to other representations. If the representations had 
inherent meaning, this would be the downfall of historical debate in general. Historical reality 
is the product of debate, or rather is approached in it. Representations only come into being 
as meaningful entities after they are positioned into the representationalist universe amongst 
other representations. This process takes place unconsciously in the realm of historical 
research, in which Ankersmit does not conflict with any of his critics. Intentionally the 
historian is always organised and is free to apply whatever theory seems useful and in fact 
this must be done. Representationalist logic, applied in historical research would lead 
precisely to the absurdities that it is accused of by Roth and Zammito. Theories and logics can 
indeed be seen to help decipher signs along with the emotional content the metaphors 
contained in the text evoke, they facilitate the historical experience and the historian’s 
monadic perception of the representationalist universe where all respective representations 
exist. Representationalist logic provides no means of doing these things. It can simply explain 
what the historian does in history-writing the historical debate that is parallel to history-
writing329. 
And while 2) is also true on the level of history-writing, there is much more to it than this. The 
problem is essentially the same as with 1). The distinction between the realms of historical 
                                                     
328 WEM, 10 – 14.  
329 In NL, chapter VIII section 3 Ankersmit explains that narrative logic in itself cannot tell the historian how to 
write the text. It can only describe what the text logically amounts to. The supposed value of narrative logic 
lies elsewhere. 
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research (the phenomenal) and history-writing (the noumenal) is ignored. Critics like Roth do 
not take into account how deeply Ankersmit’s ideas run parallel to those of Leibniz. And one 
can hardly blame them, since while generally appreciated, Leibniz’s metaphysics is not widely 
known, let alone applied. Some aspects of Leibniz’s philosophy, such as his writings on what 
Raili Kauppi identified as his intensional logic even might suggest that Ankersmit is thoroughly 
un-Leibnizian in this. But this is incorrect, since intensional logic, as we commonly know it, is 
applied only in historical research and epistemology. Critics like Roth easily miss the point that 
Ankersmit’s intention is not to evict modern logic and epistemology from history. It is as if 
Ankersmit himself did not stress the distinction he is making, enough. As with Leibniz, 
Ankersmit’s focus is on the noumenal, and the phenomenal – ever important in practice – 
covered only briefly, as he leaves it for others (the hermeneuticists, narrativists, positivists 
etc.) to study. Leibniz needed to account for the noumenal in his metaphysics with the 
Monadology. However, he could never dispose of his metaphysics of corporeal substances. 
He continued to need it even after formulating his idealistic metaphysics, because he wanted 
his philosophy to explain the phenomenal too. To the extent that Ankersmit refers to 
historical research aside from historical representation the same is true of him as well. 
We saw in the previous section Ankersmit’s unquestionable commitment to relativism in the 
level of representation. If this is makes him a postmodernist, then he would not deny it. 
Ankersmit thinks that nobody in their right mind would deny that the past took place. He does 
not mean to claim that there is no truth in history. There certainly is on the level of 
statements. But “the renaissance” exists nowhere but in our minds. You don’t point 
telescopes at it and if you had asked Erasmus about it, he would have told you to get out. And 
though we talk about it, it only has phenomenal existence just as was the case with the town 
in §57 of the Monadology. But this does not mean that the “renaissance”, as a personal 
historical experience is not real for us, or that our representations of it are not real and could 
not produce other real experiences and contribute to our better understanding of the past. 
From this perspective, I gone could well say that Ankersmit is postmodernist when it comes 
to the phenomenal reality of texts as representations, but not when it comes down to the 
noumenal as the experience of historical reality. With Ankersmit and historiography it is not 
the case of “anything goes”330. Paul Feyerabend committed to the idea embodied in this 
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slogan since he believed that in science no theory must be excluded, lest we risk missing out 
on important insights to be tested. But history is different331. In “ontological objectivity” this 
applies. But in historical debate, Ankersmit thinks that” historical ‘points of view’ — which 
determine, as we have seen, the entire structure of narrative accounts of the past — may 
often be inextricably tied up with political or ethical values. Many narratios lose their internal 
consistency when robbed of the political values which structure them”332. In later account he 
argues that historical language is representational. It is meaningless in terms of epistemology.  
The aspects of the past that are represented in texts exist thanks to the notion of the sublime, 
which eventually defines the past in his philosophy of history. Whatever worth one sees in 
the notion of sublime, if any, Ankersmit clings to it and it is difficult to criticise him since 
alternative theories of this important aspect of our connection with the past, are scarce, to 
say in the least. 
Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen has expressed dissatisfaction with Ankersmit’s notion of holistic 
representation when it comes to historiography, since it seems to suggest that removing a 
sentence from a history book will change the cognitive message contained in it333. The book 
would then represent a different narrative substance or different aspect of the past. A 
counterintuitive notion since anyone would say that there are critical and less important parts 
in a text and for a historian involved in a debate removing some of the latter would have little 
difference. And indeed, from the point of view of epistemology, this is true. Historians write 
texts statement by statement. They will reflect on their source-material, look up previous 
research and reprocess their ideas and discoveries. The text is a meaningful whole made up 
of smaller meaningful parts that often have little relevance considering the whole. Ankersmit 
himself says as much:  
Since the historian himself will be aware of many of those already existing meanings, he will construct 
his sign in such a way that other experts on the text’s subject-matter can be expected to contribute to 
                                                     
331 See History as the Science of the Individual. History deals with individual representations of the past while 
science focuses on the universal.  
332 NL, 221.  
333 Kuukkanen, 75. Daniel Fairbrother has defended Ankersmit’s vision within the confines of narrative logic by 
addressing it’s Leibnizianism, claiming that in the narrativist universe statements are analogous to the monad 
and their meanings are defined by God, i.e. the historian. I think that while this analogy may provide insights to 
the workings of historiography, it is not one that Ankersmit had in mind. He specifically refers to Narrative 
substances as analogous to monads and to statements as the properties of NSs. In the level of statements 
meaning strictly follows the conventional epistemological route and this is why Ankersmit necessitates a 
double-function for statements as seen in NL on p. 95, 187 or 191. See Fairbrother 2017. 
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it a meaning coming as close as possible to the one he gives to it himself. Hence, to what one might call 
its ‘intentional meaning’. 334 
For Kuukkanen himself, the concept of rationality is central in explaining how historians come 
to a shared understanding over how to interpret the past. Generally speaking, in his 
Postnarrativist philosophy of historiography historical texts are seen as attempts to persuade 
the readership (other historians) to accept their interpretation of the past as a justified based 
on shared rational criteria. He explains that historians communally commit to rhetorical, 
epistemic and discursive standards that present a shared set of values that all commit to on 
the basis of rationality335. Further, Kuukkanen argues that historians need to look for a middle-
ground between objectivity and subjectivity in their work and rationally justify their 
conclusions to the community of historians336. In Ankersmit as a Rationalist he showcases that 
he understands the scope criterion Ankersmit presents it in NL and WEM, and therefore he 
probably has a grasp of what I explain to be the answer. 
Historical rationality for Ankersmit is indeed built around the Leibnizian concept of 
infinitesimal calculus. According to the scope criterion and the analogy drawn between 
history-writing and calculus, the historian is involved in a sublime act of seeking the local 
minima and maxima of the representation that is figuratively seen as a function. There’s an 
infinity of possible outcomes and yet the historian must eventually choose only one. And the 
one chosen will be published and will forever remain the historian’s testament about her 
historical experience she not only presented to contemporaries, but also leaves for later 
generations. To each text there is only one correspondent configuration of statements in the 
narrativist universe. This rule is absolute, since no demarcation criterion can be given about 
how many statements could be removed from a narrative substance while still calling it the 
same narrative substance. Such demarcation would compromise the logic337. But it would not 
compromise the “cognitive message”. Think again of the representationalist universe and a 
book written on history of the middle ages. Changes made to the text would certainly shift 
the representations position within a cluster of other representations. Dramatic changes 
                                                     
334 WEM, 16. 
335 Kuukkanen 2015, 199. 
336 Kuukkanen 2015, 197. 
337 Ankersmit, F. R. A Dialogue with Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, 47 – 48.  
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would shift it out of the cluster altogether, and historians would eventually begin to question 
whether the texts is about medieval history. 
The exact relationship between the notion of calculus and aesthetics/metaphor is no doubt 
difficult to fathom at first. From the point of view of Ankersmit’s philosophical notion of the 
sublime, we are powerless to resist the fierceness of historical experience. We simply 
experience reality  what is most coherent, most beautiful and strive to realise it. The 
represented of a historical writing is in experience and the historical facts all share are 
analogously reduced to the role of technique and material an artist uses to realise the whole 
of aesthetic representation. Then again, when viewing the representations made by others 
we again sublimely see the past as something suggested by our historical experience. The 
representation is same for all, but the array’s of representations at our command are 
different, so to speak. We are all gods in the sense that we create the phenomenal universe 
of historical reality, but unlike Leibniz’s God, who has all representations at his disposal, we 
are each limited to a finite amount. But eventually the point is that we can expand our 
“repertoire” of representations on any given topic – we can increase the amount of them in 
any cluster in the representational universe – and thereby become through hard work experts 
in a given field of study.  
 
Daniel Fairbrother reads Ankersmit is terms of his Leibnizianism and has defended 
Ankersmit’s position against Kuukkanen’s critique presented in Postnarrativist Philosophy of 
Historiography338. He writes: 
Ankersmit is not committed to saying that the meaning of a statement is only dependent on its bare 
position in the textual whole. This would be implausible – and thoroughly unLeibnizian. According to 
Leibniz, a monad’s role in the universe, and thus its identity, requires it to have qualities of its own, but 
which nonetheless come from an independent source – from God. Analogically: the sorts of meaning a 
statement is able to have, and thus the sort of position it is able to occupy in a text, must in some sense 
be derived from external contexts.339 
I think there is a problem here. A statement’s meaning is indeed the product of something 
external to it in Leibniz’s intensional logic, but this is utterly irrelevant when we are discussing 
historical representation as Ankersmit promotes it. Fairbrother is taking the Fregean route 
                                                     
338 Fairbrother 2017, Leibniz and the Philsosophical Criticism of Historiography. 
339 Fairbrother 2017, section 3.2. 
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here in Leibnizianism and attaches sense on to statements. Sense that is dependent on 
contexts as it is in the Dummett-interpretation of Frege340. One can naturally do this, and in a 
later text called The Soul of Historiography Fairbrother introduces his own brand of Leibnizian 
holism. One that has promise of actual application in historiography by presenting statements 
representing ranges f possiblilitis as parts of an aggregated narrative that has a soul blown 
into it by the historian. Fairbrother, I think, follows an alternative way of interpreting Leibniz’s 
substance theory as his idea is reminiscent of the Leibniz’s earlier theory of substantial 
forms341. But his monad analogy fails in Ankersmit’s case since it’s drawn between the 
statement in a text and the monad342. Puzzlement is expressed over “how we are to navigate 
– and through what medium – between the details of a text’s ‘universe’, how monads ‘mirror’ 
it, and how they give us ‘access’ to it”. I.e. how can we get to the meaning of a text from 
looking at segments of it, as Ankersmit seems to suggest that we can in one chapter in HR. 
I think this is not what Ankersmit is talking about in the citation343. It is not the property of 
the monad that reflects the whole of the monad. It is the monad that reflects the universe 
representational universe. Ankersmit applies the notion of the monad analogically to 
narrative substances and thus narrative substances reflect the narrativist universe. Narrative 
substances are ways of seeing the universe/past. What Ankersmit is talking about, in the 
citation Fairbrother refers to, is not narrative logic per se, but what follows from this logic. It 
is not the analogy between monad and the narrative substance under inspection. It is the 
analogy between the historian and God. The distinction is difficult to make, because monads, 
as points of view, are perfectly known by God. God can, figuratively, “jump from monad to 
monad” to see the universe from where he pleases, just as the reader of a realist novel can 
jump from the point of view to another between the characters in the novel. Points of view 
of characters in a realist novel are the pre-condition of objectivity that the reader achieves 
                                                     
340 Dummett, 6 – 7. Dummett says that in Frege’s Grundlagen the principle is given that terms only have 
meaning in the context of sentences. Sentences only have meaning in the contexts of their texts. Ironically, the 
idea is exactly the same in Ankersmit’s philosophy with the exception that texts are the fundamental pieces 
that are essentially meaningless. It is the relations of texts that is the context for Ankersmit. 
341 Garber, Daniel 2009: Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad. 
342 Whereas, as we should recall, Ankersmit’s case is that only the indivisible whole text Is analogous to 
Leibnizian substance.  
343 HR, 216.  
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about the universe of the novel. Similarly, the discipline of history, Ankersmit argues, can only 
achieve objectivity through perfectly subjective accounts of history. 
As was the case with Roth, Fairbrother’s suggestion that Ankersmit’s theory has no 
application then misses its point in the sense that Ankersmit’s purpose is only to facilitate 
debate in philosophy of history and in the discipline of history by providing a rigid definition 
for what history and historical writing are344. It is of course reasonable to question whether 
there are any benefits in thinking the way Ankersmit does. Clearly there are none in the level 
of historical writing itself. They may be found only in our debates concerning finished writings 
of history. It is here that Ankersmit acts as someone who tries to even the field and make 
philosophers of history recognise that their work is only possible in reflection to that of others. 
Or that objectivity is the result of subjective accounts reflecting one another. I believe he 
thinks that realising this would make philosophers of explore alternatives more readily. This 
suggestion is supported by Ankersmit’s lamentations over the dividedness of contemporary 
philosophy of history into specific schools of thought that he says have little meaningful 
communication between them345. Rational and honest philosophical debate between these 
paradigms is not taking place by his account. And what follows is that there is no real 
philosophy of history. He has also written about how “historical theorists also prefer to 
address each other instead of new and real problems”346. He is encouraging debate that goes 
beyond attempting to convince others of the superiority of one’s own view and encourages 
us to constantly seek new (and also find again, I suppose, forgotten) representations that fit 
our current needs. 
In PR, Ankersmit writes of the virtues of compromise in politics. I won’t go into a detailed 
elaboration of this here, but the basic point is that if we always seek consensus, we end up 
with these cliques that currently he thinks exist within the discipline philosophy of history. 
What should be striven for, is compromise. In compromise, we not only come to agreement 
on what is the best way of “seeing as” concerning a given topic, but this also leads to new 
                                                     
344 In Fairbrother 2018b the same reflection is given on p.403.  
345 In WEM, p. 3 – 4, he says: “Now, the state of affairs in contemporary philosophy of history is that causalists 
talk to causalists, hermeuticists to hermeneuticists and narrativists to narrativists. The preliminary question of 
who is right about historical knowledge and how it is expressed is thus abandoned for the subsidiary question 
of who stands strongest within each individual paradigm”. 
346 Ankersmit 2003, 433. 
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representations that none held formerly.347 Good debate is not about sticking inside the 
borders of one’s paradigm and arguing for its acceptance in a consensual manner. It’s about 
reading everyone’s representations and reflecting all of them to some genuine problem the 
human kind is facing. He want us to return to the “Golden Age of theory, when exciting and 
provocative theories were fired off in a breathtaking tempo and hotly discussed by everyone-
--“348. History is political and politics is historical for Ankersmit and this is how it should be. 
The ironic thing is that there has been little compromise in his own work, other than 
terminological shift and the more pronounced role of experience in work after NL, but this 
explained by his theory being intended to be the framework and condition for these 
compromises. Whether such debate is possible is a good question. 
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Conclusions 
 
F. R. Ankersmit’s philosophy of history features three distinct categories. Historical research 
is epistemological. It deals with historical theory and language and logic as they ordinarily are 
thought of in analytic philosophy. History-writing is the most prominent part of his work and 
it is explained in terms of representation and aesthetics. Finally, there is historical experience, 
which could be called the metaphysics of his system. The latter two categories have been 
Ankersmit’s focus all his career, while the first one is only referred to when establishing how 
the latter two are distinguished from it. Ankersmit has himself explained how a better general 
understanding of Leibniz’s philosophy would make his own work more approachable. 
I have here attempted to show how all these categories can in fact be explained in terms of 
Leibniz’s theory of substance. While historical research is potentially analogous to Leibniz’s 
ideas about corporeal substance, Ankersmit generally expresses little interest in it. Instead, 
his focus is on the idealistic metaphysics presented in Leibniz’s monadology. In this system 
the notion of substance is simple, unextended, and complete in the sense that it is an 
individual utterly independent of outside influence apart from God. On the other hand, 
substance in the monadology is defined as perception, sometimes conscious, as is the case 
with souls. This dichotomy is central for Ankersmit’s theory of historical representation as he 
argues that the main product of historiography, the historical narrative, is analogous to 
Leibniz’s substance. It is an indivisible individual and therefore requires to be thought of as a 
whole and evaluated in aesthetic terms instead of traditional analysis. On the other hand, 
with the theory of historical experience the status of the monad pure experience is central. 
These two aspects are for him two sides of the coin that is his philosophy of history. Finally, 
just as Leibniz’s discovery of the calculus had a profound effect on his metaphysics, so it is 
important in the application of Ankersmit’s representational logic. The notion is applied 
analogically in Ankersmit’s explanation of what the historian aims at in writing of history. It 
also explains how philosophers of history collectively may decide upon which representation 
of a given topic is best. 
In chapter I I presented Ankersmit as someone who ardently continues the tradition of 
historicism by transforming it in from a theory of historical ontology into one of historical 
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representation. He believes that in historicism only can we currently find the makings of true 
philosophy of history. What once was a philosophy about things in the past became in his 
hands a theory of how we see the things in the past, and thus collectively create historical 
reality based on our historical experience of it. From Ernst Cassirer and Dietrich Mahnke 
Ankermsit claims to inherit his interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics, in which the role of 
the monad is analogous to a function. Cassirer and his philosophy of symbolic forms provides 
useful insights in understanding the way Leibniz thinks. Like symbolic forms, Ankersmit’s 
historical representation, instructions for ways of ordering reality/the past. This connection, 
as well as Cassirer’s philosophy in general in respect to philosophy of history, should be an 
interest for future research.  
Leibniz’s intensional logic is present implicitly in Ankersmit’s acceptance of any logic as the 
basis of historical research and the logical level of statements, Leibniz’s characteristica 
universalis was essentially an envisioned complete intensional logic meant as a philosophical 
language of scholars to use for communication and discovery. Ankersmit would locate it in 
the domain of epistemology, as was the case with Frege’s logic. Ankersmit is committed to all 
historical theory as far as historical research is concerned. Were theory and language not 
applied, experience would be left formless and historiographical representations could not 
come to existence because there would be nothing to form them with. In terms of Leibniz’s 
theory of substance, corporeal substances may be thought of as analogous to texts as was 
seen to be the case in a logic where the meaning of a complex text may be thought of as a 
function of the meanings of lesser parts. But while intension and the Leibniz’s predicate-in-
subject -principle help define the text as a whole, the analogy drawn between narrative 
substance (representation) and the monad makes it indivisible, and thus unanalysable. 
Aesthetically the situation in the former paragraph is comparable to the situation that if there 
were no technique, painters could not create paintings. Or if any sort of musical notation had 
never been invented, we’d probably be in no position to enjoy the music of Ludwig van 
Beethoven. However, artists do not paint or create scores to showcase their technique (or at 
least we should hope they do not do this exclusively). Rather, they do these things to give 
form to their experience of things. But regardless of this, the only thing that remains to us is 
the musical notion or the painting and the same applies essentially to historiography. Once I 
finish writing these conclusions and upload it, this thesis will forever be regarded a 
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representation by Ankersmit’s standards (though logically speaking the text always existed 
already in the narrativist universe and I have simply individuated it). At the same time, 
however, it’s the experience that dictates the form of a representation. 
In chapter II I have attempted to explain first the notion of historical experience and then its 
relationship with historical representation. Ankersmit sees in self-identity the origin of 
historicism. We define ourselves through our personal histories. This, for him, gives the model 
for historiography. Further definition of experience interprets the monad as “experience 
without a subject of experience”349 and this gives him the opportunity to establish in sublime 
historical experience a connection between historical ontology and representation. They are 
two sides of the same coin, and Ankersmit describes it followingly: “Leibniz’s philosophy of 
representation offers the synthesis of uniqueness (i.e. of the monad’s point of view) with 
universality (i.e. what is seen from that point of view). This is how Leibniz ties together logic 
and metaphysics”350. In Ankersmit’s historical ontology pure experience is noumenal and 
representations are phenomenal. In historical representation the representations as 
meaningless signs are noumenal and any meanings about them is phenomenal. We 
experience the past in sublime historical experience under which a category such as 
temporality is meaningless. In historical experience we supposedly establish a connection 
with the past by realising the its distance from the present. Sublime historical experience is 
collective, and this explains why we have interest in the same topics in history and makes it 
possible. We share what we think is most meaningful about the past. Just think of the French 
Revolution. Though we are numerous generations removed from the event, it still carries 
immense meaning for our lives, through history. A prime example of a traumatic event that 
gives us the sublime in Ankersmit’s account. 
Since experience is given form by not only theory and language, but also “moods and 
feelings”, it is always subjective. Additionally, even though our ways of experiencing the past 
are only possible due to theory and language, experience is the more fundamental category. 
Experience gives us aspects of the past and how experience come about can be explained 
either epistemologically or representationally. The first approach is unsatisfactory, because 
of the qualitative aspect of experience itself. Representational meaning inherent in is 
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paradoxically a truly universal and objective account of meaning while epistemological 
meaning is not. This gets us to the point of historical representation and calculus. In chapter 
III I explored how the Leibnizian notion of calculus was applied in Ankersmit’s philosophy. I 
also provided an explanation for his interpretation of how Leibniz applied it in the formulation 
his metaphysics. Ankersmit draws another analogy to explain history-writing as 
representation. This time it was between Leibniz’s God and the historian. Both are beings that 
create and sustain things. God makes the monads into independent and free entities that he 
only continually maintains. That is the miracle in his philosophy. Leibniz’s perfect creator 
never needs to intervene in reality, once it is set into perfect harmony.351 Ankersmit’s 
historian is like God, but he’s not perfect. He only has a finite amount of representations at 
his disposal. Yet, both analogously apply the calculus in defining the meaning of a given 
representation. God can perfectly derive the meaning of any one thing. But this is impossible 
for the historian. There is no calculus of the humanities and therefore instead historians seek 
the “maxima” and “minima” of the figurative “functions” of historical topics though aesthetic 
means and this requires trial and error. The analogy between history-writing and calculus can 
thus do nothing more but define the act. It cannot advice the act. 
If we call back to mind the “representational universe” described in chapter III, we might say 
that God sees no difference between the representational universe and the actual one, when 
he locates something in the other, he does the same on the other, since he sees everything 
from everywhere. Alternatively, we can say that all knowledge is for God in Leibniz’s thinking 
analytical, while human beings need the notion of contingency due to their imperfect ability 
to reason. The historian can be said to have many points of view at his disposal concerning 
some topic, yet he is forced to evaluate new representations in relations to those known 
before and situate the representation into a “cluster” of proximate representations in the 
fictional representationalist universe. And the same is true of any representation. His own or 
someone else’s. He experiences something and this is the noumenal reality of the past for 
him. Thereafter he writes a text that best represents this aspect of the past. There is no reason 
to be baffled at whether it is the situating of the representations among others he does or 
turning his experience into a representation, because both these processes are the same, 
                                                     
351 Aho & Roinila, 358. The 13th point made in Leibniz’s third letter to Clarke explains how God’s limitless 
foresight ensures this.  
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described in different ways. Ankersmit’s aesthetic follows Nelson Goodman and Arthur Danto 
in that he understands history-writing as the act of substituting an aspect of the past in our 
experience with the representation, which is the text. Doing this well requires what I have 
described the “aesthetic intuition”. One need to be familiar with many other representations 
concerning a certain topic or collective historical experience in order to be able to make of it 
a representation that answers our collective questions about it. 
Beyond establishing these analogous connections between the philosophies of Leibniz and 
Ankersmit, the value of this paper is, hopefully that it can make help readers understand 
Ankersmit’s philosophy better and shed some light on the goals of Ankersmit’s work. 
Something many readers seem to miss. I now think of him as an analogy of Leibniz himself. 
Both these philosophers play the role of scholarly conciliators between different opposing 
schools of thought. Both seek to provide their respective disciplines with a fully coherent “first 
philosophy”, Leibniz with his idealistic metaphysics and Ankersmit with his logic of history, 
which begins neither with experience nor representation, but is best understood – I believe – 
as an interplay of both. The representations we create with various methods, are meaningless 
until we apply our own methods of interpretation on them and they give us experience. Yet 
experience in itself is noumenal, containing in it all the (epistemologically) inexplainable 
subjective and qualitative aspects that make life interesting and give it meaning, and it is in 
its terms of experience that we write history by representing it. 
Metaphorically speaking Ankersmit has never been a crusader that walks into the community 
of historians as a claimant to truth, attempting to gain followers. He is rather like a warden, 
standing outside this community, guarding it against such would-be crusaders352. His 
philosophy is meant for philosophy of history, where he hopes to inspire what he thinks is 
genuine debate as I described it at the end of chapter III. He has encouraged historians to 
adopt a more subjective stance in their writing. This is because he feels contemporary 
historiography lacks daring and has been reduced to feeble description without attempt to 
give the past meaning. I think he has a very good point here, as the days are long gone when 
political office holders turned to historians for advice. It’s quite rare that one hears about a 
                                                     
352 In a reply to his critics Ankersmit writes: “ I have an innate dislike of all fads, fashions and of what is 
pompously announced as the inescapable “new paradigm”; I always feel an irresistible urge to react to such 
vociferous claims with a cold-shouldering and sceptical ‘well, we’ll see about that’”. See Ankersmit 2018, 489 – 
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historian being turned to for advice by holders of political offices. Instead, experts on finance, 
and empirical science have a much stronger position here. Ankersmit has extended his 
philosophy to political representation as well, and this is a situation he would wish to reverse.  
For the individual historian Ankersmit’s philosophy can teach humility and respect towards 
the well-argued and factually valid opinions of others. Since representational logic defines 
objectivity in terms of relations between existing representations, it reminds the historian 
that any historical period or topic can never be thoroughly understood. Rather it is the case, 
that we understand the past in terms of our subjective experience of it, even while most of 
the established facts about the past remain the same. It should also remind us of the 
importance of looking at all the previously made suggestions of what a certain period of the 
past or historical subject of was like for its subjects. “Ankersmit’s Leibnizianism” is 
unsurprisingly one of those subjects that have not been explored enough and I occasionally 
felt there was little to reflect on during the process of writing. Hopefully in time this too will 
be remedied and the community of historians shall have a better idea about both Leibniz and 
Ankersmit and the relations of their philosophies.   
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[Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, 
but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also 
indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of 
a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates the omission of a brief passage 
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1. My topic here will be the monad, which is just a simple substance. By calling it ‘simple’ I 
mean that it has no parts, though it can be a part of something composite. 
2. There must be simple substances, because there are composites. A composite thing is just 
a collection of simple ones that happen to have come together. 
3. Something that has no parts can’t be extended, can’t have a shape, and can’t be split up. 
So monads are the true atoms of Nature—the elements out of which everything is made. 
4. We don’t have to fear that a monad might fall to pieces; there is no conceivable way it 
could •go out of existence naturally. 
5. For the same reason, there is no way for a simple substance to •come into existence 
naturally, for that would involve its being put together, assembled, composed, and a simple 
substance couldn’t be formed in that way because it has no parts. 
6. So we can say that the only way for monads to begin or end—to come into existence or go 
out of existence—is •instantaneously, being created or annihilated all at once. Composite 
things, in contrast with that, can begin or end •gradually, through the assembling or scattering 
of their parts. 
7. It doesn’t make sense to suppose that a monad might be altered or re-arranged internally 
by any other created thing. Within a monad there’s nothing to re-arrange, andthere is no 
conceivable internal motion in it that could be started, steered, sped up, or slowed down, as 
can happen in a composite thing that has parts that can change in relation to one another. 
[The passage from here to * is not by Leibniz. It makes explicit what was presumably at work 
in his mind when he made his remarkable jump.] That rules out every sort of influence that 
one might think a created thing might have on something else. (I stress ‘created’ because of 
course I don’t rule out God’s affecting a monad.) Some philosophers have held that one thing 
can affect another by sending an ‘accident’ across to it, understanding an accident to be an 
instance of a property as distinct from the thing that has the property. According to these 
philosophers, in addition to the •universal property heat and the •particular thing this poker 
there is a •particular property, an instance, an accident, namely the heat of this poker; and 
they hold that when the poker is plunged into cold water which then becomes warmer, the 
poker sends an accident—some of its particular heat—across to the water. Now, you might 
think that although a created thing can’t cause re-arrangements in a simple substance it might 
be able to affect it in a different way by sending an accident across to it. And because you 
might think this I should add that * monads have no windows through which anything could 
come in or go out! And ·anyway, quite apart from the imperviousness of monads to them, 
these supposed migrating accidents are philosophical rubbish·: accidents can’t detach 
themselves and stroll about outside of substances!. . . . So neither substance nor accident can 
come into a monad from outside. 
8. Monads, ·although they have no parts·, must have some qualities. There are two reasons 
why this must be so. (1) If they didn’t have qualities they wouldn’t be real things at all. (2) If 
they didn’t differ from one another in their qualities, there would be no detectable changes 
in the world ·of composite things·. Here is why. [Leibniz starts the next sentence ‘If monads 
had no qualities,’ but this is obviously a slip.] If monads all had the same qualities, they would 
be indistinguishable from one another (given that they don’t differ in any quantitative way, 
e.g. in size). That would make all composite things ·such as portions of matter· 
indistinguishable from one another also, because whatever is the case about a composite 
thing has to come from its simple ingredients. ·Even if every portion of matter were exactly 
like every other, there might still be variety in the material world through differences in 
patterns of distribution of portions of matter in empty space. I think there is no empty space—
the extended world is entirely full, a plenum·. So, assuming a plenum and no qualitative 
variety, any moving around of matter would only result in each place containing something 
exactly like what it had contained previously, so that one state of things would be 
indistinguishable from another. 
9. ·That shows that some monads must be qualitatively unlike some others; but now I go 
further·. Indeed, every monad must be qualitatively unlike every other. That is because in 
Nature no two things are perfectly alike; between any two things a difference can be found 
that is internal—i.e. based on what each is like in its own nature ·rather than merely on how 
they relate to other things, e.g. where they are in space·. 
11. From what I said in 7 it follows that natural changes in a monad—·ones that don’t come 
from divine intervention·— come from an internal force, since no external causes could ever 
influence its interior. 
12. But in addition to this ·general· force for change ·that is the same in all monads·, there 
must be the detailed nature of the ·individual· changing simple substance, this being what 
makes it belong to one species rather than another. 
14. The passing state that incorporates and represents a multitude within a unity—i.e. within 
the simple substance— is nothing but what we call •perception. This must be carefully 
distinguished from •awareness or consciousness, as will become clear in what follows. 
[‘Awareness’ here translates aperception. French had no noun for that job (nor did English), 
so Leibniz coined the aperception on the basis of the verb phrase s’apercevoir de, which 
meant and still means ‘to be aware of’.] In that the Cartesians failed badly, entirely 
discounting perceptions whose owners were not aware of them. That made them think that 
the only monads are minds, which led them to deny that animals have souls ·because those 
would be simple substances below the level of minds· . . . . Like the uneducated man in the 
street they confused a long stupor with death, ·whereas really a long period of 
unconsciousness is different from death· in the strict sense. This led them further into the 
Aristotelians’ wrong belief in souls that are entirely separated ·from any body·, as well as 
confirming misguided minds in the belief that souls are mortal. 
15. The action of the internal force that brings about change—brings the monad from one 
perception to another— can be called •appetition. Appetite cannot always get the whole way 
to the perception towards which it is tending, but it always gets some of the way, and reaches 
new perceptions— ·that is, new temporary states of the monad·. 
16. A simple substance that incorporates a multiplicity— that’s something we experience in 
ourselves. ·We are simple substances·, and we find that every perception we can be aware 
of—right down to the least of them—involves variety in its object; ·and a perception 
representing variety in the object that it is of must itself be variegated in some way·. Thus 
everyone who accepts that the soul is a simple substance should accept this multiplicity in the 
monad, and Bayle oughtn’t to have found any difficulty in it, as he did in the article ‘Rorarius’ 
in his Dictionary. 
17. It has to be acknowledged that •perception can’t be explained by mechanical principles, 
that is by shapes and motions, and thus that nothing that •depends on perception can be 
explained in that way either. ·Suppose this were wrong·. Imagine there were a machine whose 
structure produced thought, feeling, and perception; we can conceive of its being enlarged 
while maintaining the same relative proportions ·among its parts·, so that we could walk into 
it as we can walk into a mill. Suppose we do walk into it; all we would find there are cogs and 
levers and so on pushing one another, and never anything to account for a perception. So 
perception must be sought in simple substances, not in composite things like machines. And 
that is all that can be found in a simple substance—•perceptions and •changes in perceptions; 
and those changes are all that the internal actions of simple substances can consist in. 
18. [The word ‘entelechy’, used in this section, is a Greek label that Leibniz gives to monads, 
especially when he wants to emphasize the monad’s role as a source of power, energy, or the 
like. He connects it here with the monad’s ‘perfection’, apparently meaning this in the sense 
of completeness, self-sufficiency, causal power. In 62 he will connect ‘entelechy’ with the 
monad’s central role in the life of a body of which it is the soul.] We could give the name 
‘entelechy’ to all simple substances or created monads, because they have within them a 
certain perfection. . . .; there is a kind of self-sufficiency which makes them sources of their 
own internal actions—makes them immaterial automata, as it were. 
38. That is why the ultimate reason for things must be in a •necessary substance which we 
call ‘God’. The details of all the ·contingent· changes are contained in him only eminently, as 
in their source. [To say that x contains a property ‘only eminently’ is to say that x doesn’t 
literally have that property, but does have the resources to cause things to have it. For 
example, God is not politically astute, but he contains political astuteness eminently.] 
47. Thus God alone is the basic unitary thing, the original simple substance. All created or 
derivative monads are produced by him. They are generated by the continual flashes of silent 
lightning (so to speak) that God gives off from moment to moment—flashes that are limited 
·in what they can give only· by the essential limits on what the created things can take in. 
51. How can the states of monad x explain the states of monad y? Not by x’s having a •real 
influence on y, for that is impossible. All that x has with respect to y is an •ideal influence, 
which works through the intervention of God. When God is setting things up at the outset, 
monad x reasonably demands, in God’s mind, that God take account of x in designing y. That 
is how x’s states explain y’s: it has nothing to do with real causal influence of x over y, which 
is something a created monad could never exert. 
57. And just as the same town when seen from different sides will seem quite different—as 
though it were multiplied perspectivally—the same thing happens here: because of the 
infinite multitude of simple substances it’s as though there were that many different 
universes; but they are all perspectives on the same one, differing according to the different 
points of view of the monads. 
58. And that is the way to get the greatest possible •variety, but with all the •order there 
could be; i.e. it is the way to get as much perfection as there could be. 
61. And in this respect composite things are analogous to simple ones. ·In the world of 
composites, the world of matter·, everything is full, which means that all matter is interlinked. 
·If there were empty space, a body might move in it without affecting any other body; but 
that is not how things stand·. In a plenum [= ‘world that is full’], any movement must have an 
effect on distant bodies, the greater the distance the smaller the effect, ·but always some 
effect. Here is why·. Each body is affected by •the bodies that touch it, and feels some effects 
of everything that happens to •them; but also through •them it also feels the effects of all 
the bodies that touch •them, and so on, so that such communication extends indefinitely. As 
a result, each body feels the effects of everything that happens in the universe, so that he 
who sees everything could read off from each body what is happening everywhere; and, 
indeed, because he could see in its present state what is distant both in space and in time, he 
could read also what has happened and what will happen. . . . But a soul can read within itself 
only what is represented there distinctly; it could never bring out all at once everything that 
is folded into it, because its folds go on to infinity. 
 
